CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00341/1

O ?? ?
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2977
INFO BONN/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 00341

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 1/8/88 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: INTERMEDIARY SEES BAKHTIAR AND GOES TO MEET KHOMEINI

SUMMARY: OPTIMISTIC INTERMEDIARY IS ON HIS WAY TO TRY REASONING WITH KHOMEINI, AFTER HAVING AN INTERESTING EXCHANGE WITH [illegible] P.M. BAKHTIAR WHICH ILLUSTRATES THE WEAKNESS OF BAKHTIAR'S NEW GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY

1. [illegible] CONSPIRATOR IN THE CAUSE OF SWEET, PATRIOTIC REASON, [illegible] ROYAL, OLD TIME NEWSPAPER EDITOR AND LONGTIME [illegible] AND HIS GOOD CONNECTIONS IN FRANCE, IS FLYING TODAY, [illegible], TO SEE KHOMEINI. HE MAY HOPE TO DESCRIBE THE [illegible] SITUATION AS SEEN DEVELOPING IN IRAN TO KHOMEINI, [illegible] OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN A FEW [illegible]. HE WILL FIND KHOMEINI TO BE LESS OBSTINATE AND [illegible] THAN HE HAS BEEN LEADERS "ON VACATION." THERE [illegible] FIND "VERY THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO," WITH A PECUNCY [illegible] CHAOS, NO WAY TO SETTLE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION [illegible] SECRET REFERENDUM, THINK OF THE LONG TERM FUTURE OF [illegible] BROS. HE WILL ADVISE AGAINST A HURRY-UP REFERENDUM [illegible] ROBE OF KHOMEINI'S CURRENT PROGRAM.

2. [illegible] IS NOT [illegible] CURRENT AND IS RELYING ON HIS [illegible] DISMISS [illegible] BAKHTIAR BY HIS INFLUENCE. [illegible] THINKS SANJABI OR BAZARGAN [illegible] FOR INTERVIEW IN PARIS. KHOMEINI [illegible] THE FACT TO PRESS THE OLD MAN WITH PREVIOUS [illegible] ARRANGEMENTS. [illegible] SAYS HE HAS AN [illegible] THAT KHOMEINI [illegible] HIM [illegible] ALONE. [illegible] IS VERY WELL [illegible] RETINUE (I.E., YAZDI [illegible] ADDED.

3. [illegible] BAKHTIAR MENTIONED TO [illegible] THAT HE [illegible] THAT:

-- A. AC [illegible] HAVE [illegible] PRINT [illegible] [illegible] MEET TO DISCUSS [illegible] EDITORS AND WORK [illegible] [illegible] ATTENTION. [illegible] ATTENTION BY SAID NOTHING [illegible] [illegible] BE [illegible] BY A CANNED BY MILITARY COURT, [illegible] [illegible] EDITORS, TEHRAN 342.1

-- [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] AND [illegible] REQUESTED PERMISSION [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

OF POLICE, GENDARMERIE, ETC. SO AS TO CENTRALIZE IN HIM THE CONTROL OF LAW AND ORDER FORCES. BAKHTIAR WAS INTERESTED WHEN IQBAL REMINDED HIM THAT ON ONE OF HIS VACATION TRIPS OFF ON THE COUNTRY (WHILE JAM WAS CHIEF OF SUPREME COMMANDER'S STAFF) SHAH HAD APPOINTED JAM "ASSISTANT SUPREME COMMANDER," TO ACT IN SHAH'S STEAD. THIS WAS A USEFUL PRECEDENT. (JAM ARRIVED IN TEHRAN MORNING JAN 7 AND HAD AUDIENCE WITH SHAH THAT AFTERNOON.)

-- E. BAKHTIAR HAS GIVEN ARMY AND POLICE ORDERS NOT TO INTERFERE WITH PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATIONS. IF DEMONSTRATIONS ARE NOT PEACEFUL THEY ARE TO USE TEARGAS, WATER CANNON, SHOOT INTO THE AIR, BUT NOT SHOOT AT DEMONSTRATORS BEFORE GETTING PERMISSION FROM BAKHTIAR PERSONALLY.

F. IQBAL SUGGESTED TO BAKHTIAR THAT:

-- A. NO ONE IS SUPPORTING HIM AMONG THE OPPOSITION, BUT IF HE DOES SOME GOOD THINGS HE MIGHT START TO GET SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. BAKHTIAR SAID HE WOULD DO A VERY GREAT DEAL IF PEOPLE WOULD JUST ALLOW HIM 2 1/2 MONTHS. (COMMENT: IQBAL AGREED THAT WAS ALMOST LIKE ASKING FOR THE MOON IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.)

-- B. BAKHTIAR SHOULD GET SHAH TO RETURN HIS PROPERTIES, AND THOSE OF HIS FAMILY, TO THE NATION. BAKHTIAR REPLIED HE HAD DISCUSSED SOME SUCH STEP WITH THE SHAH.

-- C. MAJORITY OF REGENCY COUNCIL SHOULD HAVE WELL KNOWN NATIONAL FIGURES, TO MAKE UP FOR THEIR DEARTH ON BAKHTIAR'S CABINET. IQBAL TOLD BAKHTIAR THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, HIS NEW MINISTER OF EDUCATION WAS SAVAK AGENT IN CHARGE OF STUDENTS IN IRANIAN EMBASSY IN ANKARA WHEN KHOMEINI WAS JUST EXILED THERE IN 1963-64 AND IT BECAME HIS JOB TO KEEP KHOMEINI UNDER SURVEILLANCE. BAKHTIAR REPLIED HE WAS UNAWARE OF THIS AND WOULD INVESTIGATE. (SEE ALSO DEBA'HSHESH'S CHARGE AGAINST SAME MINISTER, THAT HE WAS ACTIVE WITH SAVAK, TEHRAN 295.)

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CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS TEHRAN 00341

O 090942Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2778
INFO RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3589
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00341

LIMDIS

D. BAKHTIAR SHOULD CHANGE IRANIAN NATIONAL ANTHEM FROM ITS PRESENT PAEAN TO PAHLAVIS TOWARD SOMETHING MORE FIGHTING AND NATIONALIST, LIKE THE MARSEILLAISE.

E. BAKHTIAR SHOULD GET GOOD MEN TO HELP WITH HIS SPEECH WRITING AND RADIO/TV APPEARANCES. (HE RECOMMENDED SEPEHR OF "THE DIPLOMAT" AND RETIRED "ETELAAT" EDITOR KEYVANI.)

F. BAKHTIAR SHOULD CONTACT THE SOVIETS TO HELP TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF HIMSELF. BAKHTIAR READILY AGREED THAT THE SHAH HAD UNNECESSARILY SPOILED RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS. ONE COULD KEEP GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS TOO. (COMMENT: THIS LAST WAS THE ONLY POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PIECE OF ADVICE WE COULD DETECT IN WHAT EQBAL TOLD BAKHTIAR.)

5. WHILE EQBAL WAS THERE, IN COMPANY OF SAVAK CHIEF MOGHADAM, TOP POLICE OFFICIALS, AND OTHERS, THE SHAH CALLED MOGHADAM ON THE TELEPHONE TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE TENOR OF THE PRESS, PARTICUARLY THE OPPOSITIONIST CONTENT OF KAYHAN AND ETELAAT, WHICH HAD JUST REAPPEARED. MOGHADAM HAD TO ADMIT THAT A PROJECT TO IMPROVE THE GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF PUBLIC INFORMATION WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED AND APPROVED UNDER SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT A FEW MONTHS AGO HAD NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

6. FINALLY, PRESENCE OF GARABAGHI WAS DUE TO CALL FOR HELP ISSUED TO ARMY BY GENDARMERIE BECAUSE THEY WERE UNDER ATTACK BY ARMED KURDS IN THE TOWN OF BANEH IN KURDISTAN SINCE EARLY MORNING JAN 6.

7. COMMENT: THE LIFE OF A NEW PRIME MINISTER IS NOT AN EASY ONE. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER INTERMEDIARY, BAKHTIAR WAS ON THE TELEPHONE TO DR. BEJAZI MORNING JAN 7, PLEADING FOR SUPPORT FROM THE RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN THE COUNTRY. WE HAVE NOW HAD THREE SEPARATE REPORTS, HOWEVER, EMINATING WITH SPECIFICS DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS CHOSEN BY BAKHTIAR FOR HIS CABINET. EQBAL AND BERAKHSHESH AGREED ON THE MINISTER OF EDUCATION BEING SAVAK. EQBAL'S NEPHEW (WHO WORKS SEPARATELY) TOLD POL COUNSELOR EVENING DEC 7 THAT HE PERSONALLY KNEW TWO OTHER MINISTERS WHO WERE NOT CLEAN IN THEIR BACKGROUNDS. ONE WAS ABBAS GHALI BAKHTIAR (INDUSTRY AND MINES), THE OTHER JAVAD KHADEM (HOUSING AND URBAN PLANNING), WHO HAD BEEN EMPLOYEE OF HIS FOR A TIME. WITH ACCUSATIONS OF THAT SORT ALREADY COMING FROM PEOPLE (LIKE THE TWO EQBALS) WHO PROFESS TO SUPPORT BAKHTIAR, ONE CAN HARDLY EVEN IMAGINE HOW HIS OPPOSITION WILL HIT HIM [illegible] SHORTLY.

3. FOREGOING HAD BEEN TYPED BEFORE WE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF JAM'S REFUSAL TO JOING BAKHTIAR CAST (SEPTEL FOLLOWS).
SULLIVAN
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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-240-483

C O N F I D E N T I A L/EXDIS

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2775
INFO
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 03340

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: RDS 1/3/85 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE P.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: JAM REFUSES JOIN BAKHTIAR GOVT

1. INTERMEDIARY NOBAR CONFIRMED TO POL COUNSELOR MORRIS JAM'S THAT GENERAL JAM HAS REFUSED TO JOIN BAKHTIAR GOVT AND WILL RETURN TO LONDON AS SOON AS HE GETS A SEAT ON A PLANE.

2. JAM WAS IN AUDIENCE WITH SHAH UNTIL MIDNIGHT. SHAH EXPRESSED HIS OWN WORRIES ABOUT LEAVING THE COUNTRY IN TERMS OF A POSSIBLE MOVE BY ARMY OFFICERS. JAM HAS DECIDED BAKHTIAR GOVT IS HOPELESS PROPOSITION, AND HE CANNOT GO CONTRARY TO KHOMEINI'S WISHES. HE HAD TOLD NOBAR HE WOULD ACCEPT THAT POSITION (MINISTER OF WAR) IF KHOMEINI ASKED HIM TO TAKE IT.

3. IN LIGHT THIS IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT NOBAR HAS REVISED HIS EXPECTATIONS FROM TRIP TO SEE KHOMEINI. HE MERELY HOPES TO GET SOME IDEA OF KHOMEINI'S STRATEGY AND PERHAPS BE HELPFUL TO JAM.

4. COMMENT: EMBOFF REPORTS BAZARGAN (LMI) STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH BAKHTIAR GOVT ONLY FOR A FEW DAYS, TO SEE IF HE CAN GET SHAH TO LEAVE. IF SHAH LEAVES, PLAN IS FOR KHOMEINI TO RETURN IN TRIUMPH. WE NOTE KHOMEINI IS MAKING CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS ABOUT THE ARMY FROM PARIS. ALL THIS SUGGESTS HE IS GETTING READY TO RETURN -- IF SHAH DEPARTS -- AND MAKE THE DEPARTURE PERMANENT. IF SHAH SHOULD DECIDE AT LAST MINUTE NOT TO GO, ANY STRUGGLE PRESUMABLY WILL CONTINUE, WITH BAKHTIAR BEING BROUGHT TUMBLING DOWN AS THE FIRST STEP. STULLIVAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L/EXDIS TEHRAN 03340

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C 291348Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2861
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00430

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-8-85 (ESCUDERO, S.T.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN QAZVIN

ORIGIN: STATE 1/0/79
ACTION: DOM:CKAAS
INFO: PCL:STESCUDERO
CLEAR: POL:DLAGUPARIS
DISTR: POL-2 AMB DCM
PM POCH-2 ICA
OR AID CT IAC
AFOSI CHRON/15

1. SUMMARY: EMBOFF VISITED QAZVIN, TWO HOURS DRIVE FROM TEHRAN, JANUARY 8, IN COMPANY WITH NATIONAL FRONT (NAT) ACTIVIST SHAMS-UD-DIN SADR. EMBOFF ATTENDED MOURNING CEREMONIES IN LOCAL MOSQUE, AS WELL AS MASSIVE PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION, AND GOT FIRST-HAND LOOK AT RESULTS OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN QAZVIN IN PAST TWO WEEKS. SITUATION WAS NOT BY NOT AS BAD AS DESCRIBED BY TEHRAN RUMOR MILL PUT, WITH 198 CONFIRMED DEAD, UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF WOUNDED AND SEVERAL SHOPS, HOMES, AND ONE HOTEL LOOTED AND BURNED, THINGS ARE BAD ENOUGH. THE INTENSE FEELING OF HATRED WHICH EMBOFF FOUND IN MASHAD DOES NOT SEEM TO BE AS STRONG IN QAZVIN BUT THE PEOPLE EVINCED NO GLIMMER OF SUPPORT FOR THE SHAH, BAKHTIAR, OR ANYONE ELSE EXCEPT KHOMEINI. END SUMMARY.

2. TRAVELLING WITH NATIONAL FRONT MILITANT DR. SHAMS-UD-DIN SADR, HIS BROTHER, DR. AHMAD SADR KHASE-JAVADI, (MEMBERS OF AN OLD AND POWERFUL QAZVIN FAMILY) AND LESSER NATIONAL FRONTER DR. (ENG) KHAVARI, EMBOFF VISITED QAZVIN JANUARY 8. PURPOSE WAS TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS FOLLOWING OUTBREAKS OF SERIOUS VIOLENCE WHICH TEHRAN RUMOR MONGERS WERE LIKENING TO SAVAGERY IN MASHAD. UPON ARRIVAL EMBOFF WENT DIRECTLY TO 800 YEAR OLD SAFAVID MOSQUE TO HEAR A SERIES OF SERMONS, MULLAHS, AND ONE MUJTAHED WHIPPING UP CROWD OF SEVERAL THOUSAND BOTH INSIDE MOSQUE AND IN COURTYARD IN PREPARATION FOR DEMONSTRATION COMMEMORATING KHOMEINI'S DAY OF MOURNING. MOST INTERESTING STATEMENT WAS THAT DELIVERED BY AHMAD SADR KHASE-JAVADI, WHO IS ONE OF MOST SKILLED FARSI ORATORS EMBOFF HAS EVER HEARD. WHEN INTRODUCED, NOT BY NAME BUT MERELY AS A REPORTER FROM TEHRAN, SADR WAS GREETED BY SCATTERED CRIES OF "SAVAK AGENT". YES WITHIN MOMENTS THE CROWD WAS HIS. HE PUSHED THEM ONE WAY, AND THEN ANOTHER, AND BY THE TIME HE DESCRIBED A SCENE WHERE THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF NAJAFABAD (NEAR ISFAHAN) FIRED HIS PISTOL INTO THE AIR TO DRIVE AWAY A CROWD OF POTENTIAL BLOOD DONORS SEEKING TO HELP THOSE WOUNDED IN LOCAL CLASHES, HALF THE AUDIENCE WAS OPENLY WEEPING. DESPITE THEIR EMOTIONAL STATE, AUDIENCE NOTED AND LATER OBSERVED INSTRUCTIONS DELIVERED BY MUJTAHED WHICH FORBADE WINDOW BREAKING, BURNING, AND THROWING ROCKS AT OR OTHERWISE HARRASSING SOLDIERS DURING DEMONSTRATION.

3. DEMONSTRATION MOVED DIRECTLY OUT OF MOSQUE AND INTO STREET WHERE MARCHERS WERE JOINED BY OTHERS. EMBOFF WAS USHERED TO PLACE OF HONOR IMMEDIATELY BEHIND PHALANX OF MULLAHS, FLAGS, BANNERS, PICTURES OF KHOMEINI AND MARTYRED QAZVINIS, ETC., WHICH LED THE PARADE. GIVEN

PROMINENT LOCATION AND LARGE NUMBERS OF FRENETIC DEMONSTRATORS, IT COULD HAVE BEEN PAINFULLY AWKWARD TO EMBOFF TO TAKE PART AND EMBOFF OPTED FOR ROLE OF NON-PARTICIPATING MARCHER FOR SEVERAL BLOCKS, UNTIL COMFORTABLE OPPORTUNITY TO SLIP AWAY PRESENTED ITSELF. LIKE TASSUA/ASHURA MARCHES IN TEHRAN, QAZVIN DEMO WAS TIGHTLY ORGANIZED. SOME 15,000 PEOPLE (BBC REPORTER DAVID LANE WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT ESTIMATES 50,000 BUT THIS IS ABSURD) WERE ORGANIZED IN CHANTING BATTALIONS OF ABOUT 500 EACH, SEPARATED FROM ONE ANOTHER BY LINES OF BANNER-CARRIERS WHO KEPT A CONSTANT DISTANCE FROM GROUP IN FRONT OF THEM. PROCESSION ALSO INCLUDED A CHADORED WOMEN'S CONTINGENT OF ABOUT 200. (COMMENT: PRESENCE OF SO MANY WOMEN IS STRONG INDICATION OF DEPTH OF ANTI-SHAH FEELINGS IN QAZVIN, WHERE WOMEN RARELY LEAVE THEIR HOMES FOR ANY PURPOSE. END COMMENT.) YOUTHFUL MONITORS WITH RED ARMBANDS MAINTAINED MARCHING CLIPP AND KEPT CROWD FROM PASSING TOO CLOSE TO POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS, SUCH AS GATE TO MILITARY CANTONMENT, BY FORMING HUMAN CHAIN AROUND ENTRYWAY. DEMONSTRATION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY PEACEFUL: EMBOFF SAW NO VIOLENCE, HEARD NO SHOTS OR ANY RUMORS OF TROUBLE CONNECTED WITH THE PROCESSION.

4. EARLIER PROCESSIONS HAD NOT BEEN SO LUCKY. ON DEC 27, SOME 300 MARCHERS WERE ALLEGEDLY FIRED ON WHEN PASSING GENDARMERIE STATION BY A GENDARME SERGEANT NAMED ZANJANI. THREE MEN WERE KILLED. LATER THAT SAME EVENING SIX PEOPLE FELL AFOUL OF SAME GENDARME (NOT CLEAR HOW THEY DID SO) AND THREE WERE KILLED OUTRIGHT, ONE DIED OF WOUNDS, ONE WAS SHOT IN FOOT AND REMAINING YOUTH GOT AWAY TO SPREAD THE WORD. PEOPLE ERUPTED INTO THE STREETS ON DEC 28 AND 96 MORE WERE SLAIN.

5. ON NIGHT OF JANUARY 1-2 MULLAHS CONDUCTED A SIT-IN AT ONE OF LOCAL HOSPITALS ON BEHALF OF FAMILIES OF THE DEAD, WHO HAD BEEN PREVENTED FROM TAKING CUSTODY OF THE BODIES OF THEIR RELATIVES FOR BURIAL. BY MORNING A LARGE CROWD, ESTIMATED AT 40,000-50,000 BY HOSPITAL DOCTORS,
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2832
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00430

HAD GATHERED IN SUPPORT. MEANWHILE, MILITARY HAD BEEN REINFORCED WITH 700-MAN CONTINGENT FROM ZANJAN. SOLDIERS ATTACKED AND DISPERSED CROWD AND IN ENSUING VICIENCE ON JANUARY 2-3, DURING WHICH MILITARY EVIDENTLY GOT OUT OF CONTROL, AT LEAST 83 MORE PEOPLE WERE KILLED. ONE GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS WAS FIRED UPON BY SOLDIERS AS THEY EMERGED FROM BAZAAR AND REPORTEDLY SUFFERED 32 DEAD. (COMMENT: EMBOFF OBSERVED MANY BULLET HOLES IN WALLS AND DOORS AT THAT POINT, RANGING FROM KNEE HEIGHT TO WELL ABOVE HEAD LEVEL. BAZAAR, LIKE EVERYTHING ELSE IN TOWN, WAS CLOSED FOR DAY OF MOURNING SO IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO VERIFY ACCOUNTS OF INCIDENT BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT FIRE DIRECTED AGAINST A CROWD IN THAT CONSTRICTED SPACE WOULD HAVE INFLICTED MANY CASUALTIES. END COMMENT.)

6. MILITARY ALLEGEDLY LOOTED AND THEN BURNED SEVERAL SHOPS. EMBOFF VISITED ONE BURNED-OUT SHOP WHERE SAFE HAD BEEN RIPPED OPEN LIKE SARDINE CAN. NEWEST AND LARGEST HOTEL IN QAZVIN, THE PASSAGE HOTEL, WHICH HAD CONTAINED 45 ROOMS AND 48 SHOPS, WAS COMPLETELY GUTTED AT A LOSS TO ITS PRO-KHOMEINI OWNER, ALI ZAHEDI, OF 35 MILLION TOMAN (ABOUT $5 MILLION). MILITARY ALSO ALLEGEDLY DROVE TANKS INTO FRONTS OF SEVERAL DRUGSTORES, LOOTED DRUGS, AND THEN BURNED THEM. SEVERAL DOCTORS HAVE COME FROM TEHRAN AND OTHER CITIES TO OFFER THEIR SERVICES IN HOSPITALS TO THE WOUNDED. OTHER LOCAL DOCTORS ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD TREAT THE WOUNDED FREE OF CHARGE. THE HOMES OF TWO SUCH DOCTORS WERE ATTACKED AND BURNED BY SOLDIERS. EMBOFF VISITED BURNED OUT HOME OF ONE OF THESE, A DR. (FNU) DAFTARI. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS CALLED FOR OTHER CITIES TO SEND FOOD AND OTHER ARTICLES OF ASSISTANCE TO QAZVIN BUT MILITARY HAS REPORTEDLY SEIZED THREE TRUCKLOADS OF SUCH SUPPLIES. OVER 700 AUTOMOBILES WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN BURNED. THERE ARE UNCONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE MILITARY HAULED OFF MANY DEAD AND WOUNDED, SOME OF WHOM WERE BURIED ALIVE IN A COMMON GRAVE AT A PLACE OUTSIDE OF QAZVIN CALLED AB-GILAKI.

7. COMMENT: ATMOSPHERE IN QAZVIN IS TENSE, BUT IN NO WAY COMPARABLE TO THE AIR OF UNMITIGATED VICIOUSNESS WHICH PERMEATED MASHAD DURING EMBOFF'S VISIT AND THEREAFTER. RUMOR MILL HAS, AS USUAL, EXAGGERATED THE INCIDENTS IN QAZVIN. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH TWO CHILDREN WERE APPARENTLY INJURED WHEN STRUCK BY MILITARY VEHICLE, IT IS NOT RPT NOT TRUE THAT DEMONSTRATORS IN QAZVIN WERE CRUSHED UNDER TANKS OR THAT TANKS WERE USED TO CRUSH HOMES OF OPPOSITION ACTIVISTS. EFFECT OF CLASHES HAS BEEN TO FURTHER SOLIDIFY OPPOSITION OF QAZVINIS TO ANYTHING THE SHAH MIGHT DO. EMBOFF WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANYONE IN TOWN WHO HAD A GOOD WORD FOR EITHER THE SHAH OR BAKHTIAR. GENERAL POPULAR VIEW WAS PERHAPS BEST EX-

PRESSED BY FORMER HOTELIER ZAREDI WHO ARGUED THAT THE PEOPLE WOULD SUPPORT WHOEVER KHOMEINI WANTS AS PRIME MINISTER AND NO ONE ELSE. MANY QAZVINIS POINT TO SIMILAR DEPREDATIONS BY MILITARY IN MASHAD AND NAJAFABAD AND SUGGEST, IN TIME-HONORED PERSIAN FASHION, THAT MILITARY ACTIONS WERE COORDINATED AS PARTS OF SOME GREATER ARMY PLOT. DEPARTMENT SHOULD NOTE THAT, WHILE NUMBERS OF DEAD ARE CONFIRMED FROM HOSPITAL RECORDS, SOURCES OF REMAINDER OF ABOVE INFORMATION ARE NOT NEUTRAL. NO ONE IS NEUTRAL IN QAZVIN. HOWEVER, SO MANY DIFFERENT PEOPLE TOLD ESSENTIALLY THE SAME STORY THAT EMBOFF IS REASONABLY CERTAIN OF THE FACTS. EMBOFF DID NOT CONTACT MILITARY, WHOSE STORY IS THAT ONLY 12 PEOPLE WERE KILLED IN CLASHES PROVOKED BY ASSAULT BY TOWNSPEOPLE ON SOLDIERS. DOCTORS INSIST THAT NO SOLDIER HAS BEEN INJURED IN QAZVIN SINCE DECEMBER 3, WHEN ONE WAS STABBED BUT SURVIVED FOLLOWING AN OPERATION.

8. MORE COMMENT: ORGANIZATION AND PEACEFUL NATURE OF DEMONSTRATION WERE IMPRESSIVE, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF RECENT EVENTS. WHILE THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ISLAMIC AND OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS MAY NO LONGER HAVE FULL CONTROL OF SOME ELEMENTS OF THE MOB IN TEHRAN, THIS IS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE IN QAZVIN. SULLIVAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 04

O 291337Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2830
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0426

CHRGE: STATE 1/9/79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL/MIL:MLGREEN
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: PM-3 AMB DCM
POL2 EC2 DAO IC
OR MAAG CHRON/1

E.O. 12065: GDS 1-9-85 (GREENE, M.L.) OR-G
TAGS: MASS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR'S VIEWS ON MILITARY SALES AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

DEF 19-8

1. TWO REPORTERS HAVE TOLD US IN CONFIDENCE OF VIEWS GIVEN TO THEM BY PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE BAKHTIAR AND HIS IMMEDIATE OFFICE.

2. ACCORDING TO FIRST REPORTER, BAKHTIAR WILL ANNOUNCE THAT HE PLANS TO REVIEW, IN LIGHT OF FUNDS AVAILABLE, FOLLOWING: TOTAL OF 12 BILLION DOLLARS OF US FMS PURCHASES NOW IN PIPELINE; TOTAL OF 10 BILLION DOLLARS FROM UK NOW IN PIPELINE; 200 AIRCRAFT FROM US; "FLYING RADAR PLANES"; AND SIX WEST GERMAN SHIPS.

3. ALONG SIMILAR LINES BUT LESS SPECIFICALLY, BAKHTIAR HAS TOLD ANOTHER REPORTER THAT HE WILL HAVE REVIEW OF FOREIGN MILITARY SALES IN LIGHT OF (A) MONEY AVAILABLE AND (B) MILITARY NEEDS. IN THAT PROCESS BAKHTIAR SAID HE WOULD RESPECT CONTRACTS ALREADY SIGNED UNLESS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO INTERESTS OF IRAN. HE SAID HE HAD ASKED MINISTER OF FINANCE TO PREPARE LIST OF WHAT IRAN COULD AFFORD. BAKHTIAR COMMENTED THAT FOREIGN WORKERS WHO ARE RECEIVING HUGE SALARIES AND DOING NOTHING WILL HAVE TO GO.

4. FINALLY, HE SAID IRAN WOULD NEVER AGAIN BE POLICEMAN OF THE PERSIAN GULF, BUT CASH AND CARRY PURCHASES FROM THE US WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE IF THE US APPROVED.
SULLIVAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0426

S E C R E T/E X D I S

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC WIACT IMMEDIATE 0224

EXDIS

S E C R E T TEHRAN 10421

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-2-09 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR ON PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION

SUMMARY: BAKHTIAR WILL PRESENT HIS GOVERNMENT TO MAJLES JAN 11 AND TO SENATE JAN 13. SHAH WILL PROBABLY WAIT UNTIL CONFIDENCE VOTE TO LEAVE IRAN. HE EXPECTS UP TO 30 DEPUTIES TO SPEAK AGAINST GOVERNMENT. ACCORDING TO BAKHTIAR, EFFORTS STILL BEING MADE TO GET GEN. JAM TO JOIN GOVERNMENT. BAKHTIAR WILL DISCUSS REGENCY COUNCIL WITH SHAH THIS AFTERNOON JAN 9. ISFAHAN WILL BE NEXT CITY TO GO OUT OF MARTIAL LAW. END SUMMARY

1. PRIME MINISTER RECEIVED POLISH STEMPEL FOR BRIEF CALL JAN 9 AND SAID HE WILL BE PRESENTING HIS GOVERNMENT TO MAJLES JAN 11. TO SPEED UP APPROVAL PROCESS, PM WILL PRESENT NEW GOVERNMENT AND PROGRAM TO SENATE MORNING JAN 13, THEN RETURN TO MAJLES FOR DEBATE. HE SAID NUMBER OF DEPUTIES, PERHAPS 30, WISHED TO SPEAK AGAINST GOVERNMENT; "NOW THEY ALL WANT TO SHOW HOW PATRIOTIC THEY ARE." IN REPLY TO QUESTION, HE EXPECTED FINAL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE NEAR END OF NEXT IRANIAN WEEK, EITHER JAN 15 OR 17. (WE UNDERSTAND FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT PM HAS FACED MUCH HIGHER SLEDDING THAN EXPECTED.)

2. BAKHTIAR SAID SHAH WILL PROBABLY WAIT UNTIL VOTE OF CONFIDENCE TO LEAVE COUNTRY, BUT WOULD DO SO "VERY QUICKLY THEREAFTER." (SOME QUARTERS BELIEVE SHAH MAY DEPART AFTER GOVERNMENT IS PRESENTED TO BOTH MAJLES AND SENATE. SITUATION SEEMS VERY FLUID AT THE MOMENT.)

3. PRIME MINISTER SAID EFFORTS ARE STILL BEING MADE TO GET GEN. JAM TO JOIN THE CABINET, AND PRESSURE IS BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR. NEVERTHELESS, BAKHTIAR SAYS HE HAS OTHER CANDIDATES READY IF NECESSARY. HE PREFERRED NOT TO NAME HIM AT THIS TIME. (SPEAK LATER AND HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT JAM WAS DEFINITELY OUT.)

SECRET

PAGE 03 TYPRAN 03421 S E C R E T/E X D I S

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. NATHANSON IS EAGER TO GET HIS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT GOING, AND ASKED HOW HE COULD GET CLEARANCE TO REACTIVATE TWO OLD CORPORATIONS, LATIN AMERICAN TRADE CENTER (NON-PROFIT) AND PAN AMERICAN CLEARING CORP (PROFIT). EMBOFF STRESSED AGAIN THAT EMBASSY WILL NOT BECOME EVEN INDIRECTLY INVOLVED. NATHANSON AGREED (COMMENT: HE ALWAYS AGREES BUT KEEPS COMING BACK FOR MORE "COORDINATION" AND SAID HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO ACT DIRECTLY WITH USG IN WASHINGTON. EMBOFF OFFERED NO ADVICE ON LEGALITY OF MOVING NATHANSON'S OLD CORPORATIONS TO IRAN BUT AGREED TO PUT HIM IN CONTACT WITH ECONOMIC SECTION IF HE WISHED ADVICE ON OPENING NEW PRIVATE BUSINESS. HE WILL CONTACT EMB [illegible] HE

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CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] PROBLEM TO ROI.

. COMMENT: NATHANSON IS A TRIPLE ECCENTRIC BUT NO FOOL. HE IS ALSO NOT A BLOWHARD, AND IF HE RECEIVES A FAVORABLE DESCRIPTION ON THE IRANIAN SIDE, HE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PRO-CEED WITH SCHEME TO FOSTER QUICK-ACTING SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. HIS IDEAS ARE BY NO MEANS RIDICULOUS, AND THEY APPEAR MORE REASONABLE NOW THAT HE TOO HAS ACCEPTED NOTION THAT THE SHAH WILL GO. WHETHER HE CAN INTEREST THE IRANIANS IS ANOTHER MATTER, BUT HE HAS HANDLED BIG DEVELOPMENT PRO-JECTS IN THE PAST. WHILE HE READILY ACCEPTS EMBASSY DECLARATION THAT USG IS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED, HE CLEARLY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE SOME INVOLVEMENT AND WILL TRY AGAIN TO OBTAIN IT IF HIS PROJECT GETS OFF THE GROUND. SULLIVAN

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CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 203

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977-240-06

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00399

? 021277 JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9814

CHRGE: STATE 1/9/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNIAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT:
CLEAR: POL:GELAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-2 AMB DCM
ECON 2 PM ICA
OR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/1

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00399

E.O. 11652: RDS-4 1/9/89 (PERETT, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: ANOTHER MODERATE POLITICAL GROUP SURFACES UNDER IRAN MAZAREI

1. DR. ADNAN MAZAREI, ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY, AND A FORMER EMBASSY NATIONAL EMPLOYEE IN THE ECONOMIC SECTION, MET AT HIS REQUEST JAN 2 WITH POL COUNS WILLIAM PERETT. MAZAREI SEEKS USG MORAL SUPPORT FOR HIS POLITICAL GROUP RAMA (HUMANIST MESSENGER OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE). THIS IS GROUP BASED ON HUMANIST IDEOLOGY WHICH WOULD ENABLE IRAN TO RESIST PRESSURES FROM MARXIST AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST SIDES.

2. MAZAREI TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT HIS BELIEF IN A "HUMANISTIC" IDEOLOGY COMBINING THE BEST OF CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM. HE HAS LONG PUBLISHED AND LECTURED ON THE SUBJECT, AND IN 1965 HE TRIED TO LAUNCH A SIMILAR PARTY, HUMANIST RESURGENCE OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. HE HAS REPLACED THE NON-DISCREDITED WORD, "RESURGENCE" (RASTAKHIZ) IN THE NAME. THAT EFFORT QUICKLY ABORTED ONCE THE SHAH'S DISPLEASURE BECAME EVIDENT. IN PRACTICAL TERMS, THE GROUP IS APPARENTLY A MODERATE, PRO-WEST, REFORMIST PARTY. HE SAYS HE IS IN CONTACT WITH THE DERAKHSHESH GROUP, AND THAT EITHER WILL HELP THE OTHER IF ONE OF THEM APPEARS CLOSE TO SUCCESS. THE NATIONAL FRONT, HOWEVER, IS MERELY "A GROUP OF OLD MEN LIVING ON THE MEMORY OF MOSSADEGH." THEY LACK AN IDEOLOGY AND CANNOT THEREFORE INSPIRE THE PUBLIC. MAZAREI CLAIMS ABOUT 150 HARD-CORE MEMBERS, MOSTLY ACADEMICS AND LAWYERS, PLUS A THOUSAND OR SO SYMPATHIZERS. GROUP ALLEGEDLY HAS CHAPTERS IN SEVERAL CITIES BESIDES TEHRAN. MAZAREI PLANS TO HOLD WEEKLY MEETINGS AND TO START A NEWSPAPER. HIS AMBITION IS TO ONE DAY HEAD A MAJOR POLITICAL PARTY.

00824Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2846
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00451

CHRGE: STATE 1/9/79

APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DIST: POL 3 AMB DCM
ECON2 PM ICA
OR ADM YS DAO
AFOSI CHRON/15

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/9/89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, IR
SUBJECT: ANOTHER MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST GROUP GETS IN TOUCH

1. ON JAN 4 MR. RAHIM SAFFARI VISITED POL COUNSELOR AT HIS OWN REQUEST. SAFFARI IS A LONG TIME OPPOSITONIST IN HIS EARLY 60S, WHO HAS WRITTEN MANY BOOKS AND SAYS HE WILL BE WRITING MORE BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS. HE IS ONE OF THE MILDER MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST MEMBERS (POL COUNSELOR MET HIM AT A THIRD COUNTRY EMBASSY COCKTAIL PARTY SOME MONTHS AGO).

2. SAFFARI EXPLAINED THAT HE IS PRESIDENT OF THE "UNITY FOR LIBERTY" PARTY OF WHICH MAJLIS DEPUTY BANI AHMAD IS SECRETARY GENERAL. HE CONFIDED THIS RESULTED FROM BANI AHMAD'S TACTICAL ERROR IN DECLARING HIMSELF FOR SHARIF-EMAMI GOVT IN THE MAJLIS ON THE VERY FIRST DAY, AND THEN HAVING TO REVERSE HIMSELF THE NEXT DAY UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE OPPOSITION.. HIS FOLLOWERS, WHO ARE PERTURBED BY THIS ABSENCE OF SAGACIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO SAFFARI, CAME TO SAFFARI AND ASKED HIM TO BE THEIR TOP GUIDE. SAFFARI DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS AN INTIMATE OF MOSSADEGH'S, MORE SO THAN SOME OF THE TOP NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS WHO ARE NOW USING MOSSADEGH'S NAME TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN CAREERS. HE PROTESTED HE WOULD NEVER DO THAT HIMSELF.

3. SAFFAIR MADE IT CLEAR HE IS WITHHOLDING SUPPORT FROM THE BAKHTIAR GOVT AND GAVE US A COPY OF A PAMPHLET IN ENGLISH, TRANSLATED FROM THE FARSI, WHICH SETS FORTH A PROGRAM VERY SIMILAR TO THOSE OF OTHER SUCH MODERATE GROUPS. ITS FIRST POINT IS RESIGNATION OF THE SHAH AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF LEARNED PEOPLE TRUSTED BY THE NATION. THEN SHOULD COME DISSOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT AND SPEEDY PREPARATIONS FOR FREE ELECTIONS, ENDING OF MARTIAL LAW, DISSOLUTION OF SAVAK, ETC. ETC. SAFFARI SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

4. COMMENT: WE REPORT ABOVE AS ONE MORE EXAMPLE OF DISPARATE MODERATE GROUPS WHICH HOPE TO GET A CHANCE TO REBUILD THEIR FOLLOWING IF EVENTS IN THE NEAR FUTURE PERMIT. SULLIVAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRA[redacted]

P 101351Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2876
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00502

CHRGE: STATE 1[redacted]/79
APPRV: MIN:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAK
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM ICA
OR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/1[redacted]

E.O. 12065: RDS 1/10/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, IR SEDU
SUBJECT: PROFESSOR'S GROUP TO MOVE FOR UNIVERSITY RE-OPENING

SUMMARY: PROFESSOR'S GROUP WILL TRY TO REOPEN UNIVERSITIES JAN 13. THEY WERE SEEKING PROMISE OF GOVT NON-INTERFERENCE. EDUCATIONAL COMMUNITY QUITE RADICAL ABOUT CORRUPTION TRIALS AND BELIEVES BAKHTIAR GOVT MUST TAKE FIRM ACTION TO SURVIVE. END SUMMARY

1. POLOFF SPOKE AT LENGTH JAN 6 WITH PROFESSOR ALI MOHAMMADI, PROFESSOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR AT FARABAD UNIVERSITY IN TEHRAN. MOHAMMADI IS A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF DR. NASSER PAKDAMAN'S SOLIDARITY GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN RUNNING 70 TO 100-MAN SIT IN AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. MOHAMMADI IS IN HIS EARLY 40'S, RECEIVED HIS PH.D. FROM COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND WORKED FOR SOME TIME WITH NIRT (IRANIAN RADIO AND TELEVISION) BEFORE TURNING TO TEACHING A FEW YEARS AGO.

2. MOHAMMADI SAID THERE WILL BE MEETINGS JAN 9 AND 10 BETWEEN PAKDAMAN'S GROUP, UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS AND GOVT OFFICIALS. PURPOSE OF MEETINGS IS TO SET GUIDELINES FOR UNIVERSITY REOPENINGS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE JAN 13 IF ALL GOES WELL. MOHAMMADI SAID FRANKLY THAT UNIVERSITY GROUP DID NOT PARTICULARLY SUPPORT BAKHTIAR'S GOVERNMENT BUT FELT THIS WAS A CHANCE TO GET THE UNIVERSITIES REOPENED AND TURN STUDENTS ATTENTION IN MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION. SOLIDARITY GROUPS BASIC GOALS WILL BE TO ESTABLISH A DEGREE OF UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN SELECTION OF DEPARTMENT HEADS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS. MOHAMMADI SAID UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS WOULD PROBABLY NOT RPT NOT INSIST ON EXECUTIVE RIGHTS TO APPOINT CHANCELLORS AND VICE CHANCELLORS BUT DEFINITELY WANTED MORE SAY IN THIS PROCESS THAN IRANIAN GOVT HAS EVER PROVIDED BEFORE. (PRESS JAN 10 NOTED SOME UNIVERSITY FACULTY COUNCILS HAVE CALLED FOR UNIVERSITY REOPENING WITHIN A WEEK.)

3. MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IN MOHAMMADI EYES IS QUESTION OF CORRUPTION. HE SAID UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS ARE A MAJOR FORCE BEHIND PRESSURE TO HOLD PUBLIC TRIALS IN ARYAMEHR STADIUM FOR "LIST OF FIFTEEN" MAJOR FIGURES. HE PERSONALLY HOPES JUDICIAL PROCESS WOULD BE FOLLOWED EVEN IN SUCH PUBLIC TRIALS, BUT THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE PEOPLE HANGING FROM THE LAMP POST WITHIN TWO WEEKS.

4. WITH RESPECT TO BAKHTIAR GOVT, MOHAMMADI SAID SOLIDARITY GROUP THOUGHT SOMETHING USEFUL COULD COME ABOUT IF PRIME MINISTER COULD ACT ON ISSUES OF MAJOR PUBLIC CONCERN. HIS SOLIDARITY GROUP SEES BAKHTIAR GOVT AS TRANSITIONAL EFFORT LEADING TO FREE ELECTIONS. PROBLEM IN EYES OF

MOHAMMADI IS THAT "CABINET NONENTITIES" DON'T HAVE THE BUREAUCRATIC KNOWLEDGE TO MAKE THEIR MINISTRIES EFFECTIVE. USUALLY INCOMING MINISTERS CAN DRAW ON A CADRE OF FRIENDS OR ACQUAINTANCES TO SUPPORT THEM THROUGH EARLY DAYS. BIGGEST PROBLEM BAKHTIAR OR ANY SUBSEQUENT GOVT WILL FACE IS THAT BY ELIMINATING ALL THOSE WITH GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE, THEY ARE CONDEMNING THEMSELVES TO A VERY LOW LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY JUST AT MOMENT WHEN COUNTRY DEMANDS ACTION. HE SAID BEST EXAMPLE OF THIS PROCESS IS NEW EDUCATION MINISTER MOHAMMAD RIAHI WHO HAS BEEN A HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE TEACHER. RIAHI HAS NO ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE AND WAS NOT EVEN RESPECTED AS A TEACHER BY EITHER HIS STUDENTS OR THE FACULTY AT THE UNIVERSITY WHERE HE TAUGHT. MOHAMMADI, WHO KNOWS RIAHI, SAYS HE IS SOMEWHAT ARROGANT AND HONEST BUT NOT RPT NOT VERY EFFECTIVE.

5. COMMENT: IT IS INTERESTING THAT PAKDAMAN'S GROUP IS APPARENTLY MORE INTERESTED IN SQUARING AWAY UNIVERSITY SITUATION THAN DIRECT POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT. IN A PHILOSOPHICAL MOMENT, MOHAMMADI SAID IRAN NEEDS MORE GROUPS INTERESTED IN THEIR OWN AREAS OF EXPERTISE BECAUSE IF DEMOCRACY IS TO SUCCEED FOR LONG, PERSIAN AUTHORITARIAN BEHAVIOR PATTERNS WILL HAVE TO BE CHANGED. EMBASSY WOULD AGREE WITH THIS, AS WELL AS HIS COMMENTS ABOUT GOVERNMENTAL INEXPERIENCE AND RESULTANT PROBLEMS. SULLIVAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0502

S E C R E T/EXDIS

TEHRAN 0484

O 101203Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2865
IT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 00484

CHRGE: STATE 1-10-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKI
DISTR: ~~DCM~~ 2 AMB POL
PM CHRON/6

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-10-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, MILI, IR
SUBJECT: NEW DEFENSE MINISTER

SUMMARY: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) HAS INDICATED LT.GEN. KHALIL BAKHSHI-AZAR, CURRENTLY CHIEF OF ARMY J-5 (PLANS), WILL BE A SATISFACTORY REPLACEMENT FOR GEN. JAM AS DEFENSE MINISTER. LMI BELIEVES BAKHTIAR WILL NOT RPT NOT WIN PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL UNLESS SENIOR GENERAL ACCEPTABLE TO IT IS NAMED. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL SEEK REFERENDUM ON MONARCHY. LMI HAS PROBLEMS WITH LEFTISTS. END SUMMARY.

1. ABOL ENTEZAM, LMI CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, ASKED FOR AN URGENT MEETING WITH POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN 10. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS TO INDICATE THAT LMI HAD AGREED TO PUT FORWARD NAME OF GEN. KHALIL BAKHSHI-AZAR TO REPLACE GEN. JAM AS DEFENSE MINISTER IN BAKHTIAR'S CABINET. ENTEZAM SAID NOMINATION WAS BEING DISCUSSED WITH BAKHTIAR MORNING JAN 12, AND BAKHTIAR WAS EXPECTED TO AGREE. ENTEZAM SAID LMI SURVEY OF PARLIAMENT INDICATED BAKHTIAR HAD NO RPT NO HOPE OF WINNING PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL SENIOR GENERAL AS DEFENSE MINISTER. BAKHSHI-AZAR WAS ACCEPTABLE TO LMI AND NATIONAL FRONT, BOTH OF WHICH WERE HELPING BAKHTIAR GET HIS CABINET TOGETHER AT THIS POINT.

2. ENTEZAM WANTED U.S. TO KNOW BAKHSHI-AZAR WAS GOOD CANDIDATE FROM ITS POINT OF VIEW AND, ENTEZAM THOUGHT, SOME OTHERS AS WELL. ENTEZAM ASKED U.S. TO HELP CONVINCE ARMY TO ACCEPT BAKHSHI-AZAR, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF GEN. KHOSRODAD'S JAN 7 STATEMENT REPORTED IN TEHRAN PRESS MORNING JAN 10 THAT IT WAS OUT OF QUESTION FOR THE SHAH TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY; "WE WILL NOT APPROVE OF BAKHTIAR NOR ANY MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL FRONT TO TAKE THE REIGNS OF THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE WE WANT THE SHAH." EMBOFF REPEATED U.S. POLICY OF SUPPORTING CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT ENTEZAM INITIATIVE TO AMBASSADOR WHO WOULD, OF COURSE, TAKE WHATEVER FINAL ACTION WAS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

3. ENTEZAM SAID LIST OF KHOMEINI-APPROVED NAMES FOR REGENCY COUNCIL WOULD PROBABLY BE AVAILABLE WITHIN NEXT [illegible] HOURS. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUESTION ABOUT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT'S RESPONSE TO REGENCY COUNCIL PICKED BY THE SHAH, ENTEZAM SAID THAT KHOMEINI FORCES HAD DEFINITELY DECIDED TO REMAIN QUIET AND "LET BAKHTIAR PLAY THE GAME." ENTEZAM THOUGHT BAKHTIAR WOULD WITHIN A MONTH CALL FOR A REFERENDUM ON THE MONARCHY WHICH WOULD "SOLVE PROBLEM DEFINITIVELY." ADDED ALMOST AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WOULD ASK UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO MONITOR

S E C R E T/EXDIS TEHRAN 0484

REFERENDUM PROCESS. IN REPLY TO QUESTION, ENTEZAM SAID THIS HAD BEEN DECIDED UPON TO SHOW WORLD THAT CHOICE WAS REAL; PROPONENTS OF MONARCHY WOULD, OF COURSE, BE FREE TO CAMPAIGN ALONG WITH OPPONENTS.

4. AT SEPARATE MEETING, LMI'S TAVASSOLI TOLD POLOFF THAT LMI'S BAZARGAN HAD CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WITH LEFTISTS IN TRYING TO WORK OUT OIL SETTLEMENT (SAME SOURCE HAD DENIED THIS A WEEK AGO) AND THAT INVOKING NAME OF KHOMEINI WAS ONLY WAY BAZARGAN HAD SUCCEEDED. FOR THIS REASON, LMI THOUGHT KHOMEINI WAS KEY FIGURE IN ASSURING STABILITY OF BOTH TRANSITIONAL AND FINAL SOLUTION.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT: GEN. BAKHSHI-AZAR IS WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO EMBASSY. HE IS REGARDED AS ONE OF SMARTEST GENERAL OFFICERS, BUT UNFORTUNATELY FOR THIS REASON, MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES WOULD LIKE TO CIRCUMSCRIBE HIM A BIT MORE. AS DEFENSE MINISTER, HE WOULD LIKELY ENCOUNTER SOME STRAIN IN HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH SENIOR COLLEAGUES, PARTICULARLY THE SERVICE COMMANDERS. SULLIVAN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00513

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EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RGDS 1/10/85 (S.T. ESCUDERO)
TAGS: PINR IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETING JANUARY 10 WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI IN QOM. FULL REPORT WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

2. EMBOFFS PERETT AND ESCUDERO, ACCOMPANIED BY NATIONAL FRONT LEADER NASSER MINACHI, MET PRIVATELY WITH HAJI SEYYED MOHAMMAD KAZEM SHARIAT-MADARI, MOST IMPORTANT ISLAMIC LEADER PRESENTLY IN IRAN, IN QOM JANUARY 10. EMBOFF MADE PRESENTATION URGING MODERATE, NON-PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR TO AVOID INCREASING INEVITABLE NERVOUSNESS ON PART OF MILITARY SHOULD SHAH LEAVE IRAN. EMBOFF FURTHER NOTED THAT US WOULD USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE IT MAY HAVE WITH MILITARY COMMANDERS TO URGE THAT MILITARY ALSO BEHAVE IN RESPONSIBLE FASHION.

3. SHARIAT-MADARI IMMEDIATELY AGREED WITH THRUST OF EMBOFF'S STATEMENT. HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT MILITARY WILL NOT ACCEPT SHAH'S DEPARTURE, NOTING RUMORS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY CONSPIRED WITH THE SHAH TO INSTIGATE TROUBLES WHICH WOULD CAUSE A NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT TO FAIL AND MAKE POSSIBLE THE SHAH'S RETURN TO POWER. HE REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED THAT THE US DO ALL POSSIBLE TO PREVENT THIS. HOWEVER, WHILE NOTING THAT LEFTISTS AND OTHER CONSPIRATORIAL ELEMENTS MIGHT NOT OBEY HIS DIRECTIONS, HE AGREED TO ISSUE ON JANUARY 11, AN INSTRUCTION ORDERING THE FAITHFUL TO REFRAIN FROM ANY FORM OF VIOLENCE OR ANY SORT OF PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR TOWARD THE MILITARY DURING THE PERIOD AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH. THE INSTRUCTION WOULD BE ISSUED UNDER HIS SEAL AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE AYATOLLAHS GOLPAYGANI AND MARASHI.

4. AYATOLLAH WAS VERY FORTHCOMING REGARDING FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PAST US ASSISTANCE AND NOTED THAT IRAN'S NEED TO SELL OIL IS AS GREAT AS THAT OF THE US TO BUY. HE REMARKED UPON IRAN'S NEED FOR US PROTECTION AGAINST THE USSR. PRESENT CRITICISM OF US STEMS FROM MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT US HAS INTERFERED IN INTERNAL IRANIAN AFFAIRS. THIS PROBLEM CAN BE CLEARED UP AND GOOD US-IRANIAN RELATIONS CAN BE RE-ESTABLISHED ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT.

5. SHARIAT-MADARI STATED THAT HE HAS NEITHER APPROVED NOR DISAPPROVED BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. SOME AMBIGUITIES IN BAKHTIAR'S PROGRAM REGARDING THE MEANING OF SOCIALISM IN THE PHRASE "SOCIAL DEMOCRACY" AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT TOWARD OPERATION OF THE TUDEH PARTY IN IRAN (WHICH THE AYATOLLAH WOULD OPPOSE) NEED TO BE CLEARED UP. ALSO, PRIME MINISTER MUST ACT IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION.

6. COMMENT: SHARIAT-MADARI WAS CLEARLY PLEASED TO SEE SOMEONE FROM USG. HIS ATTITUDE WAS COMPLETELY REASONABLE AND COOPERATIVE. HOWEVER, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE A POSITION TOO FAR OUT IN FRONT OF THAT OF KHOMEINI AND IT REMAINS BE BE SEEN HOW MUCH OF SHARIAT-MADARI'S COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE WILL BE TRANSLATED INTO THE BEHAVIOR OF IRAN'S TRADITIONALLY QUARRELSOME POLITICIANS ONCE THE SHAH HAS GONE AND THEY HAVE THE POWER.

SULLIVAN

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2911
INFO RUOMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1896
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4245
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0934
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1278
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 1999
RUQMCD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0732
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1260
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3911
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3959
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5113
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0322
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4858
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4192
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1288
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1366
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0723
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3366
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3604
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0252
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0101
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1260
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0890
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHCHCA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00562

CHRGE: STATE 1-11-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USIC
CR CRU SHIR
TABR ISF DAO
CHRON/16

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-11-85 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: BAKHTIAR PRESENTS HIS CABINET; SHAFAQAT IS DEFENSE MINISTER

REF: (A(TEHRAN 268, (B) 78 TEHRAN 2243,

SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR PRESENTED HIS CABINET TO MAJLES MORNING JAN 11. JAFFAR SHAFAQAT, FORMER DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER AND MOST RECENTLY GOVERNOR OF EAST AZARBAIJAN PROVINCE WAS NAMED DEFENSE MINISTER. BAKHTIAR'S PROGRAM WAS SIMILAR TO PREVIOUS INDICATIONS. MAJLES WILL RECONVENE JAN 14 FOR BEGINNING OF DEBATE. SENATE PRESENTATION JAN 13. VOTE PROBABLY WILL COME JAN 16 OR 17. END SUMMARY.

1. PRIME MINISTER SHAHPOUR BAKHTIAR PRESENTED HIS CABINET TO PARLIAMENT MORNING JAN 11 AND GAVE SHORT OUTLINE OF HIS GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM. CABINET CHOICES WERE AS LISTED REF A, EXCEPT FOR REPLACEMENT OF JAM BY LT.GEN. JAAFAR SHAFAQAT FOR DEFENSE MINISTER. SHAFAQAT HAS BEEN GOVERNOR OF EAST AZARBAIJAN PROVINCE SINCE SHORTLY FOLLOWING TABRIZ RIOTS IN FEB 1978 (SEE REF B FOR BIO DATA).

2. REPLACEMENT FOR JAM WAS BIGGEST QUESTION MARK IN BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT, AND SHAFAQAT WAS REPORTEDLY CANDIDATE OF THE ACTIVE MILITARY. THOUGH PRINCIPAL OPPOSITIONIST CONTACTS UNAVAILABLE FOR COMMENT, IT IS KNOWN THAT OTHERS

[illegible] THEIR PREFERRED CANDIDATES. SHAFAQAT IS BELIEVED BY [illegible]SY TO BE A HARD-LINER ON QUESTION OF MAINTAINING CIVIL [illegible]ER; THUS HIS NOMINATION COULD BE SEEN IN SOME QUARTERS [illegible] CONFIRMATION OF RUMORS THAT BAKHTIAR IS UNDER SHAH'S [illegible] MILITARY CONTROL. CONSUL TABRIZ, HOWEVER, REPORTS [illegible]AQAT IS WELL RESPECTED AND WALKS THE STREETS OF TABRIZ [illegible]OUT LARGE ARMED RETINUE. THIS MAY BE BECAUSE HE IS A [illegible]TIVE TABRIZI WHO SPEAKS THE LOCAL LANGUAGE. WE SHALL [illegible] TO WITHHOLD JUDGEMENT FOR THE MOMENT.

3. BAKHTIAR GAVE BRIEF OUTLINE OF HIS PR[illegible]RAM, WHICH WAS [illegible]IMILAR TO THAT REPORTED PREVIOUSLY: CORR[illegible]PT WILL BE [illegible]OUGHT TO TRIAL AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE, AND SPECIAL [illegible]URTS WILL BE USED IF JUDICIARY CANNOT MOVE RAPIDLY ENOUGH. [illegible]AVAK WILL BE ABOLISHED AND A "VERY SMALL" INTELLIGENCE [illegible]IT WILL BE SET UP IN PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. SECURITY [illegible] COUNTRY WILL BE MAINTAINED IN FACE OF SUBVERSIVE THREAT, [illegible] GOOD RELATIONS WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH ALL COUNTRIES. [illegible]TTER RELATIONS WILL BE SOUGHT WITH ARABS. ALL POLITICAL [illegible]ISONERS WILL BE RELEASED BUT NOT HARDENED CRIMINALS. [illegible]INISTRY OF SCIENCE AND HIGHER EDUCATION WILL BE ABOLISHED [illegible]ND SMALL LIAISON OFFICE WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN PRIME [illegible]INISTER'S OFFICE TO WORK WITH UNIVERSITY CHANCELLORS, WHO [illegible]LL HAVE VIRTUAL AUTONOMY. RELIGIOUS LEADERS WILL BE [illegible]SPECTED AND CONSULTED ON ALL IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

4. IN SOMEWHAT EMOTIONAL FINALE, BAKHTIAR PLEADED FOR [illegible]ATION TO GIVE HIS GOVERNMENT REASONABLE TIME TO SHOW [illegible]OGRESS. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN OUT OF POLITICS FOR 25 [illegible]EARS, HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND IN PRISON, AND THUS KNEW WHAT [illegible]E PEOPLE WANTED. HE WAS READY TO GIVE IT TO THEM BUT [illegible]EEDED A LITTLE TIME.

5. MAJLES WILL RECONVENE SUNDAY, JAN 14 FOR BEGINNING OF [illegible]EBATE; MANY PARLIAMENTARIANS WILL STAND IN LINE AND SLEEP [illegible] OVER WEEKEND TO PRESERVE THEIR PLACE ON LIST TO SPEAK. [illegible] HAVE LEARNED, HOWEVER, THAT SENTIMENT IS GROWING AMONG [illegible]ISLATORS TO INVOKE CLOTURE AFTER TEN SPEAKERS ON EACH [illegible]IDE. THIS COULD BRING VOTE AS EARLY AS EVENING JAN 14. [illegible]HERWISE PROCESS COULD GO ON TO JAN 16 OR 17. SENATE [illegible]ILL DEBATE CONCURRENTLY AFTER JAN 13 PRESENTATION OF [illegible]T

[illegible]562

[illegible]NN

O 1?1306Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2912
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1897
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4246
RUEHGR/USINT BAGHDAD 0935
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1279
RUQMDE/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 2000
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0733
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1261
RUSBGD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3712
RUQMJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3960
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5114
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0323
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4859
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4193
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1289
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1367
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0724
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3367
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3605
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0253
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0102
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1261
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0891
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHQHQA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00562

CABINET BUT CANNOT VOTE UNTIL MAJLES DOES. FAVORABLE VOTE IN SENATE IS FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

6. INITIAL COMMENT: APPOINTMENT OF SAFAQAT MEANS CABINET WILL PROBABLY BE APPROVED, BUT STREET SITUATION IS LIKELY TO BECOME MORE LIVELY UNLESS BAKHTIAR HAS GOTTEN AT LEAST TACIT NATIONAL FRONT AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT APPROVAL FOR SHAFAQAT TO TAKE OFFICE. OPPOSITIONISTS MIGHT BE WILLING TO REMAIN SILENT IF THEY BELIEVED SHAFAQAT APPOINTMENT WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT MILITARY COUP. SULLIVAN
BT
#0562

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL/STADIS

TEHRAN [illegible]

CHRGE: STATE 1-11-79
APPRV: ICA:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTAMP-L:
CLEAR: POL:CSELSMBRAGG
DISTR: [illegible]

[illegible] 29
[illegible] TEHRAN
[illegible] WASHDC IMMEDIATE [illegible]

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN [illegible]

E.O.

TAGS: SHUM, IR

SUBJ: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: STATE 5[illegible]

1. EXTREMELY CHAOTIC SITUATION IN IRAN, EMBASSY HAS NUMBERS OF/DRAFT REPORT FOR HANDLING COMPLEX [illegible] IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. WE HAVE ONLY TWO CHANGES TO SUGGEST, BUT WOULD ALSO OFFER A [illegible] OBSERVATIONS WHICH MIGHT EITHER BE INCORPORATED [illegible] IF SOME EVENTUALITIES COME TO PASS, OR USED POINT FOR TESTIMONY OR OTHER PRESENTATIONS.

2. TWO LANGUAGE CHANGES: IN PARA SIX, LAST [illegible] DELETE OUT WORD "STRICT." MARTIAL LAW CONTROLS [illegible] ACTIVITY WERE IN THEORY VERY TIGHT, BUT IN [illegible] IVE LAW. IN FACT, MARTIAL LAW REGIME ITSELF [illegible] MILD AS TO ALMOST BELIE THE NAME, DESPITE [illegible] CHARGES TO THE CONTRARY AND SOME NOTABLE EXCEP- [illegible] S SENSITIVITY IN MASHAD AND QAZVIN OVER PAST [illegible]. UNDER PARA 7 (1) C, ARBITRARY ARREST, FINAL [illegible] SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: "MOREOVER, DURING THE [illegible] OF OIL FACILITIES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE FALL OF [illegible] GOI ANNOUNCED THAT STRIKING WORKERS WHO REFUSED [illegible] TO WORK WOULD BE CHARGED WITH SABOTAGE AND TRIED [illegible] SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. THIS WAS IN FACT NEVER DONE." [illegible] NOUNCEMENT IN THIS CASE TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN [illegible] WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF BAZARGAN AGREEMENT IN [illegible] UARY, 1979, ALL PARTIES AGREE THERE WILL BE NO [illegible] ARBITRARY ARREST.

3. [illegible] COMMENTS DOES NOT GO INTO DISINTEGRATION OF [illegible] WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN IRAN OVER PAST [illegible] MONTHS, NOR SHOULD IT. NEVERTHELESS, EFFECT [illegible] BREAKING OF AUTHORITY HAS BEEN BREAKDOWN IN ADMIN- [illegible] OF JUSTICE AND SOME INEVITABLE HAPHAZARDNESS [illegible] ADMINISTRATION OF A SYSTEM WHICH WAS ALREADY [illegible] SEVERE STRAIN. LARGELY DUE TO EFFORTS OF RECENT [illegible] MINISTER NAJAFI, SITUATION HAS BEEN ROUGHLY [illegible] IED. NEW BAKHTIAR JUSTICE MINISTER, YAHYA SADEQ- [illegible], ALSO A RESPECTED JURIST, WILL HAVE INEVITABLE [illegible] GETTING HIS ACT ORGANIZED IN SEMI-REVOLUTIONARY [illegible] ATION--IF HE LASTS IN OFFICE LONG ENOUGH TO TRY.

4. [illegible] OVE WILL BE COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT CAMPAIGN AGAINST [illegible] TION IS SINGLE BIGGEST POLITICAL ISSUE FACING COUNTRY, [illegible] ILL BE FIRST ONE PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR HAS STATED [illegible] TACKLE WHEN CONFIRMED. MOOD OF COUNTRY, ACCORDING [illegible] MANY LAWYERS AND LEGAL TEACHERS, COULD PUSH GOI INTO

[illegible] NUMBER OF IRANIANS [illegible]
[illegible] CRITICAL OF IMPACT OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
[illegible] WILL BE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY [illegible] AS IT RESPONDS
IN DEFENSE OF RIGHTS OF EX-ESTABLISHMENTARIANS AS IT WAS
FORMERLY IN DEFENSE OF OPPOSITIONISTS.

5. FORTUNATELY, LOW- KEY USG APPROACH TAKEN TO DATE IN IRAN
ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS WILL LEND ITSELF TO PRIVATE
EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN. SHOULD THIS BECOME NECESSARY, IN
QUARTERS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING OR AT LEAST
MODIFY EXCESSES. CONVERSELY, SINCE PRIVATE GROUPS HAVE
PREVIOUSLY BEEN VOCAL IN SUPPORT OF RIGHTS FOR OPPOSITION
FIGURES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO US IF THEY SPEED UP INTAKE
OF IRANIAN VISA PROCESS, REGARDLESS OF WHO APPLICANTS VISIT
WHEN IN U.S. GIVEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION SENSITIVITY
TO PRESS GROUPS, THIS COULD ALSO PROVIDE CONSERVATIVE
PRESSURE AGAINST LEGAL EXCESSES. IN THIS CONNECTION,
IT MIGHT BE NOTED THAT COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FREEDOM (CDHRF) HAS NOW AGREED TO "COOPERATE WITH"
JUSTICE MINISTRY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL JUDICIAL RIGHTS
FOR ACCUSED. SULLIVAN

BT
#0174

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☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1978-258-344

file

MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES

FROM: W. Gregory Perett, Political Officer

SUBJECT: NSC/CCM, EUR, OR, BTO, NEA/IRN, INR/RNA

I met on January 11 with Siavosh Dehesh, a wealthy young businessman who has returned from the United States (his principal residence is Dallas) to help save the regime. He wanted to know our policy regarding the departure of the Shah and was distraught to learn we are going to stand by and "let it happen." He said the army will disintegrate without the Shah, and that from the other side, leftist forces will use Khomeini as a stalking horse to take power. He pointed to escalating demands on the part of dissidents and predicted that after the Shah's departure, the left will assail the government for letting him get away without a trial. Thus, Khomeini's group will bring down Bakhtiar.

Dehesh was itching to strike at the Opposition as in 1953 and insisted, despite my disagreement, that it still could be done. "Just give me the word and we can round up all these monkeys within 48 hours." The army is still intact, he argued, whereas in 1953 it too was disintegrating. He and his friends still hoped to prevent the Shah from leaving or in any case to ensure the Shah's return to power. He does not particularly admire the Shah but believes the country cannot remain stable without him.

Dehesh represents the class which has made its fortune under the Pahlavi's. They are the people whom we expected to defend the Shah but who, in fact, did nothing except prepare for emigration. I was therefore impressed that Dehesh was here trying, although his group is no longer in a position to restore order; that will come (sooner or later) from other forces. His concern for the peril of a Leftist takeover is not without foundation, but that is a danger which, due to the regime's myopia and the Opposition's naivete, Iran must now face.

POL:WGPerett:lab:~~1-17~~ 1-11-79

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 20585

P 120718Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2028
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 20585

CHRGD: STATE 1/11/79
APPRV: MIN:CMNARS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLRAS: NONE
DISTR: AMB MIN DCM-2 PM OFF CHRON/17

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-4 1/11/99 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE P.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: SHAH SUPPORTERS READY TO SWITCH SIDES

1. POL COUNSELOR WAS VISITED JAN 11 BY MR. ALI SHAPOURIAN AND DR. ANOUSHIRAVAN AFRASIABI. SHAPOURIAN SERVED SOME YEARS AGO AS IRANIAN EMBASSY PRESS COUNSELOR IN WASHINGTON, SUBSEQUENTLY IN LONDON, MOST RECENTLY AS UNDERSECY IN MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND UP TO THREE MONTHS AGO AS PUBLIC RELATIONS MAN FOR PRINCESS ASHRAF. HE IS AT PRESENT MANAGING DIRECTOR OF "HOMARY" PUBLICATIONS, A PUBLISHING HOUSE RUN BY FRANKLIN PUBLISHING HOUSE OF NEW YORK. AFRASIABI IS A MEDICAL DOCTOR TRAINED IN TEHRAN AND ENGLAND, WHO RUNS A MATERNITY HOSPITAL IN DOWNTOWN TEHRAN. SERVED AS COLONEL IN THE ARMY UNTIL 5 YEARS AGO, WAS A MEMBER OF ADAM'S MARDOM PARTY, WROTE FOR BASTAMIZ NEWSPAPER UNTIL HE HAD A FALLING OUT WITH HOVEYDA, AND HAS WRITTEN FOR MIZLAAT AND KAYHAN SINCE. THESE MEN ARE OBVIOUSLY NOT OPPOSITIONISTS.

2. AFTER ASKING FOR AND GETTING A BRIEF REVIEW OF SITUATION AS USG SEES IT, SHAPOURIAN SAID THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN PEOPLE SUPPORTS THE SHAH AND IS AFRAID OF HIS LEAVING. DWELLING ON THE IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESS AT PRESENT IN THE COUNTRY, HE ADDED THAT HE HAD OBTAINED GEN. AZHARI'S AGREEMENT A FEW WEEKS AGO TO ESTABLISH A NEW NEWSPAPER WHICH WOULD "REPORT ONLY THE FACTS" AND EVEN ATTACK AZHARI GOVT FROM TIME TO TIME. HOWEVER, THE GOVT FUNDS NEEDED TO SET THIS UP HAD NEVER COME THROUGH.

3. AFRASIABI THEN GAVE HIS OPINION THAT ONE OF TWO THINGS MUST BE DONE IMMEDIATELY. THE FIRST WOULD BE THAT THE SHAH REMAIN AND PRESIDE OVER A VERY HARD CRACKDOWN BY THE MILITARY WHICH MUST SUCCEED WITHIN 48 HOURS. THIS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED BY A CIVILIAN "THINK TANK" WHICH GIVES THE MILITARY THEIR INSTRUCTIONS AND CONTINUES TO RUN THE GOVT. WHOLE THING WILL BE BLOODY AND TIME MAY BE PAST FOR IT, BUT IT IS AN OPTION WORTH CONSIDERING.

4. OTHER OPTION, ACCORDING TO AFRASIABI, WOULD BE THAT USG RECOGNIZE CAUSE OF THE SHAH AS LOST AND MOVE QUICKLY TO PUT TOGETHER A COALITION OF ARMY, NATIONAL FRONT, RELIGIOUS FORCES AND ALL OTHERS EXCEPT THE COMMUNISTS SO AS TO ESTABLISH A VIABLE GOVT AND PREVENT A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. TIME IS RUNNING SHORT FOR THIS OPTION TOO, HE FELT. USG SHOULD ACT WITHOUT HESITATION AS HESITATION WILL ONLY ENCOURAGE THE COMMUNISTS. TIME IS WORKING AGAINST A SOLUTION.

B. POL COUNSELOR LIMITED HIS COMMENTS TO AGREEING THAT SITUATION IS CRITICAL, AFRASIABI ANALYSIS IS COGENT BUT ROLE OF USG MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS THAT OF AN OUTSIDER WHO IS NOT INTERVENING IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS. WE HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVT AS REPRESENTED BY THE SHAH, AND WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN IRAN FOLLOWING ANY DECISIONS THE SHAH CHOOSES TO TAKE ABOUT THE FUTURE.

C. COMMENT: THIS WAS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SHAH LOYALISTS COMING TO SNIFF THE AIR SO AS TO GUIDE THEMSELVES ACCORDINGLY. THEY GENERALLY AGREED WITH OUR POINT THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR PEOPLE LIKE THEMSELVES TO ORGANIZE MORE WIDELY SO AS TO PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE AS PART OF ANY MODERATE BLOC OF IRANIAN OPINION WHICH MIGHT AWAKEN ITSELF AND WORK AGAINST THE POLARIZATION OF IRANIAN POLITICS BETWEEN EXTREMES. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO. SULLIVAN
BT
#0585

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00585

P 1412422 JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2970
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0942
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3718
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5123
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1373
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3617
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00668

CHRGE: STATE 1-14-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS:DL
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL 3 AMB DCM
ECON 2 PM OR
SHIR TABR ISF
CHRON/13

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-4 1-14-89 (LAMBRAKIS, G.B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: FIRST MEETING WITH NATIONAL FRONT LEADER KARIM SANJABI

SUMMARY: IN FIRST MEETING WITH EMBASSY, SANJABI HAD LITTLE OF IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE (BEYOND RECOGNIZING NEED TO RESTRAIN HIS PEOPLE FROM PROVOKING ARMY AFTER SHAH LEAVES) BUT WISHED TO COMMUNICATE ENLIGHTENED, PRO-WESTERN IMAGE TO USG, IMPLYING DESIRE FOR OUR SUPPORT. HE CONFIRMED UNWILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT OR ENTER ANY REGENCY COUNCIL APPOINTED BY THE SHAH. HE ALIGNED HIMSELF ENTIRELY WITH KHOMEINI, SAID HE PERSONALLY WOULD PREFER A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY IF KHOMEINI CAN BE TALKED AROUND TO IT, AND DOWNPLAYED DANGER FROM INTERNAL COMMUNISTS. ON OTHER HAND, HE SAID HE WAS ALERT TO DANGERS FROM SOVIET UNION, ESPECIALLY AMONG IRAN'S MINORITIES AND ASKED THAT USG "HAVE FAITH IN THE IRANIAN PEOPLE." HE SAID A HAPPY IRANIAN PEOPLE COULD HAVE POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND EVEN ISLAMIC PEOPLES OF USSR. END SUMMARY.

1. NATIONAL FRONT LEADER KARIM SANJABI RECEIVED POL COUNSELOR IN HOUSE OF A RELATIVE EVENING JAN 11 FOR HIS FIRST SUBSTANTIVE CONTACT WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MANY YEARS (OVER A DECADE AND A HALF). IT WAS AT HIS REQUEST, AND WAS DONE QUIETLY SO AS NOT TO UPSET P.M. BAKHTIAR. THE HOUSE IS A LARGE MANSION IN NORTHERN TEHRAN. AFTER BEING LET IN BY A SERVANT, POLCOUNSELOR ENTERED SPARSELY FURNISHED, IMMENSE, BARONIAL BALLROM WHICH WAS DIMLY LIT EXCEPT FOR ROARING FIRE IN FIREPLACE AT FAR END. DIGNIFIED ELDERLY SANJABI ROSE FROM ONE OF TWO LARGE EASY CHAIRS TO MEET POLCOUNS AND MEETING PROCEEDED IN FRENCH, TETE-A-TETE, SO TO SPEAK, BUT WITH THE TWO CHAIRS SPACED ABOUT 10 YARDS APART AND A SERVANT BRINGING IN TEA, NUTS AND FRUIT FROM TIME TO TIME. IT WAS A GOOD MOVIE SETTING.

2. SANJABI LED OFF WITH BRIEF REVIEW OF HIS OWN LAST DISCUSSION WITH THE SHAH IN WHICH HE HAD TOLD SHAH HE COULD ACCEPT APPOINTMENT AS PRIME MINISTER PROVIDED SHAH LEFT THE COUNTRY AND KHOMEINI APPROVED HIS ACCEPTING THE JOB. SHAH HAD BEEN ADAMANT IN REFUSING. YET A FEW DAYS LATER (SANJABI PASSED OVER SADEGI'S EFFORT, THOUGH HE SAID A FEW GOOD THINGS ABOUT SADEGI PERSONALLY) BAKHTIAR CAME

TO SANJABI--WITH NO PRIOR CONSULTATION--TO SAY HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO SEE THE SHAH THE NIGHT BEFORE AND SHAH HAD OFFERED PRIME MINISTRY TO THE NATIONAL FRONT, PROMISING TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN THE PROCESS. SANJABI WELCOMED THIS DEVELOPMENT.BUT SAID THIRD CONDITION--KHOMEINI'S APPROVAL--STILL REMAINED TO BE GOT, AND INF MUST FLY TO SEE KHOMEINI. SANJABI, ACTING AS INF LEADER, THEN DISCUSSED MATTER WITH ALLAHYAR SALEH, WHO AGREED TO THIS PROCEDURE.

3. WHEN HE RETURNED THAT EVENING, AFP REP CALLED HIM FOR REACTION TO BAKHTIAR'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT BAKHTIAR HAD AGREED TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT AT REQUEST OF THE SHAH. THIS WAS FIRST SANJABI HEARD OF IT. HE CALLED BAKHTIAR, WHO REFUSED TO RECANT. GOVERNING COUNCIL OF INF THEN MET AND READ BAKHTIAR OUT OF THE IRAN PARTY AND THE NATIONAL FRONT. SANJABI REVEALED THAT, IN ADDITION TO HIMSELF, SEVEN-MEMBER COUNCIL CONSISTS OF DR. AZAR (MOSSADEQ EDUCATION MINISTER, LIKE SANJABI HIMSELF), DR. SHAMS-ED-DIN AMIR-ALAI (MOSSADEQ JUSTICE MINISTER), DR. MOBASHERI (JUDGE, AND DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF JUSTICE MINISTRY IN ALI AMINI GOVT), DARIUSH FORUHAR (HEAD OF IRANIAN NATION PARTY) REZA SHAYAN (HEAD OF SOCIALIST GROUP OF IRAN), AND ABOL FAZL GHASSEMI (NEW SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE IRAN PARTY).

4. SANJABI EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD TOLD THE SHAH ANY ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY INF MUST BE DONE IN WAY TO HAVE PEOPLE IN THE STREET VIEW IT AS THEIR VICTORY. THIS WOULD GET A TYPE OF ENTHUSIASM FROM THEM WHICH WOULD HELP GOVERNMENT ESTABLISH ORDER. AS IT WAS, MANNER OF BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT'S BIRTH WAS AGAINST IT. HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT COULD ESTABLISH ITSELF. BESIDES, AGREEING WITHOUT AT LEAST TACIT PERMISSION FROM KHOMEINI WOULD HAVE MEANT SEPARATION FROM THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT--SOMETHING INF COULD NOT AFFORD.

5. SANJABI THEN APPEALED DIRECTLY TO USG TO "HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE PEOPLE OF IRAN." "WE UNDERSTAND THE DELICACY OF OUR GEOPOLITICAL POSITION," HE SAID. WITH BT
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P 141242Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2971
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0943
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3719
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5124
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1374
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3618
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00668

LIMDIS

RUSSIANS ON THE FRONTIER, THE PERSIAN GULF GATEWAY FOR OIL TO THE WEST, AND IRAN'S PLACEMENT AMONG IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, ETC., IRAN IS IN AN AREA WHICH IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT (EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO THE U.S. THAN WESTERN EUROPE, HE SAID) AND MOST FRAGILE. IRANIANS SINCERELY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS WITH THE U.S. AND WEST EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES.

6. THE SHAH'S GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN EVIL, ARBITRARY AND CORRUPT WITHOUT PRECEDENT, SANJABI CONTINUED. THE ROYAL FAMILY IS "ABSOLUTELY CORRUPTED." IRANIANS HAVE A SAYING: "WHEN THE HEAD ROTS, THE BODY FOLLOWS WITHOUT DEALAY." THE SPREAD OF THIS CORRUPTION CREATED WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT, AND IT CREATED KHOMEINI. HOWEVER, IRAN IS A BIG, IMPORTANT, RICH COUNTRY. ITS PEOPLE ARE MUCH BETTER EDUCATED THAN THEY WERE (COMMENT: DESPITE THE "EVIL, CORRUPT" GOVERNMENT). SOME REFORMS ARE NECESSARY, MOVING IN A NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, SOCIALISTIC DIRECTION. BUT IF ITS PEOPLE ARE HAPPY, IRAN'S POWER COULD HAVE BENEFICIAL INFLUENCE ON NEIGHBORS SUCH AS IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, EVEN THE ISLAMIC PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SANJABI SAID HE IS NOT VERY FAMILIAR WITH LEFTISTS/COMMUNISTS INSIDE IRAN. HE IS VERY WELL ACQUAINTED WITH MANY OF THEM IN THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE. THEY ARE HOPELESSLY DIVIDED: PRO-SOVIET FACTIONS, MAOISTS, TUDEH MEMBERS, ANTI-TUDEH MILITANTS (MANY OF THEM DISILLUSIONED FORMER MEMBERS). HE HAD JUST SEEN A 40-PAGE PAMPHLET WRITTEN BY SOME OF THEM WHICH ATTACKS THE TUDEH PARTY AS THE BLIND SLAVE OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM. SANJABI BELIEVES THEIR TOTAL INFLUENCE HERE IS SMALL AND MANAGEABLE.

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOVIETS HAVE TO BE WATCHED CAREFULLY, SANJABI SAID, ESPECIALLY IN STIRRING UP THE MINORITIES. SANJABI HIMSELF IS A KURD AND IS FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION IN THE WEST. THERE ARE NO SEPARATISTS IN SOUTHERN KURDISTAN, A FEW IN THE AREA OF SANANDAJ, THE CENTER, AND MORE IN THE NORTH, NEAR REZAIYEH. BUT THEY CAN BE CONTAINED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.
9. IN RESPONSE TO A COMMENT, SANJABI AGREED THERE ARE 2-3 PEOPLE AROUND KHOMEINI WITH LEFTIST IDEAS, WHOM HE TERMED "HOSTILE NATIONALISTS." GHOTBZADEH HAS HAD CONTACTS WITH FRENCH COMMUNISTS, BUT THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MAKE HIM A COMMUNIST. DR. YAZDI IS RELIGIOUS. BOTH ARE

VERY ANGRY AT NATIONAL FRONT, HE DOES NOT KNOW WHY. BANI-SADR, WHO IS PERSONALLY VERY AMBITIOUS, IS WITH THE INF. SO IS DR. MOHAMMAD MOKRI, "MASTER OF RESEARCH" AT A FRENCH INSTITUTE HE MENTIONED. (COMMENT: FROM ANOTHER, KNOWLEDGEABLE RELIGIOUS SOURCE, POLCOUNS HAS GOTTEN EXPLANATION OF KHOMEINI'S MISTRUST OF SANJABI AND NATIONAL FRONT AS DATING FROM THE FALLING OUT MOSSADEQ HAD WITH KASHANI OVER 25 YEARS AGO. ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY KHOMEINI HAS NEVER FORGIVEN MOSSADEQ FOR PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE TO THE SHAH AND SERVING AS HIS PRIME MINISTER WHEN HE WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO OUST HIM. FURTHERMORE, THIS SOURCE ADDS, KHOMEINI THOUGHT MOSSADEQ AND HIS PEOPLE IMPRUDENT IN ALLOWING TUDEH PARTY TO GET CLOSE TO THEM, THUS AROUSING U.S. COUNTER-ACTION WHICH SAVED THE SHAH. WITH SUCH A RECORD, KHOMEINI SEES NO REASON TO TRUST POWER TO THE NATIONAL FRONT AGAIN. THIS EXPLANATION IS THE MOST PERSUASIVE ONE WE HAVE HEARD TO EXPLAIN KHOMEINI'S EVIDENT MISTRUST OF SANJABI AND THE INF.)

10. COMMENTING ON OTHER INF LEADERS, SANJABI PROFESSED TO BE EVER-WILLING TO WORK WITH BAZARGAN, BUT "SOMEHOW" CIRCUMSTANCES ALWAYS CONSPIRE TO KEEP THEM APART. EVEN IN THE OLD DAYS, DR. SAHABI AND BAZARGAN KEPT A LITTLE SEPARATE FROM REST OF NATIONAL FRONT. SANJABI SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW KHOMEINI'S EXACT PROGRAM (FOR AN "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC"), BUT HE IS SURE IT IS "NOT FAR FROM THE CONSTITUTION." KHOMEINI MIGHT IN TIME COME TO ACCEPT A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY, BUT HE WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED ON. AS FOR INF, SANJABI HAS ALWAYS TAKEN THE POSITION THAT IT IS NOT THE FORM BUT THE UNDERLYING SUBSTANCE THAT IS IMPORTANT. HE PERSONALLY DISLIKES AFGHAN OR IRAQI TYPE OF REPUBLIC AND PREFERS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY ON THE WESTERN EUROPEAN MODEL. ONE COULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT THE CROWN PRINCE, BEING A MINOR, IS "INNOCENT" JUST AS WAS SAID ABOUT THE PRESENT SHAH WHEN HE SUCCEEDED HIS FATHER. NOW THE SHAH HAS BECOME WORSE THAN HIS FATHER. (HE TACITLY ADMITTED THIS WAS NOT A STRONG
PT
#0668

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P 1412422 JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2972
INFO RUFHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0944
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3720
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5125
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1375
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3619
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 TEHRAN 00668

LIMDIS

ARGUMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY, AT LEAST NOT UNDER THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY.)

11. IF BAKHTIAR CAN CALM THE STREETS, GET STRIKERS BACK TO WORK, AND OPEN THE UNIVERSITIES, THE OPPOSITION CAN GIVE HIM THE TIME HE IS ASKING FOR, SANJABI CONTINUED, BUT SANJABI DID NOT THINK HE WOULD SUCCEED. HE HAD GOTTEN A BAD START AND HAD A CABINET OF NON-ENTITIES--EVEN NO WELL-KNOWN TECHNOCRATS. IT COULD NOT LAST EVEN AS A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN RESPONSE TO A DIRECT QUESTION, SANJABI SAID HE COULD NOT WORK WITH BAKHTIAR GOVT AFTER WHAT HAPPENED. IT IS NOT PERSONAL BUT A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

12. SANJABI READILY AGREED WITH POLCOUNS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARMY MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. POLCOUNS DELIVERED TO HIM THE MESSAGE THAT WE WERE WORKING ON CALMING THE OFFICERS, BUT OPPOSITION LEADERS TOO SHOULD ORGANIZE IN ADVANCE SO THAT DAY SHAH LEAVES WOULD NOT SEE DISORDERLY DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH WOULD PROVOKE THE ARMY. SANJABI AGREED BUT SUGGESTED IT WOULD HELP IF SOME OFFICERS LEFT WITH THE SHAH, OR WERE REMOVED BY HIM BEFORE HE LEFT. POLCOUNS RESPONDED THAT SOME OF THEM HAD ALREADY LEFT, AS SANJABI KNEW, AND HE HOPED CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOME OTHERS WOULD NOT BE SEIZED AS A PRETEXT TO PROVOKE THE ARMY--ESPECIALLY AS SOME OFFICERS AND TROOPS MIGHT BE TAKEN UNAWARE BY SHAH'S DEPARTURE AND BE EXTREMELY JUMPY. SANJABI SAID THAT WOULD NOT HAPPEN.

13. OF COURSE, SANJABI ADDED, THERE MIGHT BE "SOME SMALL TRIALS" OF A "FEW" OFFICERS, IN THE PROCESS OF CHANGING THE SHAH'S ARMY INTO A NATIONAL ARMY. POLCOUNS SAID HE HOPED ANY SUCH TRIALS WOULD NOT RELATE TO ACTS COMMITTED BY THESE OFFICERS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DUTY. SURELY SANJABI DID NOT WISH TO SEE A REPETITION OF THE NURNBERG TRIALS IN IRAN. SANJABI SAID HE DID NOT AND DROPPED THE SUBJECT (COMMENT: BUT WE DOUBT HE DROPPED HIS IDEAS).

14. POLCOUNS PRESSED SANJABI A BIT ON HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD A REGENCY COUNCIL, INCLUDING SANJABI'S OWN WILLINGNESS TO SERVE ON IT. SANJABI WAS NEGATIVE ON ANY COUNCIL APPOINTED BY THE SHAH. HE SAID SHAH WAS NOT CAPABLE OF APPOINTING GOOD LEADERS TO SUCH A COUNCIL. REGENCY COUNCIL CANNOT, IN ANY CASE, EXERCISE MORE AUTHORITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION THAN IS PERMITTED TO THE KING. THUS, WHO RUNS THE GOVT IS MORE IMPORTANT. SANJABI THEN DISCUSSED FOR A MOMENT THE

IDEA OF A NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO SET POLICY FOR A GOVT (THOUGH INSISTING NO SUCH COMMITTEE SHOULD ACTUALLY TRY TO REPLACE AND CARRY OUT THE FUNCTIONS OF A GOVT). HE REMINISCED ON THE UNOFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF 28-30 WHICH SERVED AS ADVISORS TO MOSSADEQ GOVT IN THE OLD DAYS. THEY USED TO MEET EVERY WEEK OR TWO, HE RECALLED.

15. FINALLY, SANJABI MADE THE POINT THAT THE OPPOSITION HAS NOTHING AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. HE ADMITTED POL COUNSELOR'S REMARK THAT THE BAHAIS MIGHT HAVE SOMETHING TO FEAR, BUT HE SAID THIS WAS ONLY FROM LOW-LEVEL MOBS. NOT THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP (COMMENT: NOT THAT THAT WOULD MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE). JEWS LOSE SOMETHING BY ASSOCIATION WITH ISRAEL, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE NOTHING AGAINST THEM OTHERWISE. HE REFERRED TO THE POLICY OF TOLERANCE DATING FROM SHAH ABBAS' DAY. AS HE ESCORTED POLCOUNS OUT, WITH MANY PLEDGES OF GOOD WILL AND HOPES FOR A BETTER FUTURE, HE SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC.

16. COMMENT: IN THIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE EMBASSY, SANJABI CLEARLY WANTED TO TRANSMIT WHAT HE CONSIDERS HIS OWN GOOD WILL, ENLIGHTENED IDEAS, AND PRO-WESTERN ATTITUDE FOR THE ATTENTION OF THE USG, BUT INDIRECTLY. THERE WAS NOTHING OF IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL IMPORTANCE IN WHAT HE SAID, BEYOND HIS WILLINGNESS TO WORK FOR NON-PROVOCATION OF THE ARMY. WITHOUT OPENLY IMPORTUNING, HE HOPES USG WILL IDENTIFY HIM AND HIS PARTY AS NO DANGER TO ITS INTERESTS IN IRAN AND INDEED A POTENTIAL ALLY. SANJABI DID NOT GO SIGNIFICANTLY BEYOND THE POSITION HE HAS ALREADY TAKEN IN PUBLIC, HOWEVER, AND INDEED WE DOUBT HE HAS GREAT MUCH TO TELL US AT THIS TIME. HE WAS HOPING TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE FUTURE. SULLIVAN
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TEHRAN 00733

CHRGE: STATE 1/15/7
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GPERETT:G
CLEAR: 1.POL:GLAMBR
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DC
ECON-2 PM IC
SY ADM CR
DAO AFOSI
CHRON/15

O 151344Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3915
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1907
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4255
RUFHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0949
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1291
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 2010
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0744
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1280
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3724
RUQMJA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3970
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5129
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0332
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4869
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4209
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1300
RUFHMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1392
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0734
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3381
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3625
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0263
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0111
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1279
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0901
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHCHQA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00733

E.O. 12065: GDS 1-15-85 (PERETT, G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT, JAN 15, 1979

SUMMARY: KHOMEINI URGES COOPERATION WITH ARMY AGAINST HOOLIGANS. HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE ANNOUNCED. GROUP CLAIMS CREDIT FOR GRIMM ASSASSINATION. WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS INCLUDE FRATERNIZATION WITH TROOPS. SENATE APPROVES BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. MORE DEMONSTRATIONS UNDERWAY. END SUMMARY.

1. WIDESPREAD DEMONSTRATIONS OCCURRED YESTERDAY BUT WERE GENERALLY WELL-DISCIPLINED AND NONVIOLENT. EXCEPTION WAS KERMAN, WHERE CROWDS REPORTEDLY DAMAGED LIQUOR STORES AND CINEMAS. CONSULATE TABRIZ REPORTS TERRORISTS ASSASSINATED A POLICE MAJOR (COMMANDER OF FIRST PRECINCT) AND HIS TWO BODYGUARDS WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE THIS MORNING AS THEY LEFT MAJOR'S HOUSE.

2. NETWORK OF "PEOPLES' JUSTICE" CONTINUES TO GAIN MOMENTUM. AYATOLLAH QOMI HAS CALLED FOR THE PEOPLE TO TAKE OVER SECURITY IN MASHAD, PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS MADE SIMILAR APPEAL IN TABRIZ, AND PRESS EVEN REPORTS A PEOPLES COURT ACTIVE IN SMALL TOWN OF ARDUMIEH NEAR REZAYIEH. COURT REPORTEDLY FINED FOUR MEN FOR EXTORTION. PRESS ALSO REPORTS TWO POLICEMEN WERE WOUNDED BY GUNFIRE SATURDAY NIGHT IN BEHBAHAN.

3. SAYED JALALEDDIN TEHRANI HAS BEEN NAMED CHAIRMAN OF REGENCY COUNCIL. SINCE COUNCIL IS FORMED UNDER ARTICLE 42, THERE IS NO STATUTORY REQUIREMENT AS TO ITS MEMBERSHIP. THIS IS WHY SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS NOT ON THE COUNCIL.

4. ELECTRICAL WORKERS HAVE ANNOUNCED RETURN TO NIGHTLY BLACKOUTS 2015-2145, AND TELEPHONE OPERATORS WILL HENCEFORTH ADD THEIR EFFORTS WITH WORK STOPPAGE 1000-1030 DAILY, PREVENTING LONG DISTANCE CALLS WITHIN THAT HALF HOUR.

5. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ISSUED COMMUNIQUE YESTERDAY, WARNING OF AN OUTSIDE PLOT BY VESTED INTERESTS WHICH TRIES TO SET THE PEOPLE AND THE ARMY AGAINST EACH OTHER. MERCENARIES ARE ATTACKING TROOPS AND GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS TO MAKE ARMY THINK THAT THE PEOPLE WISH TO DESTROY THEM. "THE PUBLIC IS DUTY BOUND TO TREAT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY AND ARMED FORCES WITH BROTHERLY KINDNESS AND TO DEFEND THEM AGAINST ANY POSSIBLE ATTACK BY THE HOOLIGANS. THE ARMY AND MEMBERS OF THE POLICE ARE ALSO DUTY BOUND TO ACT TOWARDS THE PUBLIC WITH KINDNESS AND IN BROTHERLY MANNER AND REALIZE THAT IF ATTACKED BY HOOLIGANS THE NATION IS NOT TO BLAME BUT THAT IT IS INSPIRED BY FOREIGN AGENTS AND ADVENTURERS WHO INTEND TO MAKE TROUBLE." AYATOLLAH DAST-GHEIB OF SHIRAZ ISSUED SIMILAR WARNING.

6. KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL REPORTEDLY WILL INCLUDE DR. IBRAHIM YAZDI, ENG. MEHDI BAZARGAN, SADEGH QOTBZADEH, FAZLOLLAH BANI SADR, AND RETIRED REAR ADMIRAL AHMAD MADANI. KHOMEINI'S CAMP HAS NOT CONFIRMED THE LIST.

7. SENATE TODAY VOTED CONFIDENCE IN BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. VOTE WAS 38-1, WITH 2 ABSTENTIONS. MAJLIS WILL RESUME DEBATE TOMORROW.

8. AYATOLLAH KHONSARI OF TEHRAN HAS ISSUED OPEN LETTER TO BAKHTIAR, ADMONISHING HIM FOR HIS SLANDER TOWARD KHOMEINI. HE PRINCIPALLY CRITICIZES BAKHTIAR FOR

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O 151344Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3316
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1908
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4256
RUEHGB/USINT BAGHDAD 0950
RUFROL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1292
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 2011
RUQMCD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0745
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1281
RUSPCL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3725
RUQMBA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3971
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5130
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0333
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4870
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4210
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1301
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1383
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0735
RUSBAH/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3382
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3626
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0264
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0112
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1280
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0902
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHCHQA/USCINCPAC
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00733

SUGGESTING THAT KHOMEINI IS SURROUNDED BY COMMUNIST ELEMENTS.

9. A GROUP CALLED THE "MOVAHEDDIN" HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR ASSASSINATION OF OSCO ACTING MANAGER PAUL GRIMM IN AHWAZ LAST MONTH. THE NAME IS A NEW ONE, AND WE WILL ATTEMPT TO LEARN MORE ABOUT IT.

10. AMERICAN MARTIN BERKOVITZ, EMPLOYEE WITH PARSONS-JURDEN, DIED YESTERDAY IN KERMAN. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE THUS FAR TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEATH WAS DUE TO NATURAL CAUSES OR FOUL PLAY.

11. IRANIAN NATIONAL FRONT SPONSORED A MARCH IN BAZAAR AREA THIS MORNING. BAZAARIS THEMSELVES HAVE LITTLE USE FOR INF, BUT OTHER ELEMENTS UNDOUBTEDLY JOINED IN. LARGE DEMONSTRATION TOOK PLACE IN SHIRAZ NEAR CONSULATE THIS MORNING. FOCUS OF RALLY WAS ELSEWHERE, HOWEVER, AND THE WELL-DISCIPLINED CROWD DID NOT BOTHER CONSULATE.
SULLIVAN
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#0733

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O 170850Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3065
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 02809

LIMDIS

CHRGE: STATE 1-16-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:IAL
CLEAR: POL:GELAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM OR
CERON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-16-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, IR, PINT
SUBJECT: SHARIATMADARI REPORTEDLY SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

SUMMARY: POLITICAL BROKER SAID AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI WOULD LIKE QUIET U.S. SUPPORT FOR MODERATE RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE TO KHOMEINI. SOURCE PORTRAYED COMMUNISTS AND OTHER RADICALS AS GROWING STRONGER EVERY DAY AND SUGGESTED KHOMEINI GROUP COULD NOT REALLY CONTROL IRAN EVEN IF KHOMEINI RETURNED. SOURCE GAVE KHOMEINI GROUP ABOUT TWO TO THREE WEEKS BEFORE IT WAS SWAMPED BY COMBINATION OF PROBLEMS OF MODERN IRAN AND LEFTIST MILITANTS. THIS IS A COMMON VIEW, BUT ONE WHICH HAS NOT BEEN PROVED. END SUMMARY.

1. HEDAYAT ESLAMINIA CALLED ON POLOFFS STEMPEL AND PERETT MORNING JAN 15 TO DISCUSS PRESENT SITUATION AND PASS ALONG MESSAGE WHICH HE SAID CAME DIRECTLY FROM AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI. ESLAMINIA SET STAGE FOR SHARIATMADARI MESSAGE WITH FAMILIAR PITCH: GOI HAD PROVED ITSELF INCOMPETENT TO HANDLE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. IT COULDN'T EVEN BRIBE SUCCESSFULLY. PRESENT WAVE OF DEMONSTRATIONS HAD DISINTEGRATED TO CHAOS--TEHRAN ULEMA HAD RECENTLY CALLED FOR CALM AND WERE NOT BEING OBEYED (COMMENT: TRUE TO A POINT; BUT MOST OF DEMONSTRATIONS CURRENTLY GOING ON THIS WEEK ARE ORGANIZED BY THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) AND FAIRLY-WELL DISCIPLINED.). COMMUNISTS AND RADICALS HAVE THE ORGANIZATION TO REALLY CAUSE TROUBLE, THEY ARE READY TO DO SO. IN COMPARISON, MULLAHS ARE NOT WELL ORGANIZED.

2. BULK OF PEOPLE INCLUDING MAJOR RELIGIOUS LEADERS (HE INCLUDED EVERYBODY BUT KHOMEINI) DO NOT WANT CHAOS. STORE-KEEPERS AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN INTIMIDATED INTO STAYING CLOSED BUT WOULD LIKE TO OPEN. IT WILL BE VERY HARD TO GET STRIKERS BACK TO WORK UNDER ANY GOVERNMENT SINCE AUTHORITY HAS VIRTUALLY COLLAPSED.

3. MODERATE IN-COUNTRY CLERGY GREATLY DISLIKE KHOMEINI, BUT THEY ARE AFRAID TO OPPOSE HIM PUBLICLY. NEVERTHELESS, SHARIATMADARI HAS SAID HE WILL TRY TO RALLY MODERATE ULEMA TO OPPOSE SUCH THINGS AS "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" OF KHOMEINI. (COMMENT: IN-COUNTRY CLERGY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER SHAH REMAIN AS MONARCH, EVEN IF HE TAKES A VACATION. THEY SEE HIM AS BULWARK AGAINST BOLSHEVISM.) EMBOFF WONDERED WHAT HAD TAKEN MODERATES SO LONG TO REACT TO KHOMEINI. ESLAMINIA SAID THEY WERE SCARED; THAT WAS WHY IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT MODERATES KNEW THEY HAD "U.S. BACKING." EMBOFFS EXPLORED WHAT THIS MEANT. ESLAMINIA FIRST SAID IT MEANT HELP WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF ANY

ANTI-KHOMEINI EFFORT, THEN MOVED TO POSITION WHERE QUESTION OF U.S. SUPPORT WAS LARGELY TO BE PRO FORMA FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS TO BOLSTER AYATOLLAHS' SPIRITS. EMBOFFS PROFESSED TO BE AT A LOSS TO SEE WHAT U.S. COULD DO THAT WOULD NOT BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. THEY GENTLY CHIDED ESLAMINIA TO THE EFFECT THAT IF CLERGY WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO DO THIS ON THEIR OWN, IT APPEARED TO BE OF LITTLE USE TO OBTAIN FOREIGN "BACKING" WHICH COULD BE DISASTROUS IF DISCOVERED. ESLAMINIA REITERATED THAT SUCH BACKING HAD TO BE DISCREET.

4. AT THIS POINT, MEETING WAS JOINED BRIEFLY BY POLCOUNS, WHO REVIEWED PREVIOUS POINTS AND NOTED THAT IT WAS VERY LATE IN THE DAY FOR MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO FINALLY DECIDE TO GET STARTED ON SOMETHING. ESLAMINIA SIGHED AND AGREED, NOTING THAT GOI HAD BEEN SO COMPLETELY INEPT AT CORRALING RELIGIOUS SUPPORT THAT EVEN WHEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD WANTED TO WORK FOR THE REGIME, THE GOI AND THE COURT MINISTRY HAD BEEN TOO SLOW TO ACT.

5. EMBOFFS SAID THEY WOULD PRESENT ABOVE THOUGHTS TO AMBASSADOR. ESLAMINIA NOTED THAT IF USG REALLY WANTED TO SHOW SUPPORT FOR MODERATES AND EVENTUALLY WORK WITH THEM AS KHOMEINI EFFORT COLLAPSED, NOW WAS THE TIME TO BEGIN. MOREOVER, LIKE ALL AYATOLLAHS, SHARIATMADARI WANTED SUPPORT OF OTHER ULEMA. ANY EFFORT TO GAIN RELIGIOUS SUPPORT MUST INVOLVE CONTACTING OTHER MULLAHS, HOJATOLLAHS, ETC. AS WELL SO THAT WHEN SENIOR AYATOLLAH CALLS FOR SOME ACTION, OTHERS WILL SAY, "HE'S RIGHT!" EMBOFFS SAID THIS SOUNDED LIKE MAJOR EFFORT FOR A GOVERNMENT, NOT AN EMBASSY. ESLAMINIA JUST SMILED IN AGREEMENT.

6. COMMENT: ESLAMINIA IS SADDENED BY THE GOI OVER THE PAST NINE MONTHS. HE AND OTHERS TRIED EARLY IN 1978 TO GET REGIME TO DEAL SENSIBLY WITH THE MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. HE ACCEPTS (WITH SOME HEARTBURN) THE FACT THAT KHOMEINI APPEARS TO HAVE "WON" THIS ROUND BUT IS LOOKING BEYOND, TO THE TIME WHEN HE (AND OTHERS) FEEL THE OPPOSITION WILL BICKER AMONG ITSELF. ESLAMINIA FEELS THE U.S. SHOULD QUIETLY SUPPORT THE RELIGIOUS MODERATES TO PREVENT BT
#0809

NNNN

O 170850Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3066
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00809

LIMDIS

OF EASE THE UNPLEASANT DEVELOPMENTS TO COME. ESLAMINIA
HAS GOOD CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE LIKE SAVAK'S GEN. MOGHADAM.
WE ARE NOT SURE ON BEHALF OF WHOM, EXACTLY, ESLAMINIA IS
WORKING AT THIS STAGE; THEREFORE SOME CAUTION IS IN ORDER.
SULLIVAN
BT
#0809

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 0809/2

...ROCE JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3068
INFO
S E C R E T SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00811

EXDIS

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-16-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS ORGANIZER SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR MODERATES

REF: TEHRAN 0809

SUMMARY: SHARIATMADARI ORGANIZER QUERIED POLOFF ON PROJECTED SITUATION FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. RELIGIOUS MODERATES WOULD LIKE TO ORGANIZE FOR EXPECTED COLLAPSE OF KHOMEINI-LED GOVERNMENTAL SOLUTION. HE URGED U.S. BACKING, HOWEVER DISCREET, FOR THIS EFFORT AND EXPRESSED REAL FEAR THAT "FOREIGN HAND" WAS BEHIND KHOMEINI. END SUMMARY.

1. POLOFF STEMPEL MET WITH HEDAYAT ESLAMINIA AND DR. JAVAD MANAGHEBI, PROFESSOR AT EL AHIAT RELIGIOUS COLLEGE, TEHRAN (SEE LIMDIS MEMCON DATED APRIL 30, 1978) AND A CONFIDANTE OF AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI MORNING JAN 16. MANAGHEBI IS HEAD OF "BRAIN-TRUST" GROUP OF RELIGIOUS FIGURES WHO SHARE VIEWS OF MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, BUT HAVE MAINTAINED GOOD LINES WITH KHOMEINI CAMP.

2. IRANIAN PAIR WANTED U.S. VIEWS ON NUMBER OF HARD QUESTIONS: WILL KHOMEINI COME BACK AND WHEN? WILL HE MOVE VERY RAPIDLY TO DISCARD MONARCHY? EMBOFF SAID USG DID NOT HAVE DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO THESE QUESTIONS, BUT IT LOOKED LIKE KHOMEINI WOULD RETURN AT SOME POINT, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE EFFORT TO CHANGE GOVERNMENT. QUESTION OF WHETHER KHOMEINI WOULD SUCCEED DEPENDED ON EXACTLY WHAT HE TRIED TO DO AND MILITARY REACTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THERE WAS SOME ROOM, EMBOFF OPINED, FOR MODERATE RELIGIOUS PRESSURE ON KHOMEINI NOT TO MOVE TOO FAST.

3. MANAGHEBI SAID IT WAS SHARIATMADARI (AND HIS GROUP'S) VIEW THAT IT WAS USELESS TO TRY TO PROP UP BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT; THE SOONER KHOMEINI TOOK POWER AND "THE PEOPLE" SAW THAT HEAVEN WOULD NOT BE FORTHCOMING WITHIN THE MONTH, THE SOONER SERIOUS WORK COULD BE DONE IN "REBUILDING" IRAN. BIG PROBLEM WAS WHETHER KHOMEINI DRIVE FOR ISLAMIC REPUBLIC COULD BE MUTED OR SLOWED DOWN ENOUGH FOR STRAINS IN OPPOSITION TO DEVELOP. MANAGHEBI SAID KHOMEINI HIMSELF WAS STAUNCHLY ANTI-COMMUNIST. YAZDI, GHOTBZADEH, BANISADR AND SOME OF THE YOUNGER MEN AROUND HIM IN PARIS WERE RADICAL MARXISTS BENT ON "DESTROYING THE IRANIAN NATION, AND MODERATE AYATOLLAHS KNOW THIS. FOR "UNHOLY TRIO AND HOLY MAN" THE "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" WAS A SHAM. MANAGHEBI RETURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE THEME THAT A "FOREIGN HAND" WAS BEHIND KHOMEINI. HE READILY ACCEPTED [illegible]'S ASSURANCES THAT IT WAS NOT REPT NOT USG, BUT

THOUGHT IT WAS PROBABLY THE RUSSIANS AND MIGHT BE THE BRITISH. EMBOFF REPLIED USG THOUGHT THERE WAS NO MASSIVE SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN SOURCES, BUT IT WAS CLEAR USSR WAS "MEDDLING" IN TROUBLED WATERS.

4. GROUP WHICH MANAGHEBI LED WAS READY TO WORK FOR MODERATION AND REDUCTION IN INFLUENCE OF LEFTIST RADICALS IN MOVEMENT AS LONG AS IT COULD BE CERTAIN ATTEMPT WAS NOT FOREDOMED TO FAILURE. IDEALLY, GROUP WANTED U.S. SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST GUARANTEE AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION AGAINST IT. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT USG FOLLOWED FOREIGN PROBLEM VERY CAREFULLY AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO; QUESTION OF FURTHER U.S. "SUPPORT" WOULD HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED ELSEWHERE, BUT EMBOFF THOUGHT THIS MIGHT NOT RPT NOT BE HELPFUL, GIVEN CURRENT ANTI-FOREIGN FEELING IN IRAN. IRANIAN PAIR AGREED THAT ANY SUCH SUPPORT WOULD HAVE TO BE MORE SYMBOLIC THAN ACTUAL. FOR NOW, SIMPLE ASSURANCE THAT USG THOUGHT ACTIVITY WAS WORTHWHILE WOULD BE HELPFUL. EMBOFF AVOIDED ANSWERING QUESTION, BUT NOTED USG FAVORED MODERATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

5. PAIR ASKED WHAT NEXT SIX MONTHS WOULD BRING. EMBOFF NOTED USG HAD SAME PROBLEM WITH CRYSTAL BALL THAT EVERYBODY ELSE HAD. MANAGHEBI THOUGHT IF REFERENDUM ON MONARCHY COULD BE PUT OFF FOR SIX MONTHS, IT COULD BE WON BY MONARCHY IF RELIGIOUS LEADERS COULD BECOME ACTIVE. PAIR WERE ABSOLUTELY CAUSTIC IN THEIR CRITICISM OF INEPTITUDE OF EVERYONE IN GOI FROM SHAH TO COURT MINISTER TO OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS. ESLAMINIA SAID SITUATION HAD COME TO PRESENT STATE BECAUSE SHAH "LOST HIMSELF" AND GOT NO HELP FROM THOSE WHO SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THEY HAD MOST TO LOOSE.

6. COMMENT: IT IS TEMPTING TO TOLE ABOVE IN TOO-LITTLE-TOO-LATE BASKET, AND CERTAINLY IT WAS CLEAR THAT BOTH MEN REALIZE TIME FOR MODERATE SOLUTION TO NEUTRALIZE KHOMINI HAS PASSED. COMMENTS, ESPECIALLY BY MANAGHEBI, SUGGEST STRAINS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO BREAK THROUGH IN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, AND SHARIATMADARI FORCES ARE BEGINNING TO LOOK AT THE POST-SHAH PHASE IN TERMS OF ENHANCING THEIR SF
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3069
BT
S E C R E T SECTION 02 TEHRAN 00811

EXDIS

OWN POSITION VIS-A-VIS THOSE WHOM THEY VIEW AS ENDANGERING ISLAM. MANAGHEBI IS AN IMPRESSIVELY INTELLIGENT PROFESSOR WHO HAS THE BEST GRASP OF PERSIAN POLITICS OF ANY OF THE RELIGIOUS FIGURES WITH WHOM REPORTING OFFICER HAS DEALT. HE IS IN HIS EARLY FIFTIES AND SPEAKS PERSIAN BUT VIRTUALLY NO ENGLISH. HE CLAIMS HIS NETWORK OF RELIGIOUS SUPPORTERS WAS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN INDUCING AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO MODERATE HIS STAND AGAINST ATTACKING FOREIGNERS (IT'S "UNISLAMIC", ACCORDING TO THE DR.). EMBASSY WILL KEEP IN TOUCH. SULLIVAN
BT
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S E C R E T/E X D I S TEHRAN 0

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00820

O 171145Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3075
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00820

CHRGE: STATE 1/16/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKI
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ~~POL~~ 3 AMB DCM ECON-2 PM OR CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1/16/88 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: FAILURE OF A MISSION TO KHOMEINI

REF: TEHRAN 341

1. KHOSROW EQBAL, WHO DEPARTED A WEEK AGO FULL OF HOPE TO CONVERT KHOMEINI TO HIS OWN VIEW OF MODERATION IN IRAN (SEE REFTEL) HAS SENT WORD BACK TO AN INTERMEDIARY THAT KHOMEINI IS AN "ARROGANT MONSTER." EQBAL APPARENTLY DID NOT GET THE PRIVATE TETE-A-TETE WITH KHOMEINI HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN PROMISED AND HAS REACHED THE (HASTY) CONCLUSION THAT KHOMEINI IS "SURROUNDED BY COMMUNISTS."

2. SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENTLY, EQBAL REFERRED TO WHAT HE SEES AS IRAN'S FATE (UNDER RIGID RELIGIOUS RULE) AS MOVING FROM LIFE UNDER A DICTATORSHIP OF THE BOOT TO LIFE UNDER A DICTATORSHIP OF THE SANDAL. A DISTRAUGHT BUT WISER MAN, OUR FRIEND EQBAL HAS REPORTEDLY EXTENDED HIS STAY IN FRANCE FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. SULLIVAN
BT
#0820

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 00820

R 171217Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3079
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 00824

CHRGE: STATE 1-17-7
APPRV: ICM;CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT
CLFAR: POL:GBLAMPRA
DISTR: PCI-3 AME L
ECON 2 PM IC
OR SHIR TAB
ISF CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RDS 1-17-85 (PERETT, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: ~~BAZAARIS' FEARS FOR~~ THE FUTURE

1. POLCOUNS AND EMBOFF PERETT MET WITH FOUR BAZAARIS JAN 14 IN HOME OF POLITICAL BROKER ESLAMINIA. THE BAZAARIS, MOST OF WHOM HAD MET PREVICUSLY WITH EMBOFFS, EXPRESSED GREAT APPREHENSION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF IRAN BUT HAD LITTLE IDEA OF HOW TO PREVENT CHAOS. THEY REPEATEDLY ASKED EMBOFFS WHAT THEY SHOULD DO, AND OUR RESPONSE THAT THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE SOLVED BY IRANIANS THEMSELVES DID NOT SATISFY THEM. ALL FEARED A BREAKUP OF THE ARMY, AND A SUBSEQUENT WAVE OF ANARCHY WHICH THEY COULD NOT STOP. THIS WAVE CONSISTS OF THE MASSES, MOSTLY YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO KNOW NOTHING BUT HAVE THE POWER TO DISRUPT NORMAL BUSINESS LIFE. THESE PEOPLE ARE NOW CONTROLLED BY COMMUNISTS, AND THE BUSINESS LEADERS CANNOT RESIST THEM. THEY FEAR GENUINE ANARCHY AND BELIEVE THINGS MIGHT GET SO BAD THAT TRIBAL LEADERS, FREE FROM CENTRAL CONTROL, WILL SIMPLY SEIZE ANCESTRAL QASHQAI AND BAKHTIARI LANDS.

2. IT ALL HAS TO STOP SOMEWHERE. AT SOME POINT THE GOVT MUST SAY: "NOW WE HAVE FULFILLED ALL YOUR DEMANDS. GET BACK TO WORK." THE BAZAARIS WERE NOT SURE, HOWEVER, HOW THIS COULD BE DONE. THEY SAID AT ONE POINT THAT THE BAKHTIAR GOVT MIGHT SUCCEED IN RESTORING ORDER IF BAKHTIAR LIVES UP TO HIS PROMISES, PARTICULARLY THAT OF PUNISHING THE GUILTY. (THE BAZAARIS, LIKE MOST OTHER PEOPLE WE MEET, DEMAND TO SEE BODIES SWAYING AT THE END OF A ROPE BEFORE THEY WILL TRUST ANY GOVT.) THEY SAID, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT ANY NEW GOVT MUST USE KHOMEINI'S INFLUENCE TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS, AND THEY ADDED THAT THEY WERE ALL 100 PERCENT BEHIND KHOMEINI. UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTACT KHOMEINI. BUT WE MUST DEAL WITH THE MAN HIMSELF; HIS ADVISORS MISREPRESENT HIS VIEWS. (THERE WAS DISCUSSION AND SOME DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER KHOMEINI'S AIDES ARE OUTRIGHT COMMUNIST OR NOT.)

3. AS FOR THEIR OWN EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE, THE BAZAARIS HAD LITTLE TO SAY APART FROM THEIR APPREHENSION. THEY BELIEVED PEOPLE WOULD NOT ACCEPT A KING, UNLESS PERHAPS HE REIGNED LIKE THE KING OF ENGLAND. IF FREE ELECTIONS ARE HELD, THEY DO NOT PLAN TO VOTE, FEARING TO BECOME INVOLVED POLITICALLY, BUT THEIR EMPLOYEES WILL.

4. COMMENT: THESE TRADITIONAL BUSINESSMEN ARE FRIGHTENED AND CONFUSED. WHEN WE FIRST MET THEM TWO MONTHS AGO, THEY HAD A LIST OF SPECIFIC DEMANDS WHICH, IF SATISFIED, WOULD LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS. NOW THEY SIMPLY WANT PEACE BUT DO NOT KNOW HOW TO OBTAIN IT. IN SEARCH OF AN ANSWER THEY, LIKE SO MANY IRANIANS OF EVERY POLITICAL PERSUASION, TURN TO USG. WHEN WE SAID WE WERE IN NO

POSITION TO DO ANYTHING DIRECTLY. THEY NODDED BUT SHORTLY
RETURNED TO THE SAME QUESTION. THEY WILL GLADLY RALLY TO
ANY PROMISE OF RESTORED STABILITY--SUBJECT, AS IN ALL
THINGS, TO THE APPROVAL OF KHOMEINI. SULLIVAN
ET
#0824

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 0

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 00818

C 171139Z JAN 79 CHRGE: STATE 1/17/79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3074 INFO: POL:GBLAMBRAK
BT CLEAR: NONE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN, 00818 DISTR: POL 3 AMB ICM
ECON-2 PM ICA
OR AIM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/1

E.O. 12065: GDS-4 1/17/89 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI'S PLANS

1. SOURCE WITH ACCESS, BUT NOT ESPECIALLY IMPRESSIVE TRACK RECORD, TOLD POL COUNSELOR JAN 17 THAT RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT'S DR. HEJAZI SAW SHARIAT-MADARI IN QOM A DAY OR TWO AGO. SHARIAT-MADARI TOLD HIM:

-- A. KHOMEINI WILL RETURN TO IRAN NEXT SATURDAY OR SUNDAY (JAN 20 OR 21).

-- B. DEMONSTRATORS ON JAN 19 WILL TAKE OVER THE PALACE.

-- C. KHOMEINI'S ORIGINAL PLAN TO RETURN THE DAY AFTER THE SHAH LEFT HAD BEEN CHANGED BECAUSE BAKHTIAR REFUSED TO RESIGN. HOWEVER, SHARIAT-MADARI DOUBTS BAKHTIAR CAN END THE STRIKES OR HOLD ON MUCH LONGER AGAINST KHOMEINI'S OPPOSITION.

2. ABOVE PUTS KHOMEINI'S RETURN SOMEWHAT EARLIER THAN LATEST INFORMATION FROM LMI SOURCES. ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER PALACE WOULD PROVOKE DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH IRANIAN MILITARY, WHICH WOULD BE CONTRADICTORY TO KHOMEINI'S PUBLICLY STATED POLICIES. THEREFORE, THIS REPORT MAY MERELY REFLECT SHARIAT-MADARI'S MOST DEEP-SEATED FEARS, OR, GIVEN OUR SOURCE'S RATHER EMOTIONAL VIEWPOINT, MAY ALSO CONTAIN SOME OF HIS OWN PERSONAL CONCERNS. SULLIVAN
BT
#0818

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 00818

S E C R E T

NNNNVV ESA790BRA806
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC 2526 0171200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171135Z JAN 79

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4413
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2317
RUENKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1349
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0895
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4286
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8591
RUTAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4462
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6171
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 9014
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7116
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4406
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9511
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1572
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5614
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUHGHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2376
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR ATHENS
RAFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GE
RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
BT
S E C R E T STATE 012526

STUTTGART FOR ELG - ALNED TAKE AS IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12065: GDS 1-17-79 (MARTIN, ROBERT)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 98, 1-17-70N PRPP HOURS EST

POLITICAL/SECURITY

17 JAN 79 25Z

031025

ACTION:
~~POL 3~~
INFO:
AMB
DCM
ECON 2
PM
OR
ICA
ADM
ISF
SHIR
TABR
CRU 2
11 GAM

THE EMBASSY HAS BEEN TOLD THAT AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI WOULD LIKE QUIET US SUPPORT FOR A MODERATE RELIGIOUS CHALLENGE TO KHOMEINI. THE INTERLOCUTOR SAID THE REASON

FOR THIS IS THE DAILY GROWING STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNISTS AND OTHER RADICALS, AND SUGGESTED THIS GROWTH HAS REACHED A POINT THAT THE KHOMEINI GROUP COULD NOT REALLY CONTROL IRAN EVEN IF KHOMEINI RETURNED.

IRAN IS QUIET TODAY. AFTER YESTERDAY'S REVELRY WITH ITS CACOPHONOUS DIN THE DEEP BREATH TODAY IS ALMOST AUDIBLE, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO PREPARATIONS FOR THE JANUARY 19 MARCH WHICH KHOMEINI IS URGING BE THE GREATEST DEMONSTRATION IN IRAN'S HISTORY.

SPECULATION AND RUMORS ABOUT KHOMEINI'S POSSIBLE TRAVEL PLANS COMPLETELY BOX THE COMPASS, WITH SLIGHT TILT IN THE DIRECTION OF WAITING TO SEE HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE MILITARY'S ACTIVITIES DEVELOP BEFORE RETURNING TO IRAN. HIS JANUARY 16 STATEMENT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS TO THOSE REPORTED EARLIER :

--FARMERS SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE POLITICALLY, AND STOP WHEAT EXPORTS; AND

--ISLAMIC, NO INTEREST BANKS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.

THERE IS INTENSE DISARRAY IN THE NATIONAL RADIO AND TV BUREAUCRACY. ALL RADIO WAS STOPPED YESTERDAY, BUT RESUMED TODAY. RUMORS PERSIST THAT THE INTERNATIONAL TV CHANNEL IN ENGLISH WILL BE CLOSED. THE REASON GIVEN IS BAKHTIAR'S COMMENT TO THE MAJLIS THAT MANY OF THE NIRT STRIKERS ARE IN FACT SAVAK AGENTS WHO ARE NOW PRESSING FOR THE FREEDOM TO BROADCAST. THERE IS THOUGHT TO BE SOME TRUTH IN THE POINT. VANCE
BT
2526

S E C R E T

BT
5428

SECRET

NNNNVV ESA228BRA946 18 JAN 79 001103
OO RUQMHR
DE RUEHC 3699 018 1256
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 1312Z1Z JAN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4433
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2344
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1380
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0934
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4297
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8618
RUTAGL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4493
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6232
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 9026
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7134
RUFHOLD/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4408
RUQMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9519
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1580
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5632
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINHEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUHQHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2391
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR IMMEDIATE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GE IMMEDIATE
RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
BT
S E C R E T STATE 013699

ACTION
~~POL3~~
INFO
AMB
DCM
OR
ICA
ADM
PM
EC2
CRU2
9J

STUTTGART FOR ELG

E.O. 12065 : GDS 1/18/35 (MARTIN, ROBERT A.)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 100, 1/18/79
ALL POSTS TAKE ACTION IMMEDIATE
POLITICAL/SECURITY

1. PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR PRIVATELY HAS CONFIRMED THAT HIS JUSTICE MINISTER, MR. BAZIRI, RESIGNED JANUARY 17. BAZIRI CLAIMED THAT HIS MINISTRY LACKED THE TECHNICAL AND MANPOWER CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE THOSE CHARGED WITH CORRUPTION. THERE IS SOME SPECULATION THAT THIS MOVE IS A RESULT OF THREATS AGAINST BAZIRI BY STRIKING JUSTICE MINISTRY WORKERS. BAZIRI HAD EARLIER BEEN PHYSICALLY EJECTED ON ONE OCASION FROM HIS OFFICE. THIS IS CLEARLY A BLOW TO BAKHTIAR.

SECRET

2. FIFTEEN MAJLIS DEPUTIES ALSO RESIGNED YESTERDAY CLAIMING THEY WERE UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR DUTIES UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS. THEY WERE OPPOSITION FIGURES. THE MOVE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE KHOMEINI CALL TO RESIGN IN ORDER TO PAVE THE WAY FOR HIS NEW GOVERNMENT.

3. THE CLERGY HAS ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE JANUARY 19 MARCH, CALLING FOR IT TO BE A PURELY ISLAMIC EVENT; THERE SHOULD BE NO SLOGANS OR BANNERS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ISLAM. THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT, THE POLITICAL GROUP

LINKED TO KHOMEINI, WILL RUN THE MARCH. THE NATIONAL FRONT HAS URGED ITS SUPPORTERS TO PARTICIPATE. SINCE IT IS AN OFFICIAL DAY OF MOURNING THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE TO MAKE PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS URGING SUPPORT, AND HAS NOT MADE ANY COMMENT.

4. IRAN IS AGAIN SUBSTANTIALLY QUIET AS PREPARATIONS CONTINUE FOR THE HUGE MARCH TOMORROW.

5. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE IRANIAN AMBASSADORS TO THE UK, BRAZIL, ITALY, INDIA, SYRIA, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE BEEN FIRED.

SAFETY OF AMERICANS

1. THE AIRPORT IN TEHRAN WAS OPERATING NORMALLY TODAY UNDER OVERCAST SKIES; HOWEVER, VISIBILITY WAS GOOD. PAN AM'S 747 CARRIED 335 PASSENGERS. LUFTHANSA, BRITISH AIRWAYS, AIR FRANCE, SWISSAIR, ALITALIA, SABENA, KLM, AND THE CZECH AND FINNISH AIRLINES HAD FLIGHTS.

2. ACCORDING TO ALL REPORTS THE AIRPORT WILL BE CLOSED JANUARY 19. BECAUSE OF THAT PAN AM PLANS TWO 747S JANUARY 20. VANCE
BT
3699

SECRET

0 181405Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3142
INFO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00926

CHRGE: STATE 1/18/79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:CC
CLEAR: 1.POL:GBLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
PM OR ECON
CHRON/9

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-18-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF IRAN (LMI) SEEKS TO CALM SITUATION DOWN, ACCELERATE ITS PROGRESS.

REF: (A) TEHRAN 0833, (B) PARIS 1707,

SUMMARY: LMI SOURCE SPEAKING FOR MEHDI BAZARGAN, URGED EMBASSY TO CONTINUE EXERTING ITS INFLUENCE ON THE IRANIAN MILITARY NOT TO FIRE ON AND OTHERWISE ATTACK CROWDS. BAZARGAN ALSO WANTS U.S. TO KNOW THAT ACCELERATED TIMETABLE FOR LMI MOVE INTO GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY IF SUBSTANTIAL LEFTIST GAINS ARE TO BE FORESTALLED. LMI FEELS THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN KHOMEINI'S ALTERNATIVE COUNCIL AND PRESENT GOI WILL SORT ITSELF OUT WITH MINIMAL PROBLEMS, AND THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL TAKE OVER. THIS SUGGESTS RUMORS OF A DEAL BETWEEN BAKHTIAR AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT MAY HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE. MEANWHILE QUESTIONS OF TIMING OF KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN AND OTHER UNCERTAINTIES INDICATE KHOMEINI AND HIS AIDES ARE CAREFULLY ANALYZING THEIR SITUATION BEFORE THEY DECIDE WHICH WAY TO JUMP. END SUMMARY.

1. MOHAMMAD TAVASSOLI (AKA TAVAKOLI),SENIOR LMI OFFICIAL, CALLED ON POLOFF STEMPEL UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM LMI CHIEF BAZARGAN TO MAKE TWO POINTS: (A) LMI WAS GRATEFUL TO U.S. FOR ITS EFFORTS AT KEEPING IRANIAN MILITARY FROM TAKING OVER VIA MILITARY COUP AND URGED USG TO CONTINUE, AND (B) IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO SPEED UP ITS TIMETABLE IF SEVERE TUDEH (COMMUNIST) INROADS WERE NOT TO BE MADE IN PRESENT IRANIAN BODY POLITIC.

2. ON QUESTION OF KEEPING MILITARY UNDER CONTROL, SOURCE RECOUNTED LMI VIEW OF SITUATION IN AHWAZ OVER PAST TWO DAYS FROM MOVEMENT'S OWN OFFICERS ON THE SPOT: EVENING JAN 16, ARMY TOOK DOWN SHAH'S STATUE TO PREVENT IT FROM BEING DESECRATED. CROWDS CHEERED, AND KEPT UP SHOUTING THROUGHOUT NIGHT. FOLLOWING DAY, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF KHUZISTAN, GENERAL JA'FARIAN ADDRESSED TROOPS AT MORNING MUSTER AND READ SHAH'S FINAL LETTER URGING TROOPS TO KEEP THE NATION SAFE. IN EMOTIONAL ADDRESS, JA'FARIAN THEN URGED TROOPS TO DO WHAT THEY COULD TO DEFEND SHAH'S POSITION. SUBSEQUENTLY, CROWDS TAUNTED TROOPS AND SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS REACTED, BEATING THEM UP AND CHASING THEM OFF WITH FIRE. TANKS THEN WERE SENT INTO STREETS, BASHING CARS AND FIRING AT PEOPLE. THIS CAUSED SEVERE CONFLICT BETWEEN GENERAL JA'FARIAN AND AHWAZ MILITARY GOVERNOR SHAMS-TABRIZI. AS RESULT, "SOMEONE" (WHO NOT KNOWN, BUT PRESUMABLY OFFICIALLY RELATED) FORMED GROUP OF CLUB-WIELDERS, WHO THEN WENT ABOUT ATTACKING PEOPLE IN

CITY AND AT JONDI SHAPUR UNIVERSITY. BY AFTERNOON, JAN 17, PEOPLE WERE HUDDLED IN THEIR HOUSES AND FEARFUL OF COMING OUT. LMI ESTIMATES OF KILLED ARE ABOUT 30, WITH OTHERS SERIOUSLY INJURED. (COMMENT: THIS IS NOT OUT OF LINE WITH OTHER REPORTS.)

3. LMI SAYS SIMILAR BUT NOT AS VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAPPENED IN DEZFUL, GILAN, AND ARAK. LMI URGED USG TO CONTINUE TO PRESS MILITARY TO MAINTAIN RESTRAINT. EMBOFF SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO, BUT EMPHASIZED STRONGLY CONCURRENT NEED FOR LMI TO RESTRAIN EXCESSES OF CROWD ENTHUSIASM, AND TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH MILITARY LEADERS WHO, WE ARE CONVINCED, DO NOT RPT NOT WANT BLOODSHED EITHER. SOURCE TOOK THE POINT WITH MUCH MORE GRACE AND MUCH LESS ARGUMENT THAN PREVIOUSLY.

4. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO POLITICS OF PRESENT SITUATION: TAVASSOLI SAID LMI BELIEVED LEFTISTS WERE GETTING STRONGER. TUDEH SPEAKERS, ESPECIALLY RECENTLY-RELEASED LEADER BEHAZIN (MOHAMMAD ETEMADZADEH) WHO HAD CALLED FOR PLAIN REPUBLIC, NOT ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, WERE TALKING EVERYWHERE. UNIVERSITY GROUPS WERE ALSO ACTIVE, AND SOME VIOLENCE ALREADY HAD OCCURRED BETWEEN ISLAMIC AND RADICAL LEFTIST STUDENTS AT TEHRAN UNIVERSITY.

5. SITUATION CLEARLY CALLED FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO ACCELERATE ITS TIMETABLE. BAZARGAN WANTED USG TO KNOW THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, AND APPEAL FOR OUR SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING. WHEN ASKED WHAT SUPPORT WAS WANTED, TAVASSOLI SAID SIMPLY UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE MOVEMENT WAS GOING, AND INFLUENCE WITH MILITARY TO PREVENT MILITARY "DISRUPTING" UNFOLDING ARRANGEMENTS. EMBOFF SAID USG SUPPORTED PEACEFUL, ORDERLY SOLUTION, AND URGED LMI TO WORK THIS OUT WITH PRESENT GOI. TAVASSOLI SAID THIS WAS UNDERWAY.

6. TIMETABLE, ACCORDING TO BAZARGAN, IS AS FOLLOWS: KHOMEINI WILL ANNOUNCE NAMES OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL JAN 19 OR 20. BAZARGAN AND NATIONAL FRONT CHIEF
BT
#0926

NNNN

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—225-323

O 181405Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5143
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 00926

LIMDIS

KARIM SANJABI WILL CERTAINLY BE ON COUNCIL, BUT OTHER NAMES NOT RPT NOT KNOWN. ONE IMPORTANT POINT: THERE WILL BE NO RPT NO RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON COUNCIL. TAVASSOLI SAID PRESENT PLANS WHICH ARE NOT FULLY WORKED OUT INCLUDE SPECIAL "ADVISORY GROUP" OF KEY RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS AYATOLLAHS TALEQANI, MONTAZERI, ETC. FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT OF ISLAMIC COUNCIL, PRESUMABLY RESIGNATIONS OF MAJLES MEMBERS AND MINISTER, WHICH ALREADY STARTED JAN 17, WILL CONTINUE. PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR IS EXPECTED THEN "TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE" TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH WILL SCHEDULE ELECTIONS FAIRLY SOON (TAVASSOLI THOUGHT ABOUT TWO OR THREE MONTHS WERE THE WORKING TIME FRAME, BUT NO FIRM DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE).

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KHOMEINI COUNCIL AND REGENCY COUNCIL, TO WHICH ARMY WAS LOYAL, TAVASSOLI SAID HE KNEW EFFORTS WERE UNDERWAY TO WORK OUT SOME KIND OF A DEAL, BUT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT (COMMENT: TAVASSOLI IS APPARENTLY UNAWARE OF MINATCHI EFFORTS -- SEE REF A, PARA TWO).

8. QUESTION OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN IS STILL SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN, BUT CURRENT THINKING OF KHOMEINI HIMSELF AS EXPRESSED TO BAZARGAN IS TO DELAY HIS RETURN UNTIL ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS INHERITED MANTLE OF POWER, AND "ARMY IS UNDER MORE CONTROL". THIS DECISION WAS UNDER STEADY REVIEW. SOURCE THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN KHOMEINI RETURN TO IRAN IN SIX TO TEN DAYS FROM NOW. DISCUSSION ENDED WITH SOURCE'S PROMISE TO KEEP IN MORE REGULAR CONTACT OVER NEXT FEW DAYS.

9. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: TAVASSOLI WAS THE MOST FORTHCOMING HE HAS EVER BEEN WITH REPORTING OFFICER, AND SEEMED TO SAY BY HIS DEMEANOR THAT USG WAS BEING MORE "REALISTIC" IN APPRAISAL OF SITUATION THAN IT HAD BEEN BEFORE. HE MADE IT CLEAR HE WAS SPEAKING ON ORDERS FROM BAZARGAN, WHO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT USG UNDERSTOOD POINTS HE PRESENTED. TO THIS DEGREE, HE WAS AS FORTHCOMING ABOUT LMI FUTURE INTENTIONS AS HE HAS EVER BEEN ON ANYTHING, AND WILLING TO SPECIFY AREAS IN WHICH HE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED. WHILE HE EITHER DOESN'T KNOW ABOUT EFFORTS TO RECONCILE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI COUNCIL (REF A) OR IS A MASTER DISSEMBLER (REPORTING OFFICER BELIEVES THE FORMER), HE IS CONVINCED THAT SOLUTION FOR TRANSFER WILL BE WORKED OUT. BREEZY WAY BOTH TAVASSOLI AND ENTEZAM PASS OVER PROBLEMS OF HANDLING LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT IN ALTERNATIVE ISLAMIC FRAMEWORK SUGGESTS SOME CREDENCE TO RUMORS THAT BAKHTIAR HAS ALREADY DONE A DEAL OF SORTS WITH KHOMEINI

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1977—213-323

(SEE SRI REPORTING). EVEN IF THIS IS THE CASE, LMI SEEMS TO BE IGNORING ROLE OF MILITARY, WHICH ACCORDING TO OUR LIGHTS, IS BY NO MEANS READY TO LIE DOWN AND ACCEPT LMI SOLUTION WITHOUT SOME HARD ARGUMENT AND INFIGHTING.

10. ON QUESTION OF TIMING OF KHOMEINI RETURN, THIS IS FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD ANY RESPONSIBLE MOVEMENT FIGURE SUGGEST KHOMEINI WOULD DELAY RETURN TO IRAN AS LONG AS IT TOOK TO GET ISLAMIC STRUCTURE IN PLACE, EITHER THROUGH TAKEOVER OR COMPROMISE. PROBLEM WITH THIS PROJECTION, FROM KHOMEINI'S VIEW, MUST BE THAT HE IS ALREADY UNDER PRESSURE FROM IN-COUNTRY GROUPS TO RETURN. LOCAL PRESS HAD CARRIED SEVERAL APPEALS TO HIM TO COME BACK, AND ALI AMINI IS REPORTEDLY IN PARIS TO URGE HIM TO RETURN. WE ASSUME AT LEAST SOME OF THESE APPEALS ARE GENUINE, NOT JUST THE EXPECTED PERSIAN "TAAROF".

11. CONVERSATIONS WITH LMI FIGURES OVER PAST TWO-THREE DAYS, PLUS KINDS OF STATEMENTS COMING OUT OF PARIS (SEE REF B FOR EXAMPLE) SUGGEST SOME UNCERTAINTIES IN KHOMEINI THINKING, AND INCREASING BACK AND FORTH COMMENTS BETWEEN KHOMEINI AIDES. APPEARS TO US AT THIS POINT THAT, WHILE NEGOTIATIONS AND TALKS GO ON HERE, THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL INDECISION AND SORTING OUT GOING ON IN PARIS. GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES HERE IN IRAN AS WELL AS THOSE IN PARIS, IT IS CLEAR WE ARE NEITHER OUT OF THE POLITICAL WOODS, NOR YET FULLY ENGAGED IN WHAT COULD BE INTENSELY POLITICAL PROCESS OF RECONCILING IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES. ABOUT THE ONLY REALLY POSITIVE FEATURE OF THIS IS THAT KHOMEINI, FOR WHATEVER REASON, HAS HELD BACK FROM IMMEDIATE RETURN TO IRAN, THUS LEAVING SOME ROOM FOR MORE NEGOTIATION, AT LEAST FOR NOW. SULLIVAN
BT
#0926

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 0926

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323

892

P 180948Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3116
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 0392

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/18/99 (PERETT, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION VIEWS

ORIGIN: STATE 1/18/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT:EG
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMERAKIS
DISTR: POL 3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM ICA
OR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/15

SUMMARY: ECLECTIC GROUP OF OPPOSITIONISTS DELIVERED 3-HOUR HARANGUE TO EMBOFFS, BLAMING USG VIA THE SHAH FOR IRAN'S ILLS. END SUMMARY

1. EMBOFFS ESCUDERO AND PERETT MET WITH ECLECTIC GROUP OF OPPOSITIONISTS JAN 12 IN HOME OF DR. HAVAI. COLLECTION OF ABOUT TWO DOZEN MEN INCLUDED, WELL KNOWN DISSIDENT WRITER HAJ SAEED JAVADI, PHYSICIANS, LAWYERS, PROFESSORS, A BAZAARI AND AN AGRICULTURIST. (THERE WERE ALSO 3-4 SCARVED WOMEN HUDDLED IN A CORNER FOR THE LATTER PART OF THE MEETING. THEY SAID NOTHING UNTIL ONE FINALLY BECAME SO ANGRY SHE JOINED IN THE FRAY, BUT THE MEN IGNORED HER). SIZE OF THE GATHERING HINDERED INTIMATE CONVERSATION, BUT HAVAI WANTED TO ASSEMBLE A BROAD CROSS-SECTION OF DISSIDENTS SO THEY COULD HAVE A GO AT THE EMBASSY. DESPITE THE VARIETY OF PROFESSIONS AND THE PRESENCE OF ONE BAZAARI, THIS WAS BASICALLY A NATIONAL FRONT CROWD, AND THEY SPOKE LITTLE ABOUT ISLAM OR THE AYATOLLAHS.

2. EXCEPT FOR THE PROBLEM OF FIGHTING FOR THE TURN TO SPEAK, THE GROUP HAD A GRAND TIME. THEY WERE POLITE BUT PITILESS IN ASSAILING USG POLICY AND OUR PUPPET SHAH. EMBOFF DELIVERED OUR SEMI-OFFICIAL EMBASSY MESSAGE THAT TROOPS WILL BE EDGY WHEN SHAH LEAVES, THEREFORE CROWDS SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PROVOKE THEM, AND MEANWHILE WE WILL USE WHATEVER INFLUENCE WE HAVE TO RESTRAIN ARMY. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED THIS MESSAGE GRACIOUSLY, AS DID SEVERAL LEADING BAZAARIS. THIS GROUP, HOWEVER, REACTED SHARPLY. EVERYONE KNOWS THAT SAVAK HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL BANK BURNINGS, ETC., SO WHY WERE WE BRINGING THIS MESSAGE TO THE OPPOSITION? FURTHERMORE, EVERYONE KNOWS THAT USG CONTROLS THE ARMY, SO THE TROOPS WILL NOT FIRE UNLESS WE GIVE PERMISSION. EMBOFFS TRIED FOR TWO HOURS TO COMBAT THESE NOTIONS, ESPECIALLY THE SECOND, BUT HAD NO LUCK. THE STANDARD CHARGES WERE ALL BROUGHT FORTH -- USG INSTALLED THE SHAH, TRAINED SAVAK, COOPERATED WITH SHAH TO EXPLOIT IRANIAN OIL AT LOW PRICES, ETC.

3. WHEN THEY WERE NOT ATTACKING U.S. POLICY, THE GROUP INDICATED RELIGION (THEREFORE KHOMEINI) WAS NOT THE DOMINANT ELEMENT IN THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT. IN FACT, WITH THE SHAH GONE THEY DO NOT EXPECT ANY OF THE AYATOLLAHS TO EXERCISE GREAT INFLUENCE. EMBOFF ASKED IF FREE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT RETURN A BEVY OF KHOMEINI-APPROVED DEPUTIES. THEY THOUGHT NOT, EXCEPT IN SOME VILLAGES. ONE OPPOSITIONIST CLAIMED FOUR FIFTHS OF THE PEOPLE IN CITIES ARE EDUCATED AND WILL EXERCISE THEIR OWN CHOICE RATHER THAN BLINDLY

FOLLOWING KHOMEINI.

4. COMMENT: IT WAS, IN SHORT, THE NATIONAL FRONT/UNIVERSITY LINE THAT THE RELIGIOUS PEOPLE WILL GET RID OF THE REGIME, THEN THEY (THE INF) WILL STEP IN AND RUN THE SHOW. THEY THINK (WITH JUSTICE) THAT THEY ARE THE ONLY TRAINED POLITICIANS IN TOWN, BUT THEIR SCENARIO BECOMES INEVITABLE ONLY IF ONE ASSUMES IRAN WILL MOVE QUICKLY TO PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. THAT IS AN OPEN QUESTION. SULLIVAN
BT
#0892

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EXDIS

[illegible] FROM ACTIVE [illegible] THAT FORCES [illegible] AS THE [illegible] UNEMPLOYED [illegible] TO [illegible] GRADUALLY ERODE KHOMEINI'S ABILITY [illegible].

6. [illegible] IN THE KHOMEINI-LINKED LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LAM)-[illegible] GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH THE NON-VIOLENT NATURE OF THE JANUARY 19 MARCH IN TEHRAN. THE EMISSARIES INDICATED THAT A KHOMEINI-APPOINTED STRIKE COMMITTEE WILL MEET IN ESFAHAN WITH A MANDATE TO GET KEY SECTORS BACK TO WORK EARLY NEXT WEEK.

7. AN OPPOSITION SOURCE TOLD THE EMBASSY TODAY THAT [illegible] COMMUNISTS ARE ORGANIZING THEIR OWN DEMONSTRATION TO TAKE PLACE IN SOUTHERN TEHRAN JANUARY 21.

8. CONSUL [illegible] REPORTS SERIOUS VIOLENCE JANUARY 19 [illegible] OF NAJAFABAD AND TIRAN OUTSIDE OF ESFAHAN - [illegible] AND ANTI-SHAH GROUPS. NAJAFABAD WAS [illegible] SCENE OF EXTENSIVE VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION BY PRO-SHAH GROUPS. AT LEAST 10 PERSONS WERE KILLED (NO AMERICANS). NO OTHER MAJOR ACT OF VIOLENCE WERE CITED.

9. CONSUL SHIRAZ REPORTS THAT THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT APPARATUS IN FARS, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS, ALMOST CEASED TO FUNCTION. THE PROVINCIAL LEADERS HAVE [illegible] IN [illegible] ESSENTIAL SERVICES. FOR THE MOMENT, [illegible] [illegible] MUST CONTINUE [illegible] LOCAL [illegible].

10. [illegible] OF THE SHAH'S [illegible] IN [illegible], [illegible] AT ASWAN ON THE MORNING OF [illegible] HOSPITAL OF JORDAN [illegible] ROYAL FAMILY FOR A VISIT [illegible].

11. [illegible]

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OO [illegible]
DE RUEHC 6586/02 0800211
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 200946Z JAN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUEBRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4364
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2403
RUEHTB/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 9481
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1473
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1119
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4347
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8693
RUTAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4577
RUEHUT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6351
RUFHFI/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 2452
RUSBAR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7170
RUFHOLL/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4417
RUMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9535
RUEHYA/[illegible] RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1681
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5020
RUEHAAA/USCINCSOUTH QUARRINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUHNJGA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2911
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RHFNAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GE
RUDOMSA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
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C O N F I FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 016500/02

EXDIS, STUTTGART FOR ELG, CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

THEM FROM DOING SO. HARDCORE STRIKE LEADERS HAVE LET IT BE KNOWN THAT FULL-SCALE PRODUCTION CAN RESUME ONLY WHEN THEY SAY SO, AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S WISHES NOTWITHSTANDING, AND THAT ANYONE WHO ATTEMPTS TO THWART THEM WILL DO SO AT HIS OWN RISK. STRIKE LEADERS ARE SAID TO BE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY YOUNG STAFF (WHITE COLLAR) EMPLOYEES NOT LONG OUT OF COLLEGE.

13. SAFETY OF AMERICANS: TWO PAN AM 747 FLIGHTS OPERATED TODAY IN TEHRAN WITH A TOTAL OF 573 PASSENGERS ON BOARD. ONE 747 IS SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 21. VANCE
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LIMDIS

221032Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3170
INFO RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3649
IT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 00957

ACTION: SP
INFO: LON
RSO: POL
CHAR: POL
DISTR: POL-2
ECON-2
CHRON/9

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 1-20-85 (STEMPEL,J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PORS, IR
SUBJ: RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION: POST-MARCH ACTIVITIES

SUMMARY: LMI SOURCES PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF JAN. 19 PARADE (BEING REPORTED SEPTELS). NO VIOLENCE NOTED, AND ONLY TWO LEFTIST GROUPS TRIED TO BORN IN. THESE WERE DISPERSED BY PARADE MARSHALLS WITHOUT TROUBLE. KHOMEINI-APPOINTED STRIKE COMMITTEE BEGAN WORK MORNING JAN 22, WITH MANDATE TO GET KEY SECTORS, INCLUDING PUBLIC WORKERS, BACK TO WORK. LMI HAS WORD LEFTISTS WILL TRY TO STAGE THEIR OWN MASS MARCH JAN. 21 IN SOUTH TEHRAN. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND BAKHTIAR STILL PROCEEDING; RELIGIOUS DELEGATION MAY GO TO PARIS TO ARGUE WITH KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST BE INSTALLED WITH SOME LEGAL FOUNDATION. LMI WORRIED THAT BAKHTIAR AND REGENCY COUNCIL WILL NOT FLAT DEAD. THOSE BACKGROUNDING THIS SUBJECT SHOULD AVOID UNWARRANTED OPTIMISM. END SUMMARY.

1. POLOFF STEMPEL SPOKE WITH LMI OFFICIALS TAVASSOLI AND ENTEZAM (STRONGLY PROTECT) LATE EVENING JAN. 19 AND ENTEZAM AGAIN NOON JAN. 20. BOTH WERE PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF PARADE. THEIR ASSESSMENT WAS THAT FESTIVITIES DREW 2.5 MILLION PEOPLE (OTHERS, INCLUDING LOCAL PRESS, PUT FIGURE BETWEEN 1.4 AND 1.8 MILLION), AND DAY PASSED WITHOUT VIOLENCE. TAVASSOLI NOTED TWO LEFTIST GROUPS HAD TRIED TO BECOME PART OF PARADE BUT WERE TURNED AWAY WITHOUT INCIDENT BY PARADE MARSHALLS. SLOGANS WERE ALL ISLAMIC. LMI MEN ADMITTED CROWD SPIRIT WAS A BIT MORE DRAGGY THAN AT ASHURA MARCH, BUT BOTH (AS WELL AS MOST OTHERS WE HAVE TALKED TO) ATTRIBUTE THIS TO LETDOWN IN WAKE OF SHAH'S DEPARTURE. NOW THAT SHAH HAS GONE, PEOPLE HAD OTHER THINGS TO WORRY ABOUT--THE WEATHER, THEIR CORNS, LACK OF GAS, ETC.

2. ENTEZAM SAID KHOMEINI-NOMINATED COMMITTEE ON STRIKES BEGAN WORK TODAY. DR. YADOLLAH SAHABI HAD BEEN NAMED CHAIRMAN, WITH DR. MOHAMMAD JAVAD BAHONAR, A RELIGIOUS LEADER, AND ENG. ALI AKBAR MOINFAR AS MEMBERS. THIS GROUP WILL NAME TWO ADDITIONAL MEMBERS. ENTEZAM SAID SAHABI WAS RECONSIDERING WHETHER HE (ENTEZAM) SHOULD BE ON COMMITTEE, SINCE HE WAS DOING MORE COORDINATING WORK ELSEWHERE. ENTEZAM ADDED HE WOULD BE FOLLOWING COMMITTEE'S WORK IN ANY CASE. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, ENTEZAM CONFIRMED COMMITTEE'S MANDATE INCLUDED BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR, AND GOAL OF EFFORTS WAS TO GET COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN. EMPHASIS NOTED PRIME MINISTER WAS MAKING MAJOR MOVES TO

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977-225-323

GET PUBLIC SECTOR BACK TO WORK BEGINNING JAN. 21. IF COMMITTEE'S AIM WAS THE SAME, IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF ITS WORK PROCEEDED FAST ENOUGH TO PREVENT CONFLICT FROM DEVELOPING, SINCE BOTH SIDES SEEM COMMITTED TO GOING BACK TO WORK. ENTEZAM UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, AND EMPHASIZED THAT SETTLEMENTS WOULD ALSO HELP CONTAIN LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHICH ARE TRYING TO MAKE INROADS INTO LABOR MOVEMENT. (COMMENT: WE HOPE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS WILL MOVE FAST ENOUGH, BUT IT WILL BE CLOSE.)

3. TAVASSOLI SAID TUDEH ORGANIZERS HAVE PUT OUT BULLETINS CALLING FOR MASS LEFTIST (AND PRESUMABLY ANTI-RELIGIOUS) RALLY FOR MID-MORNING JANUARY 21. LOCATION OF DEMONSTRATION WILL BE MEIDAN-E-QAZVIN, ABOUT A MILE NORTH OF TEHRAN RAILROAD STATION ON SHENSHOM BAHMAN STREET. (COMMENT: EXCEPT FOR TUDEH AND RADICAL LEFTIST PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY ACTIVITIES, THIS WOULD BE FIRST MAJOR TEST OF TUDEH STRENGTH IN WIDER PUBLIC COMMUNITY. THIS FIRST SALLY OF ORGANIZED LEFT, IF IN FACT IT OCCURS, MIGHT EXERCISE HELPFUL PROD TO LMI'S MODERATES TO INCREASE SPEED OF THEIR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT A MODERATE POLITICAL SOLUTION.)

4. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSION, DR. MINATCHI (AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTER) CONFIRMED THAT TALKS BETWEEN OPPOSITIONISTS AND BAKHTIAR REPRESENTATIVES HAVE GONE FORWARD ON QUESTION OF HOW TO RESOLVE CONFLICT BETWEEN REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI-APPOINTED ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI COUNCIL HAD NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN NAMED, PARTLY BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STILL GOING ON ABOUT PROJECTED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN IT AND REGENCY COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAHS RAFSANJANI AND MOTAHARI MAY LEAVE FOR PARIS JAN. 20 OR 21 IF DEAL APPEARS POSSIBLE. MINATCHI MAY ACCOMPANY THEM. PURPOSE OF TRIP WILL BE TO CONVINCE KHOMEINI THAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL MUST HAVE SOME LEGAL TIE TO PRESENT REGIME OR MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADER HERE WILL NOT

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FULLY ACCEPT IT. MINATCHI WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT ON HOW THIS MIGHT COME ABOUT, BUT SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL COULD GET ITS APPOINTMENT FROM THE REGENCY COUNCIL AS PART OF THE SELECTION PROCESS.

5. ENTEZAM EXPRESSED SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT CONCERN ABOUT UNFOLDING POLITICAL SITUATION. HE SAID KHOMEINI WAS ON THE VERGE OF ANNOUNCING THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH ALREADY HAD ITS PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET CHOSEN (HE PROFESSED NOT TO KNOW THE NAMES; HE PROBABLY DOES). PROBLEM IS, BAKHTIAR HAS REFUSED TO RESIGN (MORNING PRESS CARRIED BAKHTIAR'S PUBLIC REFUSAL TO TURN POWER OVER TO KHOMEINI--"A CORDINAL DOES NOT REPLACE A PRIME MINISTER"). ENTEZAM THOUGHT REGENCY COUNCIL AND MAJLIS WERE ABOUT READY TO RESIGN (COMMENT: THIS MAY BE PREMATURE) AND REPORT WAS NEEDED TO GET BAKHTIAR OUT OF THE WAY; USG SHOULD PRESS BAKHTIAR TO RESIGN. EMPOFF NOTED THAT BAKHTIAR WAS CONSTITUTIONAL PRIME MINISTER, AND THAT THIS WAS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN KEEPING MILITARY BEHIND CIVIL GOVERNMENT. EMPOFF VENTURED PERSONAL VIEW THAT SOME COMPROMISE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS WAS GOING TO BE NECESSARY IF KHOMEINI PROJECTIONS WERE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF REALIZATION. ENTEZAM, WHO SEEMS UNFAMILIAR WITH TALK OF COMPROMISE MENTIONED PREVIOUS PARA, NODDED AND DROPPED POINT.

6. COMMENT AND ANALYSIS: CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFUSION AND UNCERTAINTY ON PART OF BOTH MINATCHI AND ENTEZAM CORRECTLY SUGGESTS THAT OPPOSITION HAS NO CLEAR IDEA OF WHERE SITUATION GOES NEXT IF BAKHTIAR AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT REFUSE TO ROLL OVER AND PLAY DEAD. MINATCHI, WHO IS A CONGENITAL OPTIMIST, DOES NOT SEE BREAKTHROUGH ON QUESTION OF HOW TO RESOLVE QUESTION OF REGENCY COUNCIL VERSUS ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. BAKHTIAR HAS NOTED THAT IF HE IS FORCED OUT, OUTCOME IS LIKELY TO BE BLOODY MILITARY TAKEOVER. PROBLEM OF MILITARY REACTION TO KHOMEINI PROPOSALS AND LACK OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CONTINUITY TO KHOMEINI SOLUTION HAS STRENGTHENED MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS' HAND. THOUGH HE HAS NOT PROVED WILLING TO DIFFER PUBLICLY WITH KHOMEINI IN PAST, AT UNDERSTAND SHARIAT-MADARI HAD GIVEN INTERVIEW JAN. 19 TO PRESS WHICH SUPPORTS BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT TO SOME DEGREE, AND INSISTS THAT ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MUST HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS. KHOMEINI HAS BY NO MEANS LOST HIS PREEMINENT POSITION, BUT THERE IS SOME EROSION, AND IN-COUNTRY RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT IS WILLING

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[illegible] MINISTER'S REPUSAL TO REMOVE
[illegible] OF COURSE, THESE EVENTS MAY FORCE KHOMEINI
[illegible] DIRECTION OF COMPROMISE, DESPITE HIS OWN STUBBORNESS.

7. CAVEAT IS IN ORDER. AMBASSADOR AND OTHER REPORTING OFFICERS HAVE NOTICED DEPARTMENTAL SOURCES HAVE BEEN BACKGROUNDING PRESS, APPARENTLY BASED IN PART ON OUR CABLE REPORTING OF PROCESS NOTED ABOVE, AND HAVE PUT RATHER ROSY GLOW ON "NEGOTIATIONS" GOING ON WITHIN IRAN OVER KHOMEINI POSITION. MINATCHI IS A REGISTERED OPTIMIST, KHOMEINI HAS ALWAYS BEEN STUBBORN. PERSIAN NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAS NEVER BEEN A MODEL OF SMOOTH REASON AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN SUSCEPTIBLE TO OUTSIDE BREEZES. FOR THE NEXT FEW TICKLISH DAYS AND WEEKS, I THINK NO COMMENT ON THIS PROCESS IS CALLED FOR. IF THERE ARE OVERRIDING REASONS (AND WE HERE CANNOT IMAGINE WHAT THEY WOULD BE) TO BRIEF PRESS ON BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE CORRECT AS WELL AS PRUDENT TO TAKE MUCH MORE RESTRAINED, LESS OPTIMISTIC OUTLOOK, IN LINE WITH HOD CARTER'S EXCELLENT WORDS ON CHILLABLY BONES. SULLIVAN

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 30967/7

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C 211432Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3209
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 1015

LIMDIS

CHRGE: STATE 1/21/79
APPRV: MIN:OWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:DRPATTERS
CLEAR: POL:SBLAMBRAK
DISTR: POL 3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM ICA
OR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/21/99 (PATTERSON, DAVID R.) CR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL GOSSIP AMONG THE YOUNG ELITE

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: FORMER NIOC AIDE AND FORMER MINCOMMERCE DIR GENERAL COMMENTED ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERALS NAZEM AND JAM, ON "CHARACTER ASSASSINATION CAMPAIGN" AGAINST GENERAL KHOSROWDAD, ON MIN JUSTICE VAZIRI'S RESIGNATION, ON MARXIST INFLUENCE ON EVENTS, ON SANJABI, ON MFA UNDER-SECY ZELLI'S ALLEGED PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS OF JAN 19 AND ON ASSORTED OTHER MATTERS. END SUMMARY

3. FOLLOWING ARE NOTES FROM NINE-HOUR JAN 20 CONVERSATION WITH BAHRAM CHUBIN, FORMER AIDE TO DR. PARVIZ MINA AT NIOC. CHUBIN IS GENERALLY FAITHFUL BUT UNDISCRIMINATING TRANSMISSION BELT OF WHAT HE HEARS, BE IT TRUE OR FALSE. DURING PART OF THIS TIME, TWO EMBOFFS AND CHUBIN WERE ALSO JOINED BY MOSTAFA ANSARY, FORMERLY A DIRECTOR GENERAL IN THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE.

4. GENERALS NAZEM AND JAM: GENERAL NAZEM WAS RETIRED A FEW MONTHS AGO, IS "A BIT CRAZY" AND "VERY TOUGH." CHUBIN SAID NAZEM WROTE TWO LETTERS OF RESIGNATION TO THE SHAH, THE FIRST OF WHICH WAS TURNED DOWN. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECOND LETTER, WHICH WAS ABUSIVE AND THREATENING, THE SHAH AGREED SIMPLY TO RETIRE NAZEM. NAZEM AND JAM ARE RELATED AND JAM HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR NAZEM'S JUDGMENT. IT WAS NAZEM, CHUBIN CLAIMED, WHO CONVINCED JAM NOT TO ACCEPT THE MINISTRY OF WAR PORTFOLIO.

5. GEN. KHOSROWDAD: CHUBIN SAID "SOMETHING" MUST BE DONE TO STOP THE CONCERTED MARXIST-LED CAMPAIGN OF CHARACTER ASSASSINATION AGAINST GENERAL KHOSROWDAD, WHO IS TOUGH AND ABLE AND WHOSE 12 OR 16,000 RANGERS ARE STILL PERFECTLY "COULD TAKE OVER THE COUNTRY IN 24 HOURS."

6. SHARIF-EMAMI'S MEMOIRS - THE FORMER PM WILL SEVERELY CRITICIZE AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN IN HIS MEMOIRS. HE IS TELLING HIS FRIENDS THAT EVERYTIME HE TALKED TO THE AMBASSADOR, NO MATTER WHAT WAS HAPPENING, SULLIVAN URGED HIM TO "LOOSEN UP MORE." (CHUBIN'S FATHER AND SHARIF-EMAMI HAVE BEEN INTIMATES SINCE THEIR SCHOOL DAYS.)

7. MINISTER OF JUSTICE VAZIRI - CHUBIN CLAIMED THAT VAZIRI IS RESIGNED TO FORM A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH SANJABI WOULD EVENTUALLY JOIN. (COMMENT: BALONEY.)

8. CHUBIN HAS "JOINED" A GROUP CALLED THE "COMMITTEE OF

28," FORMED TO SUPPORT THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. EACH RECRUIT IS SUPPOSED TO RECRUIT FIVE ADDITIONAL NEW MEMBERS. THIS SUBJECT WAS LOST IN TIDE OF CONVERSATIONS AND EMBOFF DID NOT LEARN WHO "THE 28" ARE.

9. MARXISTS - CHUBIN ASSERTED THAT DISCIPLINED MARXIST MINORITIES ARE IN FACT CONTROLLING MANY OF THE STRIKES AND WILL, UNLESS STOPPED SOON, EFFECTIVELY TAKE OVER THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT. CHUBIN IS NOW A PARTNER IN DELTA ENGINEERING, A CONTRACTOR THAT HAS JOBS (NOW INACTIVE) AT TEHRAN REFINERY, ON ICAT-II AND ON NGL PLANTS IN THE KHUZESTAN OIL FIELDS. ONE OF HIS EMPLOYEES IS A YOUNG MARXIST NAMED SAVARAKI, WHO IS FOND OF DESCRIBING HOW HIS GROUP ARE DIRECTING THE COURSE OF EVENTS. SAVARAKI, ACCORDING TO CHUBIN, SAYS "KHOMEINI WILL NEVER RETURN; WE WON'T LET HIM." CHUBIN OFFERED TO PROVIDE MARXIST PAMPHLETS GIVEN HIM BY SAVARAKI IN WHICH SAVARAKI HAS UNDERLINED "THE REAL FACTS," TERMING THE REST "CLAPTRAP FOR RELIGIOUS CONSUMPTION." CHUBIN ALSO SAID THERE IS A RUMOR THAT IN A JOINT RAID A FEW WEEKS AGO THE CIA AND SAVAK [SIC] FOUND A "30-PAGE PLAN FOR A SEVEN-STAGE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER, ESTIMATED TO TAKE 4-5 YEARS."

10. SANJABI - SANJABI HAS LONG BEEN ON THE NIOC PAYROLL AT A SALARY OF 21,000 OR 24,000 TOMANS/MONTH (ABOUT $3,020/MONTH). ABOUT 10-12 YEARS AGO SANJABI WORKED WITH SAVAK IN IDENTIFYING LEFTISTS IN THE UNIVERSITIES. FURTHERMORE, CHUBIN CLAIMED, SANJABI IS NOT IRANIAN BORN. (OUR BIO DATA INDICATES HE WAS BORN IN SANJABI TRIBAL AREA NEAR KERMANSHAH.) IN TRYING TO GET HIM TO FORM GOVERNMENT, CHUBIN SAID, SHAH CONFRONTED SANJABI WITH THESE "FACTS" AND THREATENED TO RELEASE HIS DOSSIER IF SANJABI WOULD NOT COOPERATE. (COMMENT: OF COURSE SANJABI REFUSED -- AND NO INATION BY SOMEONE.)

11. MFA UNDERSECRETARY ZELLI - MOSTAFA ANSARY SAID THAT ON JAN 19, FOLLOWING A ROW IN THE MFA BETWEEN THOSE WHO WANTED TO SHOW "SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE" AND OTHERS WHO FELT
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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 1215

O 211430Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3210
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01015

LIMDIS

MFA SHOULD REMAIN OUTSIDE THE STRUGGLE, ZELLI ALLEGEDLY LED A GROUP TO JOIN THE MARCHERS.

12. SPEAKER OF MAJLES ALLEGEDLY WILL RESIGN, FOLLOWED BY LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER DEPUTIES, "TO GIVE BAKHTIAR A FREE HAND" TO GOVERN BY DECREE. (COMMENT: THIS STRANGE VERSION OF THE MASS-RESIGNATION RUMOR HAS ONLY THING TO COMMEND IT: RESIGNING DEPUTIES WOULD PRESUMABLY APPEAR TO BE OBEYING KHOMEINI WHILE ASSISTING BAKHTIAR -- AND BY THE WAY ESCAPING RESPONSIBILITY. WHAT MAKES IT SEEM UNLIKELY IS THAT IN MOST EYES THIS WOULD FURTHER IMPAIR IF NOT DESTROY ANY CHANCE OF BAKHTIAR'S ACHIEVING ANY MORAL AUTHORITY. RULE BY DECREE WOULD BE QUESTIONED UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.)

13. FORMER MIN ECON AND FINANCE MEHRAN HAS DEPARTED AND IS NOW IN LONDON.

14. HOVEYDA: CHUBIN REPEATED STORY, WHICH HAS APPEARED IN PRESS, OF "MICROPHONE BEHIND HOVEYDA'S CARNATION." HE ADDED THAT HOVEYDA'S INCRIMINATING RECORDINGS OF CONVERSATION WITH SHAH AND OTHERS WERE STORED AT GOI MISSION TO UN BY HOVEYDA'S BROTHER AND HAVE NOW BEEN REMOVED FROM THERE FOR SAFEKEEPING. SULLIVAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L C TEHRAN 1271/1

R 221329Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFRC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3236
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1927
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4276
RUFHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0967
RUFRCI/AMEMBASSY BONN 1312
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 2029
RUQMCI/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0793
RUFRFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1311
RUSBCI/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3741
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3987
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5150
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0348
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4889
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4236
RUQMAN/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1319
RUFRMC/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1401
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 2752
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3400
RUFRPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3656
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0279
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2127
RUFRRC/AMEMBASSY ROME 1301
RUFHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2921
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RUHCHOA/USCINCPAC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01271

E.O. 12065: GDS 1-22-85 (PERETT, G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (U) POLITICAL/SECURITY REPORT, JAN 22, 1979

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IRAN WAITS FOR KHOMEINI. BAKHTIAR VOWS TO STAND FAST. PRO,ANTI-REGIME VIOLENCE. LEFTISTS DEMONSTRATE OPENLY. MODERATE AYATOLLAHS DISTANCE THEMSELVES FROM BAKHTIAR. BATTLE BETWEEN SHARIAT-MADARI AND KHOMEINI SUPPORTERS RUMORED IN TABRIZ WITH SHARIAT-MADARI BEING CALLED A SAVAK AGENT. ATTACK ON BAHAI HOUSES IN WEST IRAN. END SUMMARY.

3. KHOMEINI IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE LATE FRIDAY MORNING, ALTHOUGH SOURCES DIFFER AS TO THE TIME AND THE AIR LINE (SOME SAY AIR FRANCE; OTHERS SAY IRAN AIR WILL RETURN TO WORK IN ORDER TO BRING BACK THE AYATOLLAH). KHOMEINI MEANWHILE REPORTEDLY STATED AGAIN THAT THE MAJLIS DEPUTIES MUST LEAVE THEIR POSTS, AS WELL AS THE REGENCY COUNCIL, AND CALLED ON THE ARMY TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOON-TO-BE-FORMED GOVT. WE LEARN SECONDHAND OF AN INTERVIEW WITH BRITISH MEDIA LAST NIGHT IN WHICH KHOMEINI ALLEGEDLY REVEALED HE HAS WORKED OUT A DEAL WITH THE MILITARY.

4. PRIMIN BAKHTIAR ADDRESSED THE NATION LAST NIGHT, DECLARING HE WILL NOT RESIGN BUT WILL REMAIN TO DEFEND

GENGE: STATE 1/22/79
APPRV: DCM:GWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GPERETT:COM
CLEAR: 1.POL:GELAMBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
FM ECON-2 ICA
SY AIM CR
DAC AFOSI
CHRON/15

THE CONSTITUTION. HE FURTHER CALLED FOR AN END TO DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES. AND HE CRITICIZED THE PRESS FOR PUTTING OUT "POISONOUS MESSAGES". HE ADDED HE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY FURTHER "INSULTS AGAINST THE ARMY". HE ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT DIFFERENCES HAVE ARISEN IN THE ARMED FORCES BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS GROUPS. BAKHTIAR CLAIMED TO BE THE MOST POWERFUL OF ALL IRANIAN PRIME MINISTERS BECAUSE HE TRULY GOVERNED. THE STRIKERS, HE CLAIMED, ARE GETTING ORDERS FROM OUTSIDE ENEMIES TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT. EVEN THOUGH GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY FULFILLED ALL THE WORKERS' DEMANDS. FIVE OF 21 MAJLIS DEPUTIES WHO RESIGNED HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR RESIGNATIONS, SO MAJLIS IS HOLDING FIRM. IRANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MET LAST NIGHT, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WAS DECIDED.

5. LEFTISTS HAVE INCREASINGLY GONE PUBLIC. MARXISTS MUSTERED SEVERAL THOUSAND YESTERDAY FOR RALLY AT TEHRAN TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY. MUSLIM STUDENTS HARRASSED MARCHERS, AND WHILE THERE WAS APPARENTLY NO MAJOR STREET WAR, THERE WAS PLENTY OF TENSION AND A NUMBER OF SCUFFLES. PRESS REPORTED ONE MUSLIM ADHERENT WHO DELIBERATELY PLOWED INTO CROWD WITH HIS AUTOMOBILE, AND WAS IN TURN BEATEN BY MARXIST SECURITY FORCES. IN PARIS MEANWHILE THE TUDEH PARTY ANNOUNCED APPROVAL OF KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. TUDEH ESPECIALLY APPROVES KHOMEINI'S DECLARATIONS AGAINST U.S. INTERFERENCE IN IRAN. ALL ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES SHOULD UNITE; TUDEH WILL THEREFORE SUPPORT A PRO-KHOMEINI GOVERNMENT. MARXIST-ISLAMIC ISSUE, LONG DENIED BY MANY OPPOSITIONISTS, IS NOW TOO OBVIOUS TO BE IGNORED.

6. IN PROVINCES, VIOLENCE ERUPTED BUT APPARENTLY BETWEEN PRO AND ANTI REGIME GROUPS RATHER THAN LEFT VS. RIGHT. TEN PEOPLE WERE KILLED YESTERDAY FROM CLASHES IN SHIRVAN AND QUCHAN (NORTHEASTERN IRAN). MORE DIED IN MESKIN-SHAHR, NEAR TABRIZ, ON SATURDAY; GOVERNMENT SAYS ONE WAS KILLED BUT LOCAL RESIDENT SAYS UP TO 40 DIED. THERE WAS ALSO VIOLENCE AND AT LEAST ONE DEATH IN HARSEEN, NEAR KERMANSHAH. CLUB-WIELDING PRO-SHAH (OR POSSIBLY PURE
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3237
INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1928
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4277
RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0968
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1313
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 2030
RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0764
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1312
RUSRQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3742
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDA 3988
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5151
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0349
RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4889
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4236
RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1320
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1402
RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0753
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3401
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3657
RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0280
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0128
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1302
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0922
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
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HOODLUM) GANGS HAVE ATTACKED TRAFFIC AT JALAFABAD (ON THE ROAD TO BANDAR-PAHLAVI), ELAM, AND OTHER TOWNS. CLUB-WIELDERS ALSO STOPPED TRAFFIC ON PAHLAVI AVENUE IN TEHRAN LAST NIGET.

7. STRIKES CONTINUE UNABATED. DISSIDENT WORKERS PULLED THE PLUG ON BAKHTIAR LAST NIGHT RIGHT AFTER HE HAD BEGUN HIS SPEECH, REDUCING THE TELECAST/BROADCAST TO BATTERY-POWERED RADIOS. NIRT WORKERS HAVE FORMALLY REJECTED THEIR NEW DIRECTOR, AMIR MASSOUD BARZIN. JUSTICE MINISTRY EMPLOYEES, TOO, HAVE STATED THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT ANY MINISTER WHO IS APPOINTED BY BAKHTIAR.

8. RELIGIOUS INFIGHTING HAS BECOME MORE EVIDENT. IN ANSWER TO A BAKHTIAR STATEMENT THAT AYATOLLAHS' SILENCE ON HIS GOVERNMENT IMPLIED CONSENT, AYATOLLAHS SHARIAT-MADARI, GOLPAYGANI, MARASHI-NAJAFI, AND ROUHANI ISSUED SEPARATE PUBLIC STATEMENTS REPUDIATING NOTION THAT THEY SUPPORT THE PRIMIN. PRESS SPECULATES THIS CAME AFTER KHOMEINI ATTACKED SHARIAT-MADARI FOR SECRETLY BACKING BAKHTIAR. IRANIAN PRESS SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST TOLD EMBOFF THAT KHOMEINI PRI-VATELY ACCUSED SHARIAT-MADARI OF BEING PRO-AMERICAN AND TOOL OF CIA, WHEREUPON SHARIAT-MADARI SAID SUCH A STATE-MENT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM A COMMUNIST.

9. CONSUL TABRIZ REPORTS MANY RUMORS THAT SHARIAT-MADARI SUPPORTERS ARE FIGHTING AGAINST KHOMEINI

SUPPORTERS IN THE STREETS. (TABRIZ IS SHARIAT-MADARI'S HOME.) ALSO RUMORS BEING SPREAD THAT SHARIAT-MADARI IS A SAVAK AGENT.

10. PRESS IS FULL OF REPORTS OF MILITARY DISSENSION, IN PARTICULAR A HUNGER STRIKE BY NEARLY 4000 AIR FORCE MEN AT SHAHROKHI AND VAHDATI AIRBASES. ABOUT 1000 MEN AT BANDAR ABBAS AIR BASE ALSO REPORTEDLY STAGED PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION SATURDAY NIGHT. THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME SUBSTANCE TO ALL THESE REPORTS, BUT WE LACK CONFIRMATION AS TO DETAILS.

11. CONSUL TABRIZ WAS WITNESS TO TELEPHONE CALLS TO TEHRAN BY TWO SOLDIERS (ONE A CONSCRIPT, ONE A PROFESSIONAL) WHO EXPRESSED WORRY ABOUT SITUATION WHEN KHOMEINI RETURNS ON FRIDAY AND WERE GIVEN ADDRESSES TO GO TO, BY THEIR FAMILIES IN TEHRAN, IF THEY WISH TO DESERT. TABRIZ REMAINS SHUT DOWN, AS MOST TOWNS. NO GOVERNOR, NO MAYOR, AND POLICE HAVE BEEN PULLED OFF THE STREETS AND CONCENTRATED IN OLD PRISON. RELIGIOUS AND "LEFTIST" GROUPS HAD A CLASH IN THE UNIVERSITY TWO DAYS AGO.

12. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT ABOUT 10 DAYS AGO IN THE SMALL TOWN OF MIANDOB (WESTERN IRAN) 2000 BAHAIS WERE RENDERED HOMELESS WHEN SOME 80 HOUSES WERE BURNED.

13. SHIRAZ REPORTS QUIET TODAY EXCEPT FOR ONE SMALL (PEACEFUL) DEMONSTRATION NEAR CONSULATE AIMED AT ONE OF SHAH'S PALACES THERE, BUT ALSO INCLUDING SHOUTS OF "YONKEE GO HOME". SULLIVAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1071/2

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 01106

CHRGE: STATE 1/22/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/22/99(PERETT, WILLIAM G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINR, IR
SUBJECT: (U) BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NEW GOVT

REF: TEHRAN 268

1. (LOU). DATA ON SHAPOUR BAKHTIAR, PRIME MINISTER, WAS PROVIDED IN CRM 78-16276.

2. (S). AHMAD MIR-FENDERESKI, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAS BORN 1918 IN TEHRAN INTO A FOREIGN SERVICE FAMILY. HE ATTENDED PRIMARY SCHOOL IN TIFLIS, WHERE HIS FATHER WAS POSTED AS CONSUL, AND RECEIVED HIS SECONDARY EDUCATION IN TEHRAN. IN 1937 HE ENTERED AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, COMPLETING HIS UNIVERSITY EDUCATION WITH A LAW DEGREE FROM ST. JOSEPH'S SCHOOL, BEIRUT. HE BEGAN HIS FOREIGN SERVICE IN 1947, AND HIS POSTS HAVE INCLUDED 3RD SECRETARY IN MOSCOW, 1949-53; BRIEF TOUR IN TEHRAN, 1953; 2ND SECY IN THE HAGUE, 1953-56; ACTING DIRECTOR OF TREATIES AND LEGAL AFFAIRS DIV., 1956-57; COUNSELOR IN NEW DELHI, 1957-60; CONSUL GENERAL, ISTANBUL, 1960-62; AND DIRECTOR OF ECON DEPT IN 1962. AFTER A BRIEF TIME AS DIRECTOR OF 2ND POLITICAL DIVISION IN 1963 HE BECAME DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN MARCH OF THAT YEAR. IN JUNE 1964 HE WAS APPOINTED UNDERSECY FOR POLITICAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS. HE THEN SERVED AS AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, JULY 1966-SEPT 1971, AFTER WHICH HE BECAME DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER. HE WAS DISMISSED IN OCT 1973, APPARENTLY AFTER HE INCURRED THE SHAH'S DISPLEASURE BY PERMITTING SOVIET AIRCRAFT, WHICH WERE RESUPPLYING THE ARAB BELLIGERENTS, TO OVERFLY IRAN IN EXCESS OF STRICT LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE SHAH. SINCE THEN HE HAS HELD NO POST OTHER THAN THE NEBULOUS ONE OF ADVISOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER. HE HAS IN FACT REMAINED OUT OF THE PICTURE FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THE RESULT OF HIS RESENTMENT AT BEING DISMISSED AND ALSO REPORTEDLY DUE TO A DRINKING PROBLEM.
MIR-FENDERESKI CLEARLY HAS A WEALTH OF EXPERIENCE, AND HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE MINISTRY REGARD HIM HIGHLY. HE WAS A SUCCESSFUL ENVOY IN MOSCOW AND HAS ALWAYS GOT ON WELL WITH RUSSIANS -- HE SPEAKS THE LANGUAGE FLUENTLY AND, IN HIS YOUNGER DAYS, REPORTEDLY BROKE INTO RUSSIAN SONG AND DANCE AFTER INDULGING IN TOO MUCH VODKA. AS PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECY IN 1964, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID A DISASTROUSLY POOR JOB OF DEFENDING THE BILL TO GIVE DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY TO AMERICAN MILITARY ADVISORS. A SMALL MAN WITH OLIVE COMPLEXION, HE IS FRIENDLY AND CHARMING. SOME USG OFFICIALS HAVE CONSIDERED HIM LESS THAN TOTALLY RELIABLE IN A STRESS SITUATION. MIR-FENDERESKI HAS THREE CHILDREN. HE SPEAKS FLUENT RUSSIAN AND FRENCH IN ADDITION TO GERMAN AND ENGLISH. (IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT MFA BIOS FURNISHED UPON SEVERAL OF

HIS PREVIOUS APPOINTMENTS DISAGREE SHARPLY WITH OUR FILES REGARDING HIS EARLY CAREER. THESE BIOS HAVE HIM ENTERING SERVICE IN 1942, SERVING AS 3RD AND 2ND SECY IN MOSCOW 1946-51, PASSPORT OFFICE IN 1951, AND 2ND AND 1ST SECY IN THE HAGUE, 1952-56.)

3. (U). LOTFALI SAMIMI, MINISTER OF POST, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE, IS ABOUT 57 YEARS OLD. HE GRADUATED IN MECHANICAL ENGINEERING IN 1945 AND JOINED THE WIRELESS DEPT THE FOLLOWING YEAR. A FOUNDER OF THE IRAN PARTY (ONE OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT), SAMIMI WAS IMPRISONED IN AUGUST 1954. AFTER SEVEN YEARS' SUSPENSION FROM GOVT SERVICE, HE WAS REAPPOINTED IN 1963. HE THEN UNDERTOOK SPECIALIZED STUDY IN COMMUNICATIONS ENGINEERING IN FRANCE AND GERMANY. LATER HE SERVED AS MANAGER OF THE STUDY DEPT OF PTT AND AS DIRECTOR OF POSTAL SERVICES. HIS LAST POST WAS THAT OF INSPECTOR IN PTT.

4. (U). MOHAMMAD MOSHIRI-YAZDI, FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEPUTY TO THE PRIME MINISTER, WAS BORN IN 1921. HE HOLDS A DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY ENTERING GOVT SERVICE 1940 IN MINISTRY OF ART AND TRADE, HE TRANSFERRED IN 1946 TO MINISTRY OF LABOR FOR THE BULK OF HIS CAREER. HIS POSTS INCLUDE: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE LABOR OFFICE IN ISFAHAN; CHIEF OF LABOR OFFICES IN KHUZESTAN AND TEHRAN; MEMBER OF THE MANAGING BOARD OF THE PUBLIC COOPERATION BOARD OF TEHRAN; DIRECTOR GENERAL OF ADMINISTRATOR, MIN OF LABOR; GOVT OBSERVER IN THE WORKERS SOCIAL INSURANCE ORGANIZATION; AND PERMANENT DEP MINISTER OF LABOR. HE BECAME CHIEF OF THE BOARD DIRECTORS OF SAVINGS AND HOUSING LOANS CO. IN JUNE 1971. MOSHIRI-YAZDI HAS WORKED WITH THE U.N.O. AND U.S. POINT FOUR PROGRAM. HE SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

5. (C). MANOUCHEHR YAZEMI, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, IS 64. HE HOLDS DECREES IN ENGINEERING AND ECONOMICS, AND AT LEAST PART OF HIS ACADEMIC WORK WAS AT HARVARD. HE HAS SERVED IN THE PLAN AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION, REACHING THE RANK OF DEPUTY IN THE PBO. HE IS

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CONSIDERED FRIENDLY TO AMERICANS BUT CRITICAL OF THE REGIME. HE SPEAKS FRENCH AND ENGLISH.

6. (C). ABBAS-QOLI BAKHTIAR, MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, MINES, AND COMMERCE, IS COUSIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER. BORN IN 1927, HE EARNED DEGREES IN LAW AND LITERATURE FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING FROM GLASGOW UNIVERSITY, AND PH.D. IN CHEMISTRY FROM UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. HIS CAREER INCLUDES POSITIONS AS TECHNICAL DIRECTOR OF ISFAHAN SUGAR JOINT STOCK CO.; LECTURER IN TECHNICAL COLLEGE, TEHRAN UNIVERSITY; CHIEF OF GAS AND PETROCHEMICAL EXPLOITATION WITH NIOC, WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR PLANNING FOR ABADAN PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX, AND (1966) MANAGING DIRECTOR OF ABADEN PETROCHEMICAL JOINT STOCK CO. HE LATER SERVED AS INDUSTRIAL UNDERSECY IN THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE. HE HAD LEFT HIS POST BY EARLY 1975, MOVING TO THE MILITARY PURCHASING ORGANIZATION. IT WAS RUMORED HE LEFT THE MEAF AS RESULT OF A CONFLICT WITH ANSARY AND NAJMABADI OVER POLITICAL ISSUES. BAKHTIAR IS IN DELICATE HEALTH AND HAS ALLEGEDLY HAD A HEART ATTACK. HE WEARS DARK GLASSES AND IS PARTIALLY PARALYZED ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF HIS FACE, A CONDITION WHICH SOMEWHAT AFFECTS HIS SPEECH. HE IS CONSIDERED PRO-AMERICAN. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH.

7.(C) ROSTAM PIRASTEH, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND FINANCE, IS 46 YEARS OLD, HE HOLDS A DOCTORATE IN ECONOMICS AND BANKING FROM AN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY. HIS BANKING CAREER INVOLVED CLOSE TIES TO THE UNITED STATES, AND MUCH OF IT IN FACT WAS WITH CHASE MANHATTAN BANK OF NEW YORK. PIRASTEH SERVED CHASE MANHATTAN AS A SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND MEMBER OF THE SENIOR PLANNING STAFF. REPORTS INDICATE CHASE MANHATTAN HAD HIGH OPINION OF HIS ABILITIES. PIRASTEH LEFT CHASE TO BECOME DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF IRAN, WHICH IS 35 PERCENT OWNED BY CHASE. HIS AMERICAN CONNECTION WOULD SEEM TO MAKE HIM APPEAR VULNERABLE TO THE WAVE OF ANTI-AMERICANISM SWEEPING IRAN. AND INDEED, HE HAS ALREADY BEEN ACCUSED BY MEAF EMPLOYEES OF HOLDING DUAL U.S.-IRANIAN CITIZENSHIP. AT RECENT MEETING WITH HIS DIRECTORS-GENERAL (THOSE WHO ARE WORKING), HE WAS TOLD HE WAS ILLEGAL AND UNACCEPTABLE. HE PERFORMED WELL IN SETTING UP THE JOINT VENTURE INTERNATIONAL BANK OF IRAN. A NATIONALIST, HE HAS URGED IRANIANS TO KEEP MONEY IN THE COUNTRY INSTEAD OF INVESTING ABROAD. HE HAS A BROAD APPROACH TO FINANCIAL ISSUES. PIRASTEH SURPRISINGLY RESIGNED FROM THE INTERNATIONAL BANK, AND IN TALKS WITH REPORTERS, HE DESCRIBES LONG-RANGE PLANS AS IF HE IS GOING TO BE AROUND TO ADMINISTER THEM. HE SEEMS TO SEPARATE THE POLITICAL SITUATION FROM ECONOMIC MATTERS, AN EXERCISE WHICH TAKES A BIT OF DOING.

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8. (C) CYRUS AMOUZEGAR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND TOURISM, WAS BORN IN 1934. HE IS NOT CONNECTED TO JAMSHID AMOUZEGAR'S FAMILY. HE RECEIVED A B.A. IN JURISPRUDENCE IN 1954 FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AND A PH.D. IN ECONOMICS FROM THE SAME UNIVERSITY IN 1963. AMOUZEGAR IS AN UNUSUAL COMBINATION OF ECONOMIST/NOVELIST. HE HAS SERVED AS ASST. MANAGER OF CENTRAL OFFICE OF IRAN CREDITS BANK, DIRECTOR OF A BOOK PUBLISHING COMPANY, AND ECONOMICS ADVISOR TO MINISTRY OF LABOR. HE HAS PUBLISHED BOOKS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS (REPORTEDLY WITH A RATHER LEFTIST VIEWPOINT), AND HE HAS ALSO PUBLISHED A NUMBER OF NOVELS, SHORT STORIES AND PLAYS.

9. (C) MOHAMMAD AMIN RIAHI, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, WAS BORN 1923 IN KHOY. HE RECEIVED A LICENTIATE FROM THE COLLEGE OF LITERATURE OF TEHRAN UNIVERSITY IN 1950 AND HE LATER EARNED A PH.D. IN LITERATURE FROM TEHRAN UNIV. HE TAUGHT HIGH SCHOOL IN QOM IN 1950, THEN BECAME DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE GENERAL DEPT OF EDUCATION IN AZERBAIJAN THE FOLLOWING YEAR. HE WAS PRINCIPAL OF TEACHERS' PRIMARY TRAINING SCHOOL TO 1952 (ACCORDING TO WHO'S WHO. THE DATE SEEMS TO BE POSSIBLE EISPRINT.). HE HAS SERVED AS DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PUBLICATIONS AND STATISTICS IN MINISTRY OF EDUCATION SINCE 1961. RIAHI HAS EDITED THE MONTHLY EDUCATION JOURNAL "AMUZESH-O-PARVARESH.. HE HAS ALSO WRITTEN AND EDITED THE MAGAZINE "KAYHAN FARHANGI." HE HAS ALSO SERVED AS DIRECTOR-GENERAL, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF IRANIAN PUBLIC LIBRARIES; COUNSELLOR TO MINISTER OF CULTURE AND ART; AND MEMBER, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SHAH-NAMEH FOUNDATION. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH AND F[illegible]CH. UNIVERSITY OPPOSITION SOURCE HELD UP RIAHI TO EMBOFF AS EXAMPLE OF MEDIOCRITY OF BAKHTIAR CABINET.

10. (LOU) MANOUCHEHR RAZMARA, MINISTER OF HEALTH IS AN M.D. AND HEART SPECIALIST. HE COMPLETED HIS EDUCATION IN FRANCE AND IS MEMBER OF FRENCH CARDIOLOGISTS SOCIETY. NO FURTHER DATA IS AVAILABLE.

11. (S) JAVAD KHADEM, MINISTER OF HOUSING AND URBAN PLANNIN IS ONLY 38 YEARS OLD. HE HOLDS A CIVIL ENGINEERING DEGREE FROM A BRITISH UNIVERSITY. HE HAS SPENT HIS SHORT CAREER
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PRIMARILY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HE HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE CONTRACTOR, AND HIS LAST POST WAS THAT OF DIRECTOR OF THE IRAN INDUSTRIAL GROUP. REPUTEDLY EMOTIONAL AND PERHAPS ANTI-AMERICAN, KHADEM IS KNOWN TO HAVE ACCEPTED BRIBES IN HIS CONTRACTING WORK.

11. (C) MANOUCHEHR ARIANA, MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, WAS BORN 1922 IN TEHRAN. HE GRADUATED IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL LAW FROM TEHRAN UNIVERSITY. HE JOINED THE MINISTRY OF LABOR IN 1946 AND HAS SERVED AS GENERAL DIRECTOR, LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS IN TEHRAN PROVINCE, GOVERNOR IN KHUZISTAN; TECHNICAL UNDERSECRETARY IN THE MINISTRY; GOVT REPRESENTATIVE ON SUPERVISION BOARD OF SOCIAL INSURANCE ORGANIZATION; AND (SINCE OCT 1973) AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF WORKERS' CHILDRENS' EDUCATION FUND. ARIANA IS REPORTEDLY A COUSIN OF RETIRED GENERAL ARIANA, ONE OF THE OLDER MILITARY MEN WHOM SOME PEOPLE IN THE OPPOSITION REPORTEDLY FOUND ACCEPTABLE. HE SPEAKS ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

12. (C) LT. GEN. JAFFAR SHAFEGHAT (ALSO SHAFAQAT), MINISTER OF WAR, WAS BORN 1915 IN TABRIZ. HE STUDIED AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY, TEHRAN, WAR COLLEGE IN FRANCE, AND RECEIVED A DOCTORATE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM UNIVERSITY OF PARIS (1953). HE HAS USED HIS LEGAL TRAINING DURING HIS MILITARY CAREER. LAUNCHING HIS CAREER IN THE FIRST INFANTRY DIVISION, AZERBAIJAN, IN 1939, AND IN 1961 HE BECAME PRESIDENT OF SUPERIOR COURT. HE WAS NAMED DEPUTY COMMANDER, IMPERIAL IRANIAN GROUND FORCES IN 1964. SHAFEGHAT SERVED AS COMMANDER, 2ND ARMY, 1966-71, SERVING CONCURRENTLY (AFTER FEB 1968) AS CHIEF OF HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE DEPT. IN JUNE 1971 HE BECAME ADJUTANT TO THE SHAH, AND IT WAS IN THAT CAPACITY THAT HE CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION OF THE TABRIZ RIOTS OF FEBRUARY 1978. ONE MONTH LATER HE BECAME GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF EAST AZERBAIJAN. SHAFEGHAT IS CONSIDERED AN OUTSTANDING COMMANDER, ACTING CAPABLY, USING HIS STAFF WELL, AND READILY ACCEPTING ADVICE. HIS HEAVY INVOLVEMENT IN LEGAL AFFAIRS DID TAKE SOME TIME AWAY FROM COMMAND DUTIES. CONSULATE TABRIZ REPORTS HE WAS WELL RESPECTED IN TABRIZ (BRING A NATIVE OF TABRIZ WITH COMMAND OF THE LANGUAGE NO DOUBT HELPED.). HE WOULD OFTEN BE SEEN WALKING THE STREETS OF THE CITY OF IN AN AUTOMOBILE, APPEARING IN PUBLIC WITHOUT ANY LARGE SECURITY RETINUE. IN TEHRAN, HOWEVER, THE OPPOSITION VIEWS HIM AS A HARDLINER ON CIVIL UNREST, PRESUMABLY BASED ON HIS SERVICE IN MILITARY COURTS; ONE OPPOSITION SOURCE CALLS HIM "THE EXECUTIONER." HE HAS THREE CHILDREN. HE SPEAKS GOOD FRENCH AND FAIR ENGLISH. SULLIVAN

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ACTION

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TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESRS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4511
RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2401
RUETTC/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1534
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1357
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4380
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8748
RUTAQL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4631
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 5447
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 9079
RUSBKR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7194
RUFHOLL/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4426
RUCMPL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9545
RUQMYA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1619
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5727
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 9425
RUTGHQA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2430
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RHFRAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GE
RUDOVBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 018767/01

STUTTGART FOR ILG , CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12065 12065: GDS 1/23/85 (PRECHT E.)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: IRAN SITREP NO. 110, 1/23/79, 1600 HOURS EST
-- 0 HOURS EST
POLITICAL/SECURITY
1. (ENTIRE TEXT SECRET)
RELIGIOUS MODERATES, INCLUDING SHARIAT MADARI, ARE SAID
TO BELIEVE THEY HAVE CONVINCED KHOMEINI TO WAIT UNTIL HE
HAS CONSULTED WITH THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP IN IRAN BEFORE
MAKING FINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SUCH ITEMS AS THE BAGE..CH
COUNCIL AND THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. THE MODERATE RE-
LIGIOUS LEADERS STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE CONSTITUTION
SHOULD BE FOLLOWED; OTHERWISE THEY SEE A REAL DANGER OF A
MILITARY COUP. SOME MODERATES WORKING FOR A COMPROMISE AND

ACTION:
POL3

INFO:
AMB
DCM
ADM
ECON2
PM
OR
ICA
CHRON R7

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323

4

SEEKING WAYS TO COMBINE THE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC COUNCIL. ADDITIONALLY, THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS TRYING TO WORK WITH THE MILITARY TO ASSURE THAT KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN WILL BE PEACEFUL.

2. MUSLIM STUDENTS PROTESTED "DIVISIVE REPORTING" AT THE OFFICES OF ONE OF TEHRAN'S PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPERS (KEYHAN'AT) YESTERDAY. THE STUDENT SPOKESMAN SAID HE RESPECTED EVERYONE'S IDEOLOGY, BUT THERE WERE SOME ISMS THAT WERE NOT RIGHT - THE VICTORIOUS REVOLUTION MUST BE RIGHTLY REFLECTED IN THE PRESS.

3. TEHRAN'S MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR, GENERAL RAHIMI, HAS BEEN NAMED TO REPLACE THE TEHRAN POLICE CHIEF. THE LATTER HAD BEEN IN HIS POST ONLY TWO WEEKS.

4. PRINT SHOP WORKERS HAVE DECLARED THEY WILL PRINT NO GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING PASSPORTS. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ASKED THE EMPLOYEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SERVICE OF IRANIAN RADIO AND TV (NIRT) TO RETURN TO WORK BECAUSE OF THE VALUABLE ROLE IT PLAYS ON THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY.

5. CONSULATE ISFAHAN REPORTS CONTINUED THREATS AND SOME LOOTING CONNECTED WITH AMERICANS MOVING OUT OR SELLING FURNITURE. SECURITY FORCES SEEM TO AVOID DEMONSTRATIONS WHENEVER THEY OCCUR. CONSULATE TABRIZ REPORTS THE CITY STILL SHUT TIGHT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OFFICES.

6. KEYHAN'AT JANUARY 22 ELABORATED ON THE PREVIOUS MEDIA REPORT OF US INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES IN IRAN, AND OF THE ALLEGED US INTEREST IN TRANSFERRING THESE FACILITIES TO TURKEY. THE WRITER ALSO NOTED TALK OF TRANSFERRING THESE INTELLIGENCE MEANS FROM IRAN TO ISRAEL. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT A US MILITARY PRESENCE OF ANY SORT POSES A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE CAUSE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT.

ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL

7. IRAN'S MINISTER OF FINANCE, ROSTAM PIRASTEH, HAS OFFERED ASSURANCES THAT ANY ARREARAGES WILL BE MADE GOOD AND THAT LATE PAYMENTS ARE THE RESULTS OF STRIKES AND NOT FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS. THE GOI IS SENDING TWO TEAMS OF SENIOR FINANCIAL OFFICIALS ABROAD TO REASSURE FOREIGN LENDERS. THE FIRST IS EXPECTED IN NEW YORK LATER THIS MONTH.

8. IRAN'S CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR, KHOSHTAB, HAS RESIGNED. KHOSHTAB HAD BEEN WIDELY CRITICIZED FOR HIS INEFFECTIVE

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LEADERSHIP WHICH ALLOWED THE CENTRAL BANK STRIVE TO RAPIDLY DECELATE. FINANCE MINISTER PIRASTEH INTENDS TO SUPERVISE THE RECOVERY OF CBI HIMSELF.

6. IRAN'S COMMERCIAL BANKS CONTINUE TO OPERATE, THOUGH WITH LIMITED SERVICES AND OFTEN WITH QUOTAS ON WITHDRAWALS DURING THE ABBREVIATED WORK WEEK. NON-COMMERCIAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES HAVE RISEN, REFLECTING IN PART THE SUCCESS OF THE CBI EMPLOYEES' STOPPAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE SALES OF THE CBI EMPLOYEES' STOPPAGE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE SALES

[redacted] COMMERCIAL BANKS TO THE COMMERCIAL BANKS FOR THE COMMERCIAL MARKET. ON JANUARY 28, FOREIGN EXCHANGE DEALERS

[redacted]

4

MCINTV ESP0228R84545
ORIGMHR
DE RUEHC #8767/02
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 032346Z JAN 79
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUESNS/AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4512
RUEBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2502
RUFRTO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1535
RUQMKM/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1056
RUFNSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4381
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8747
RUEAGL/AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4632
RUSMDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIAPE 6448
RUFHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 9080
RUSDBR/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7185
RUFHOU/AMCONSUL STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4427
RUQMIL/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9548
RUQMFA/USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1620
RUESUZ/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5728
RUFSFN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 9426
RUHONOA/ CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 231
RUENAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUFRBAA/COMIDEASTFOR
RUFRBAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GE
RUEOMBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
BT
S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF 02 STATE 018767/02

STUTTGART FOR ELG , CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

WERE QUOTING 91 RIALS/ONE DOLLAR (BUYING) AND 94/1 (SELLING)(NORMAL 70.). FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES ARE ESTIMATED AT BETWEEN $10.4 TO 10.6 BILLION.

10. FINANCE MINISTER PIRASTEH MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PRINCIPAL IRANIAN BANKS EARLIER THIS WEEK TO OFFER RELIEF MEASURES AND SUGGES
L' GUIDELINES FOR WITHDRAWALS
OF DEPOSITS. ACCORDING TO PIRASTEH, THE CBI WILL COVER, PRESUMABLY THROUGH LOANS, UP TO 50 PERCENT OF BANKS' OUTSTANDING FOREIGN EXCHANGE OBLIGATIONS.

11. THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN'S ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION I[illegible]MED THE EMBASSY THAT IRAN'S NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM, [illegible] THE MOST AMBITIOUS [illegible]NG IN THE THIRD WORLD, I[illegible]SPECIALLY SIGNIFI[illegible]. WORK [illegible] THE FRENCH AND GERMAN PROJECTS WILL BE HALTED, FOREIGN TECHNICIANS WILL RETURN

S E C R E T

PAGE FIVE S E C R ET 1477

TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES AND [illegible] IT [illegible] WILL BE DISSOLVED.
VANCE
BT
#8767

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 1116/1

O 231209Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3065
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0878
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3745
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3990
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5156
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4238
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1407
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3442
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3661
RT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 01116

CHRGD: STATE 1/23/79
APPRV: MIN:CANAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMPRAK
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MIN
FCON-2 PM OR
CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/23/88 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, IR
SUBJECT: SANJABI'S VIEWSON KHOMEINI AND GOVERNMENT

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: SANJABI IS OPPOSING ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IDEA BUT PUSHING FOR CHANGE OF GOVT. COULD SEE CROWN PRINCE EVENTUALLY RETURNING. END SUMMARY

3. IN SECOND MEETING WITH EMBASSY JAN 23, SANJABI SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE STATE OF THE NATION IN LIGHT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S PLAN TO RETURN NEXT FRIDAY. HE HAD COUNSELED KHOMEINI NOT TO RETURN YET AND LET THINGS COOL DOWN FIRST, AND HE THOUGHT OTHERS HAD COUNSELED HIM THAT WAY TOO. (COMMENT: THEY HAVE.) HOWEVER, KHOMEINI HAS AN AUTHORITARIAN STREAK IN HIS CHARACTER AND HAS DECIDED TO COME. SANJABI SENT KHOMEINI A MESSAGE THROUGH BEHESHTI LESS THAN A WEEK AGO THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO PRESS FOR CREATION OF AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. ALL CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH IS ADEQUATE TO THE TASK. THE MAIN CHANGE NECESSARY AT THIS TIME IS A NEW GOVT ACCEPTABLE TO KHOMEINI.

. SANJABI CONFIRMED TO POL COUNSELOR THAT HE IS NOT [illegible]VY TO KHOMEINI'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY AS TO WHO OR [illegible] MANY WOULD BE ON THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. [illegible]OUHAR IS IN PARIS PRESSING SANJABI'S IDEAS WITH [illegible]HEINI AND REPORTS BY TELEPHONE EVERY DAY. HE REPORTED [illegible] [illegible]BEHESHTI APPARENTLY TRANSMITTED TO KHOMEINI THAT [illegible]ANJABI DID NOT WISH TO BE A MEMBER OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLU-[illegible]IONARY COUNCIL, SOMETHING WHICH SANJABI HAD NEVER SAID. [illegible]HAD MERELY COUNSELED AGAINST CREATION OF SUCH A COUNCIL [illegible]ETHER. (COMMENT: A FINE DISTINCTION.)

. POL COUNSELOR LAID OUT USG POSITION. WE TOO ARE [illegible]RNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION [illegible]OMEINI, AFTER HIS RETURN, PRESSES HIS IDEAS FOR AN [illegible]NATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND GOVT. WE SUPPORT [illegible]ONSTITUTIONAL GOVT OF BAKHTIAR, AND NOTE THAT THE [illegible] DOES TOO. IT WOULD BE SO MUCH BETTER IF KHOMEINI

2

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 1116/1

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 1116/1

[illegible]UT OFF THE CHALLENGE TO THE PRESENT SYSTEM AND SIMPLY [illegible]CKED TO EARLY ELECTIONS, THROUGH WHICH HE PRESUMABLY [illegible]OULD WIN LARGE MAJORITY TO DO WHAT HE DESIRED. DESPITE [illegible]RECENT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO MEN, WE HOPED SANJABI [illegible]OULD SUPPORT BAKHTIAR IN WHAT COULD BE SEEN, AFTER ALL, [illegible]AS A TRANSITIONAL GOVT LEADING TO ELECTIONS WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK SANJABI SUPPORTS.

. SANJABI REVERTED TO THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN GOVT. BAKHTIAR HAS NO FIRM IDEAS, IS VERY ARROGANT, AND WE SHALL SOON SEE HE HAS NO FOLLOWING AMONG THE PEOPLE. FOR EXAMPLE, HE IS REPORTEDLY ORGANIZING A PRO-GOVT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT TOMORROW, JAN 24, WITH THE HELP OF SAVAK. THIS IS SILLY, SINCE HE CANNOT HOPE TO GET A LARGE ENOUGH NUMBER OF PEOPLE AND MIGHT PROVOKE CLASHES. HE SHOULD BE COUNSELED TO CANCEL THESE PLANS SINCE THEY MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. (COMMENT: IN FACT BAKHTIAR HAS ALREADY STARTED WITH ONE SUCH MEETING IN AMJADIEH STADIUM -- NOT FAR FROM THE EMBASSY -- THIS AFTERNOON, JAN 23.) ...

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SANJABI SAID HE SEES NO
HIMSELF BE ON A NEW GOVT. HE AGREED EASILY THAT BAZARGAN
WOULD MOST LIKELY BE TAPPED TO HEAD IT IF AT LEAST HE ON
IT. HE SAID HE HAD NOT SPOKEN VERY SPECIFICALLY ABOUT
HIS IDEAS WITH KHOMEINI RECENTLY, JUST GIVEN HIM
COMMENT: THIS INTERESTS SANJABI AS LESS THAN PROB
SOME OF THE OTHER NATIONAL FRONT COLLEAGUES SUCH AS
BAZARGAN, ASKHARI OR FARAHANI COMPLEX. SANJABI TO DEBTH
OUT LOUD AS TO WHAT HE THINKS KHOMEINI'S ATTITUDE
TOWARDS IT COULD BE. HOWEVER IT SEEMED CLEAR FROM
COUNCIL (ONLY OF A FEW MEMBERS WITH KHOMEINI PRESENT). HE
THOUGHT HE MIGHT SHORTLY BE ABLE TO SPEAK WITH KHOMEINI
THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. COMMENT: HE MIGHT
BE.
#1116

SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

PAGE 01 TEHRAN 01116 02 OF 02 121254Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3966
INFO RUEHCR/USINT BAGHDAD 0971
RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3746
RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3991
RUSPLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5156
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4239
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1404
RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3404
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3662
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 01116

LIMDIS

BE RIGHT.)

8. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT KHOMEINI STAY AWAY LONGER, KHOMEINI'S RETURN HAS ONE VIRTUE, SANJABI CONTINUED, IN THAT IT WILL FORCE HIM TO COME INTO CONTACT WITH OTHER EMINENT AYATOLLAHS SUCH AS SHARIAT-MADARI. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT TALEGHANI'S PRESENT THINKING IS, BUT HE HAD DEFINITE IMPRESSION THAT SHARIAT-MADARI AND THE QOM AYATOLLAHS DISAGREED WITH KHOMEINI'S APPROACH, THOUGH THEY ARE AFRAID TO MOUTH THEIR DISAGREEMENT. HE HOPED SOMEHOW KHOMEINI WOULD BE CONVINCED TO TONE DOWN HIS DRIVE FOR A REPUBLIC AS THIS SEEMED TO BE LEADING TO BLOODSHED. PRESENT CONSTITUTION IS IN FACT WELL SUITED TO IRAN. THE IRANIAN PEOPLE HAVE NO MORE USE FOR THE SHAH HIMSELF, HIS BROTHERS, HIS SISTERS, NEPHEWS, NIECES, UNCLES AND AUNTS. HOWEVER, THE CROWN PRINCE IS STILL A MINOR, AND SANJABI COULD CONCEIVE HIS RETURNING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH. HE THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD GONE TOO FAR IN ATTACKING THE INSTITUTION OF THE MONARCHY. (COMMENT: THIS WAS A REPETITION OF THE SAME POINT MADE IN OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATION A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO.)

9. IN TALKING A LITTLE BIT ABOUT KHOMEINI'S ENTOURAGE, SANJABI DESCRIBED GHOTBZADEH AS A "BIG LIAR." HE WAS AFRAID OF THE INFLUENCE GHOTBZADEH AND YAZDI HAD ON KHOMEINI. (COMMENT: THE THIRD MEMBER OF THE TRIO, BANI SADR, SANJABI TOLD US EARLIER HE CONSIDERS A FRIEND OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.) SANJABI RECALLED HIS OWN VISIT WITH KHOMEINI A COUPLE OF MONTHS AGO, WHEN HE AND KHOMEINI HAMMERED OUT AN AGREEMENT WHICH KHOMEINI PERSONALLY APPROVED (E EVEN ADDED ONE WORD) AND WHICH DID NOT MENTION AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. KHOMEINI HAD WANTED TO INSERT THIS BUT SANJABI REFUSED. YET THE NEXT DAY GHOTBZADEH HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT IN KHOMEINI'S NAME, CASTING ASPERSIONS ON THE JOINT STATEMENT AND SAYING KHOMEINI WAS FOR AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.

10. IN RESPONSE TO A LEAD FROM POL COUNSELOR, SANJABI ADMITTED HE WAS SURE ANTI-AMERICANISM IS RECEDING AND WILL CONTINUE TO RECEDE AFTER A REALISTIC NEW GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER AND SURVEYS THE SCENE. HE SAID HE WAS NOT AWARE OF WHO THE LEFTISTS DEMONSTRATING THESE DAYS REALLY ARE. SOME

SURELY ARE COMMUNISTS, OF VARIOUS STRIPES.

11. COMMENT: SANJABI FEELS ALL ALONE OUT IN LEFT FIELD AND IS LOOKING FOR FRIENDS, SUCH AS USG. HIS NAME STILL CARRIES WEIGHT IN OPPOSITION CIRCLES, HOWEVER, AND HE HAS THE BRAINS AND EXPERIENCE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE AT SOME LATER DATE. HE SAID HE WAS WORKING ON BROADENING HIS PARTY'S BASE AMONG THE YOUNG PEOPLE ESPECIALLY. HE NEEDS O. SULLIVAN

[illegible]116

[illegible]NNN

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 111

CONFIDENTIAL/PARIS [illegible]

[illegible] JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFRC/SSOSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 30
INFO RUFRC/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3407
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 0210

E.O. 12065: RDS-4, 1-28-99 (STEMPEL, J.E.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (C)RELIGIOUS MODERATES AIMING TO LEAN ON [illegible]

REF: TEHRAN 1 [illegible]

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: MINISTER TOLD EMBOFF THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT NEED PRESS FOR ADDITIONAL SETTINGS WITH MILITARY TO [illegible] KHOMEINI'S RETURN TO IRAN JAN 25 PEACEFUL. IN THIS CONNECTION, RELIGIOUS MODERATES INCLUDING SHARIATMADARI AND THOSE AROUND HIM BELIEVE THEY HAVE CONVINCED KHOMEINI TO WAIT UNTIL HE CONSULTS WITH IN-COUNTRY LEADERSHIP [illegible] FINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SUCH ITEMS AS REGENCY COUNCIL AND BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT. COMPROMISE REPORT NOW CIRCULATING SOME SORT OF MANEUVER TO COMBINE REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS STRONGLY BELIEVE CONSTITUTIONAL FORCES SHOULD [illegible] VULNERABLE. THERE WAS FEARS FOR KHOMEINI'S SAFETY. [illegible] SUMMARY.

1. DR. [illegible] MINISTER, SPEAKING CONFIDENTIALLY, [illegible] AFTER POLITICAL STEMPEL MORNING JAN [illegible] FOR KHOMEINI. MINISTER [illegible] HE IN DOG HAS BEEN WITH SHARIATMADARI AND OTHER MAJOR [illegible] BY MOLLAHS. MINISTER SAID HE HAD SECRETLY ASSURED LIEF KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE MOVEMENT (EMIL RAD) AS THEY WALTZ SHOULD GO FORWARD WITH MILITARY. MINISTER HAD PRESSED KHOMEINI MOSHARIATMADARI TO BE BOTHERED WITH THIS, AND LATTER HAD [illegible] PROMISED, SAYING THIS WAS NOT ITS [illegible] WITH BAZARGAN. MINISTER TOLD MOSHARIATMADARI TO GO AHEAD ANYWAY. BAZARGAN ANYWAY. BY MID-MORNING MOSHARIATMADARI HAD NOT DONE SO. [illegible] HAS TOLD BY CONTACT MOSHARIATMADARI OR KHOMEINI [illegible] DIRECTLY. (COMMENT: WE'RE NOT QUITE SURE WHY MOSHARIATMADARI IS PLAYING SPOKES-IN-CENTER AT THIS POINT, BUT WE HAVE STRONGLY ADVISED BOTH SIDES TO GET TOGETHER, AND IF THEY SHOW FLEXIBILITY WITH MOSHARIATMADARI THEY COULD AT [illegible] MEETING SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN [illegible] MINISTER HAS OPTIMISTIC MEETING WOULD [illegible] JAN 28.

EXDIS

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CONFIDENTIAL

DRIVING MORNING JAN 29 [illegible] PARIS, PROCEEDING TO EXPERT-I-ZATA COMPANY (AIR FRANCE CHARTER), SPEAKING, WHEN QUESTIONED TO A PRESS-TRAINED LOCAL TO WAIT THE ARRIVAL OF HIS PLANE. KHOMEINI WOULD REMAIN IN TEHRAN FOR TWO OR THREE DAYS, THEN RETURN TO QOM. BAKHTIAR WAS CONFIDENT THAT KHOMEINI WOULD NOT OFFER "FINAL SOLUTIONS" TO COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS NOR PROVOKE MILITARY TO REACTION. BAKHTIAR SAID QOM VISIT, IF ANNOUNCED "FINAL SETTLEMENT" ON ARRIVAL, MILITARY MIGHT MOVE AGAINST HIM. MINATCHI SAID ALL BUT IN-COUNTRY FOLLOWERS UNDERSTOOD THIS AND WERE PRESSING HIM NOT TO RUSH MATTERS TO DISASTER.

3. DISCUSSIONS OF COMPROMISE BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND GOI HAD DIRECTED TO FINDING SOME MEANS OF COMBINING REGENCY COUNCIL AND KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC COUNCIL. MINATCHI SAID OPPOSITIONISTS HAD READ REPORT THAT PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR WAS GOING TO DECLARE IRAN A REPUBLIC BEFORE KHOMEINI ARRIVAL AND [illegible] POLICY IF THAT WERE TRUE. FOLLOWS DOUBTED THAT BOURGES A DIX BAF-TRICKED EVEN IN PURSUIT OZ-LIKE SPHERE OF IRANIAN POLITICS. MINATCHI AGREED ANY MAJOR THAT WOULD BE A DISASTER; MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS, ESPECIALLY SHARIAT-MADARI, SERIOUSLY BELIEVED IT WAS NECESSARY TO FOLLOW CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS. IF THIS WERE NOT DONE, MODERATES SAW REAL DANGER OF MILITARY COUP AND CONSEQUENT UNRAVELLING OF ARMED FORCES, OR CIVIL WAR. TEHREPORT, IN-COUNTRY AYATOLLAHS WOULD PRESS KHOMEINI TO MODERATE HIS VIEWS ON ISLAMICALITY OF INSTITUTIONS IN INTERESTS OF NATION AND ISLAM. ANY ELEMENT WOULD BE COMPROMISE ON SOME FORM OF REGENCY COUNCIL APPROVAL FOR NEXT "NATIONALIST" GOVERNMENT.

4. MINATCHI SAID BOTH RELIGIOUS LEADERS AND SECULAR POLITICIANS WERE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THREATS TO KHOMEINI'S SAFETY SHOULD HE RETURN. MINATCHI HAD READ THAT THERE WERE PRO-SHAH SOLDIERS WHO HAD SWORN TO KILL KHOMEINI. SMI AND OTHERS KNOW THERE WERE COMMUNIST GROUPS WITH SAME ASPIRATION. FOR ALL MINATCHI KNEW, EMBERS MIGHT EVEN BE FOREIGN POWERS WHO WANTED KHOMEINI KILLED. HE ALLUDED TO

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

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C 2810Z2Z [illegible]
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3293
INFO RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3588
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF TEHRAN 01127

EXDIS

SOVIETS AND POSSIBLY ISRAELIS HAVING DESIGNS ON KHOMEINI. POLOFF MADE NO OTHER COMMENT EXCEPT EXPECTED OBVIOUS DENIAL THAT U.S. WISHED KHOMEINI HARM.

5. COMMENT: THOUGH MODERATES AND EVEN LMI HERE PRESSED KHOMEINI NOT TO COME, THEY HAVE SMARTLY TURNED TO TASK OF TRYING TO WORK HIM INTO THE SYSTEM WITHOUT CAUSING MAJOR BLOWUP. GIVEN TRACK RECORD OF LAST-MINUTE HEROICS BY ONE OR THE OTHER OF PARTIES INVOLVED JUST MISSING EXPECTED GOTTERDAMMRUNGS OF PAST TWO MONTHS, PERHAPS ABOVE IS NOT RPT NOT DISCOURAGING, BUT IT DOES SEEM TO BE BANKING ON NEWLY-DISCOVERED PERSIAN PRINCIPLE BEST DESCRIBED AS "SHOWDOWN WITHOUT CONFRONTATION." SULLIVAN
BT
#1127

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* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—225-323

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~~CIA~~
~~GDS~~

File B10
RAOM MADANI

1173 1

SECRET
DAO 01/25/79
DATT:TESCHAEFER
DATT:TESCHAEFER
NONE
DAO-2 CRU

1/79

USDAO/TEHRAN
DIA WASH DC, IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USDAC VAIHINGEN GE
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
COMIDEASTFOR MANAMA BA
USDAO MOSCOW USSR
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
FICPAC PEARL HARBOR HI

NOFORN WNINTEL JAN 79

DIA FOR RCM2/DN-2E/DR;CINCPAC FOR J233;USCINCEUR FOR ECJ2;
WHITE HOUSE FOR SITUATION ROOM

THIS IR*S IIR 6 846 0050 79
1. COUNTRY: IRAN(IR)
2. REPORT NUMBER: 6 846 0050 79
3. TITLE: DISCUSSIONS WITH IRANIANS(U)
4. OMIT
5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 7902*124
6. DATE OF REPORT: 790125
7. DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 790124,TEHRAN,IRAN
8. REFERENCES: ICR U-UED-49218;ICR M-2E1-15016
9. ASSESSMENT: SOURCE: C INOFMR**INFORMATION: 3
10. ORIGINATOR: USDAO(DATT)TEHRAN,IRAN
11. REQUEST EVALUATION: ICR
12. PREPARING OFFICER: THOMAS E.SCHAEFER,COL,USAF,DATT
13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: THOMAS E.SCHAEFER,D*COL,USAF,DATT
14. SOURCE: ONE TIME SOURCE
15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NOFORN CAVEAT UTILIZED TO PRO-
TECT THE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES OF THIS OFFICE.WARNING
NOTICE GIVEN AS INFORMATION IN ITSELF MAY IDENTIFY SOURCE
TO HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.DIRC:NO
16. SUMMARY:(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) THIS REPORT COVERS DISCUS-
SIONS BETWEEN DATT AND FORMER REAR ADMIRAL(NOW DR) AHMAD
MADANI DURING A DINNER PARTY ON THE EVENING OF 24 JAN 79
IN THE HOME OF DR HAJ ALILOO(MD),DATT'S LANDLORD.
17. THRU 21. OMIT
18. DS*ETAILS:(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)

SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL

SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DATT WAS ASKED BY LANDLORD IF HE WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK WITH RETIRED REAR ADMIRAL AHMAD MADANI, A POSSIBLE MINISTER OF INTERIOR IN FUTURE GOI AND MAKE A TRIP TO QOM TO TALK WITH AYATOLLAH SHARIAT MADERI.AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH T*THE AMA*BASSADOR CONCENRI**CONCERNING A MEETING WITH SHARIAT-MADERI,IT WAS DECIDED THAT A NON-MILITARY MAN WOULD BE BEST AT THIS TIME. DATT THEN INFORMED LANDLORD THAT AT SOME FUTURE DATE IT WOULD BE NICE TO VISIT QOM, POSSIBLY IN THE SPRING,BUT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO GO AT THIS TIME.HOWEVER,DATT DID STATE THAT A MEETING WITH ADMIRAL MAN*DANI WOULD BE MOST E*WELCOME SINCE WE WERE BOTH MILITARY OFFICERS AND MADANI W*COULD PROVIDE INFORMATION ON HIS DESIRES AND THOUGHTS ABOUT A NEW IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.LAST EVENING'S MEETING WAS THE RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS.
B. AFTER THE USUAL PLES*ASANTRIES AND BRIEF DISCUSSION OF BACKGROUNDS(ADMIRAL MADANI IS THE SON OF A MULLAH,DOES NOT DRINK ALCOCHOL,DOES NOT SMOKE,AND IS A DEVOUT MOSLEM) THE TALKS TURNED TO POLITICS,AND THE NEW REQUIRED(MAN*DANI'S VIEW)GOVERNMENT IN IRAN.ADMIRAL MAN*DANI STATED THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WOULD DEFD*INITELY A*BE ARRI ON FRIDAY 26 JAN AND ADDED THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH PR.ME MINISTER BAKHTIAR YESTERDAY AND PLANS HAD BEE. MADE FOR BAKHTIAR TO HAND OVER THE REINS OF GOVERNMENT TO DR A*BAZARGAN THEIR(H*KHOMEINI'S FOLLOWERS)CHOICE FOR THE NEW PRIME MINISTER.ADMIRAL MADANI STATED THAT DR BAKHTIAR WOULD BE RETAINED IN A SENIOR GOVERNMENT POSITION, PROBLY AS MINISTER OF WAR.DATT THEN ASK[illegible]F GENERAL JAM[illegible] NOT BEING S*CONSIDERED FOR THAT POR[illegible]LIO AND MADANI REPLIED THAT HE** JAM WAS A STRONG AND HONEST GENERAL CAPABLE OF HANDLING THE MILITARY.DATT ASKED IF HE(MADANI) WS*AS BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR PST AND WOULD HE ACCEPT THAT POSITION.HE RESPONDED YES TO BT*OTH QUESTIONS AND ADDED THAT MUCH WORK HAD TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THE MINISTRY SINCE RE**MAJOR REG*ORGANIZATIONAL*** PLISHED IN THE MINISTRY SINCE MAJOR REORGANIZATIONS MUST BE A*MADE IN SAVAK,THE GENDARMERIE AND THE NATIONAL POLICE. HE SAID THE CIA ORGANIZED SAVAK WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED AND REBUILT.THE OFFICERS WERE CORRUPT AND THE TORTURES HAD TO CEASE.DATT THEN STATED THAT TO HIS KNOWLEG*DGE SINCE GEN MOGHADEN HAD ASSUMED CHID*EF OF SAVAK TORTURE WAS NO LONGER USED IN SAVAK.MADANI SAID THAT MAYBE THAT WERE TRUE BUT THEY DID NOT T*HAVE HONEST OFFICERS IN SAVAK AND THEN ADDED THAT ALL GENERALS IN SAVAK AND IN THE MILITARY WERE CORRUPT AND DISHONEST.DATT RESPONDED EMPHATICALLY THAT HE HAD ME MANY HONEST,HARDWORKING AND OG**GOOD MOSLEM GENERAL OFFICERS IN THE MILITARY THAT WOULD PROVIDE EXCELLENT MILITARY LEADERSHIP FOR THEIR COUNTRY.MADANI

SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL

COUNTERED MOST WOULD HAVE TO BE RETIRED SINCE THEY WERE CORRUPT.
C. ADMIRAL MADANI STATED THAT THE IRANIAN MILITARY DID NOT HAVE TO BE LARGE; ONLY 10,000 IN THE NAVY, 15,000 IN THE AIR FORCE AND 100,000 IN THE GROUND FORCES.HE SAID THES*RE IS NO THREAT TO IRAN W*FROM THEIR ISAL**ISLAMIC NEIGHBORS AND THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT BE STOPPED EVEN BY LARGE R*IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES.HE THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY WHY DO WE NEED ALL THESE MADERN,EXPENSIVE WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
D. ADMIRAL MADANI THEN STATED THAT US HAD MADE A MISTAKE IN BACKING THE CORRUPT GOVERNMENT OF THE SHAH.* MUCH AS WE HAD DONE IN CUBA. HE ADDED THE US SHOULD SUPPORT THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF IRAN(A KHOMEINI BACKED BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT).RO ASKED SD**DID HE MEAN THE US SHOULD BACK A EVOLUTIONARY ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HE RESPONDED THAT THESE WERE ONLY WOUD**WORDS THAT DID NOT MEAN ANYTHING,AND THAT THE NEW OG**GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WOULD BE A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WITHOUT A MOA*NARCHY. RO ASKED NOT EVEN A POWERLESS MONARCHY SIMILIAR TO ENGLANDS. HE QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT NO MONARCHY WHT*ATSOEVER FOR THAT ERA HAD PASSED IN PERSIAN HISTORY.
E. RO THEN STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THE MILITARY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A KHOMEINI GOVERNMN*ENT AND THAT A MILIA*TARY COUP WOULD PROBABLY PRECEDE ANY FURTHER CIVILIAN GOVERNEMNT** GOVERNMENT CHANGES.MADANI STATED THAT WOULD BE SUICIDE, AND THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED WITH YOUNG OFFICERS WHO WOULD NOT SUPPORT A MILITARY COUP.HE ADDED THAT A MILITARY COUP LED BY YOUR AMERICAN ADVISER GENERAL HEYSER WOULD ONLY POSTPONE THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE SINCE PEOPLE WERE READY TO DIE FOR THEIR FREEDOM.HE A*A*SAID I AND A MILLION OTHER IRANIANS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE THEIR LIVES IN A REVOLUTION. ANY MILITARY COUP WOULD BE SEEN AS AN AMERICAN EFFORT TO RETAIN A CORRUPT ILLEGAL GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT IS*F A MILITARY COUP WOULD HAPPEN THEN ANARCHY WOULD RESULT FOLLOWED BY A COMMUNIST GOVET*RNMENT.
F. RO ASKED IF KHOMEINI SHOULD POSTO*PONE HIS RETURN TO IRAN. ADMIRAL MADANI SAID NO SINCE THE TIME IS NOW-HE SHOULD RETURN AND ESTABLISH A NEW GOVERNMENT.
ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS:(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)
DATT BELIEVES ADMIRAL MADANI IS A PRO-WEST, COMPARITIVELY RELIGIOUS AND INTELLIGENC*T INDIVIDUAL. HE IS A FORMER NAVAL OFFICER WHO WAS USHERED INTO EARLY RETIREMENT BECAUSE HE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE MASSIVE AND EXPENSIVE EXPANSION IN THE IIN AND COULD C*NOT STOMACH TE*HE CORRUPTNESS THAT ACCOMPANIED THIS BUILDUP OF THE NAVY. HE HAD OBTAINED A DOCTORATE IN POLITICS AND ECONOMICS(HIS STATEMENT)AND HAS RECENTLY BEEN INVOLVED IN TEACHING IN

SECRET NOFORN WNINTEL

UNIVERSITIES IN IRAN. HE INDICATED VERY STRONGLY THAT THE PROBLEMS IN IRAN WERE AIDED AND ABEITED BY THE UNITED STATES AND HE HAS NOT CHANGED THIS THEME SINCE ENROLLING IN THE US NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. HE APPEARS TO BE SINCERE IN HIS CONVERSATION,BUT RO FEELS HE MAY BE AN INSPIRED OPPORTUNIST WAITING TO GET BACK IN THE IN**MAIN STREAM OF GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS. HE LIKE MANY IRANIANS TRIES TO IMPRESS YOU WITH HIS TOP LEVEL ASSOCIATIONS AND INSIDE H*KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT ŞS TAKING PLACE AND HOW WELL INFORMED HE IS. ADMIRAL MADANI STAE*TES HE IS ANTI-COMMUNIST AND THAT IRAN DOES NOT WANT TO TURN TO THE EAST FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT. HE STATED THAT REQUIRED AMERICANS AND WESTERNERS WOULD BE ASKED TO RETURN TO AID IRAN IN THEIR ECEO**ECOM*NOMIC RECOVERY.
REGARDLESS OF HIS TRUE CAPABILITIES ADMIRAL MADANI IS SEEN BY THE ISLAMIC MODERATES,INTELLIGENT IRANIANS(DOCTORS, LAWYERS,PROFESSORS,BUSINESSMNE AND***
LAWYERS,PROFESSORS,BUSINESSMEN AND CLERGY)AS AN HONEST OFFICER, A SINCERE MUSLIM, AND A GOOD CHOICE AS A FUTURE GOVERNMENT LEADER IF A NEW SOCIALIST CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED WITHOUT BLOODSHED,ADMIRAL MADANI MAY WELL BE INCLUDED IN THE TOP ECHELONG*.
DECLAS***
DECL 25 JANUARY 1985##

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P I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEHRAN 01261

. . 1220Z; DOP-6 1-25-80 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
. . : PINS, PINR, PGOV, PORS, IR
. . : PLANS SET FOR KHOMEINI ARRIVAL IN TEHRAN

. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

. SUMMARY: MINATCHI BRIEFED EMBOFF ON PLANS APPROVED BY GOI FOR ARRIVAL OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI IN TEHRAN JAN 30. KHOMEINI'S FAMILY SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE TODAY. MINATCHI DOES NOT BELIEVE KHOMEINI WILL ANNOUNCE ANY "FINAL STEPS" JAN 30. END SUMMARY.

. DR. NASSER MINATCHI, AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI'S [illegible] AND MODERATE OPPOSITIONIST POLITICAL [illegible] (STRICTLY) TOLD POLOFF STEMPEL MORNING JAN 29 THAT LATE [illegible] 24 PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR HAD PERSONALLY AGREED TO AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SCHEDULED RETURN BY AIR FRANCE FLIGHT, AND HAD ALSO APPROVED KHOMEINI'S INITIAL PROGRAM. SCHEDULE CALLS FOR AYATOLLAH TO ARRIVE MEHRABAD 8:30 AND 9:00 A.M. MILITARY WILL KEEP AIRPORT CLOSED, AND ALLOW ENTRANCE OF OFFICIAL GREETING PARTY BY ADMISSION CARD. PARTY WILL CONSIST OF ABOUT TEN OR TWELVE (AS NOW PLANNED) MINATCHI SAID THIS MIGHT GROW), INCLUDING [illegible] JOINING TEHRAN CLERGY SUCH AS AYATOLLAH TALEGANI, AYATOLLAH SEYED MOHAMMAD BEHESHTI (KHOMEINI'S CHIEF LIEUTENANT), AS WELL AS OPPOSITIONIST POLITICIANS KARIM SANJABI, MEHDI BAZARGAN, DARIUSH FOROUHAR, MINATCHI AND OTHERS.

. PUBLIC WILL NOT EXPECT NOT BE ADMITTED TO AIRPORT, BUT MASSIVE CROWD WILL AWAIT KHOMEINI AT SHAHYAD MONUMENT ALONG AIRPORT ROAD. AFTER INITIAL GREETINGS, KHOMEINI WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO BEHESHT-E-ZAHRA CEMETERY IN SOUTH TEHRAN VIA SHAHYAD MONUMENT, EISENHOWER AVENUE, JALAVI BOULEVARD AND QOM ROAD. AYATOLLAH WILL SPEAK (APPARENTLY ALONG WITH OTHERS) AT CEMETERY, THEN PROCEED TO HIS QUARTERS AT REFA ISLAMIC SCHOOL NEAR PRESENT [illegible] QOM. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL THEN RECEIVE COUNTRY'S [illegible] QOM OVER PERIOD OF TWO OR THREE DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING [illegible] QOM.

. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, PRIME MINISTER WILL NOT [illegible] MEET AYATOLLAH AT AIRPORT UNLESS HE RECEIVES SUITABLE [illegible] TO LETTER HE SENT KHOMEINI JANUARY 25. LETTER [illegible] TO DISCUSS COUNTRY'S STATE AND CLOSES WITH RITUAL [illegible] TO PLACE HIMSELF AT KHOMEINI'S DISPOSAL. (COMMENT: [illegible] UNDERSTAND FROM OTHER SOURCES THAT LETTER WAS FORTHCOMING AND FRIENDLY, BUT DID NOT GO AS FAR IN [illegible] PORTION OF BAKHTIAR [illegible] DEFERENCE TO KHOMEINI AS

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(ASSUMED INTIMATES.) AS THINGS NOW STAND, PRIME MINISTER BAZARGAN WILL CALL ON AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI AT SOME "EARLY" MOMENT DURING HIS TEHRAN STAY (COMMENT: MINATCHI SAID WHEN HE WOULD PROBABLY EXPAND ON HOW EVENTS UNFOLD).

6. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI'S FAMILY WAS DUE TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN JAN 26 AND WOULD RESIDE IN JUSE-BEHIND HOME ON DOWLAT AVENUE IN DARBOUS AREA OF NORTH TEHRAN. KHOMEINI HIMSELF MOST PROBABLY NOT BE STAYING WITH THEM, REMAINING FOR POLITICAL REASONS HE WISHED TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH IRANIAN "WITH HIS PEOPLE". (COMMENT: MINATCHI HAD NO IDEA HOW FAMILY ARRIVAL WOULD BE ARRANGED WITH AIRPORT CLOSED, BUT DID NOT SEEM TO THINK THIS WAS A PROBLEM.)

7. ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT WHETHER KHOMEINI WOULD IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT AFTER SEEING, MINATCHI SAID AYATOLLAH WAS BEING PRESSED STRONGLY BY HIS IN-COUNTRY SUPPORTERS NOT YET NOT TO GO SO, AND THERE HAD BEEN INDICATIONS THAT HE WOULD WAIT TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF FINAL SOLUTIONS UNTIL HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO CONSULT WITH IN-COUNTRY ULEMA. (COMMENT: WE HOPE THIS IS THE CASE, BUT WE'RE HOLDING OUR BREATH. CONFRONTATIONS WOULD BE SQUARELY IN ISLAMIC STRIDENT VEIN AND COULD BE TOUGH -- PERHAPS NECESSARY -- WAY OF CHECKING SUPPORT OF MORE MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CAN IMAGINE COUNTER-PRESSURES FROM THOSE AROUND THE AYATOLLAH IN PARIS.)

8. MEETING BETWEEN MOST SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND SENIOR KHOMEINI OFFICIALS HAS NOT YET TAKEN PLACE, ACCORDING TO MINATCHI. GEN. GHARABAGHI REPORTED AS AT "TOO BUSY" ON JAN 24, BUT MINATCHI PRESSED HIM, MOREAU HAND ON POINT, AND SAID BAZARGAN AND A SENIOR MILITARY FIGURE WERE READY TO MEET GHARABAGHI ANYWHERE, EVEN AT GHARABAGHI'S HOME. MINATCHI THOUGHT MEETING WAS TENTATIVELY SET FOR EVENING JAN 25. (COMMENT: SUCH A MEETING WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN MAINTAINING MILITARY COOPERATION WITH PLAN OUTLINED ABOVE AND IT PLEASE IN)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1286

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3288
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01286

CHRGE: STATE 1-25-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT:LAB
CLEAR: POL:GRIAMBRAKIS
DISTR: [redacted]-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR SHIR TABR ISF
CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/24/99 (PERETT, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: (U) OPPOSITION VIEWS

REF: TEHRAN 892

1. EMBOFF PERETT MET JAN 22 WITH DR. ALI KHAJAVI, NATIONAL FRONT SUPPORTER WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY ORGANIZED MEETING OF OPPOSITIONISTS WITH EMBOFFS (HIS NAME WAS SPELLED INCORRECTLY IN REFTEL.). SEPARATED FROM HIS COLLEAGUES, KHAJAVI EXPRESSED MIXED SATISFACTION AND APPREHENSION AT THE PROSPECT OF KHOMEINI'S RETURN. HE WAS GLAD TO SEAL THE VICTORY OVER THE REGIME, BUT NOW HE WORRIED ABOUT THE DANGER FROM THE LEFT. IN CONTRAST TO THE GENERAL TONE OF THE EARLIER MEETING, WHERE AMERICAN CONCERN ABOUT THE FAR LEFT WAS LARGELY DERIDED, KHAJAVI SAID HE VIEWED KHOMEINI AS THE LAST BARRIER AGAINST A COMMUNIST IRAN. IF KHOMEINI FALLS, THE COMMUNISTS, WHO ARE WELL-PLACED, WILL MOVE IN. HE THEREFORE FEARED AN ASSASSINATION OR MILITARY TAKEOVER.

2. EMBOFF SAID USG SHARES SOME OF THESE FEARS, AND THIS WAS WHY WE HOPED OPPOSITION WOULD SUPPORT BAKHTIAR. KHAJAVI SAID BAKHTIAR HAS SHOWN SPUNK, BUT HE CANNOT GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT AFTER ALLOWING THE ILLEGAL MAJLIS TO CONFIRM HIM. KHAJAVI THEREFORE FELT BAKHTIAR SHOULD STAND ASIDE. HE HOPED FOR EARLY FREE ELECTIONS, INAUGURATING A SOCIAL DEMOCRACY ON THE ORDER OF SWEDEN OR FINLAND. HE WORRIES TOO ABOUT EXCESSIVE RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE, SAYING HE AND HIS FRIENDS RESPECT ISLAM BUT DO NOT WANT IT TO RUN THEIR LIVES.

3. KHAJAVI DESCRIBED THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW POLITICAL GROUP OF HIS FRIEND HAJ SEYED JAVADI, "THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT," AS A SECULAR BATTLE AGAINST COMMUNISM. HE SAID ONE CANNOT USE RELIGION TO COMBAT COMMUNIST IDEAS IF THE LISTENERS ARE NOT RELIGIOUS. THE GROUP WHICH SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A MOVEMENT WITHIN THE NATIONAL FRONT RATHER THAN A NEW POLITICAL PARTY, WILL ARGUE THAT THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF COMMUNISM ARE OBTAINABLE WITHOUT THE TYRANNY WHICH EXISTS UNDER COMMUNIST RULE.

4. COMMENT: KHAJAVI, A SENSITIVE, INTELLIGENT MAN, IS WORRIED AND CONFUSED. HE AND MANY, PERHAPS EVEN MOST, NATIONAL FRONTERS INCREASINGLY SENSE THE POWER OF THE RELIGIOUS AND LEFTIST GROUPS AND THEIR OWN WEAKNESS. HE HOPES KHOMEINI CAN KEEP OUT THE LEFTISTS, BUT HE PLAINLY DISLIKES THE IDEA OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC; HE WANTS A LIBERAL, PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY. HIS GROUP HAS ALWAYS REPRESENTED A SMALL MINORITY WITHIN THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT, AND NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE BEGINNING TO REALIZE THAT. SULLIVAN
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01317

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/26/98 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, IR
SUBJECT: HOVEYDA LOYALIST LETS OFF STEAM

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: FORMER MINISTER, WHO IS PRO-HOVEYDA, SHAH LOYALIST BEMOANS THE ABDICATION OF POWER WHICH PRODUCED IRAN'S PRESENT PREDICAMENT AND SEES COMMUNISTS HIDING UNDER THE ROBES OF THE MULLAHS. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SHAH RETURN. HE PRODUCES NO EVIDENCE FOR HIS THESIS, WHICH RUNS CONTRARY TO ALL OUR INDICATIONS THAT CURRENT ISLAMIC MILITANCY PROBABLY REPRESENTS BEST AVAILABLE BUFFER TO COMMUNIST EXTREMISM. END SUMMARY

3. RESPONDING TO A REQUEST TO MEET AN "OPPOSITIONIST" IN THE HOUSE OF AN INTERMEDIARY, POL COUNSELOR ENDED UP MEETING JAN 20 WITH FORMER MIN OF HEALTH (1965-73) MANUCHEHR SHAHGOLI. SHAHGOLI SUPPOSEDLY DID NOT KNOW POL COUNSELOR WAS WORKING WITH THE EMBASSY AND EXPRESSED DISTRESS UPON LEARNING THIS AT THE END OF THE TALK "BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE SIDES" IN PRESENT SITUATION. AFTER PLEDGING POL COUNSELOR TO ABSOLUTE SECRECY, HE THEN WENT ON AT LENGTH INDICATING HIS PRO-SHAH LOYALTY, IN ADDITION TO HIS KNOWN HOVEYDA VIEWS. SHAHGOLI IS A PLASTIC SURGEON.

4. IN A RAMBLING DISCUSSION, SHAHGOLI DWELT ON SHAH'S MISTAKE IN DOING AWAY WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, AS A RESULT OF WHICH MODERATES WHO ARE LOYAL TO THE MONARCHY HAVE NO WAY OF EXPRESSING THIS. AS A FORMER LEADER OF THE IRAN NOVIN PARTY, HE WAS ESPECIALLY SORRY TO SEE IRAN NOVIN BROKEN UP AND RASTAHIZ CREATED. HE SAID THIS HAS BEEN DONE AFTER THE SHAH REALIZED HOW STRONG THE PARTY ITSELF WAS GETTING, BECAUSE ON ONE OCCASION ALL THE SHAH'S EFFORTS, AND THE PAHLAVI FOUNDATION MONEY USED THROUGH SHARIF-EMAMI WAS UNABLE TO SWITCH THE VOTE OF PEOPLE IN RAMSAR FROM AN IRAN NOVIN TO A MARDOM CANDIDATE. WHEN THEY SAW THEY COULD NOT DO IT, SHAH DECIDED IT WAS TIME TO CRUSH YET ANOTHER ORGANIZATION WHICH WAS GETTING STRONG.

5. SHAHGOLI WAS ALARMIST ON COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN THE COUNTRY. HE SAID HE BELIEVED A STORY WE HAVE HEARD FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT THE TUDEH ORGANIZED ITSELF FOR THE LONG HAUL BY RECRUITING 15 AND 16 YEAR OLDS AND INSTRUCTING THEM TO BECOME STUDENTS IN THE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS IN QOM AND ELSEWHERE. THIS BEGAN YEARS AGO AND BY NOW MOST MULLAHS ARE MULLAHS AROUND [illegible]

THE TRUE POWER. MEANWHILE, KHOMEINI HAS UNDERCUT THE CONSERVATIVE RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP BY RECRUTING THESE YOUNG MULLAHS AND RELIGIOUS STUDENTS TO HIS CAUSE. SHAHGOLI REPEATED AN (UNCONFIRMED) STORY WE HAVE ALREADY HEARD THAT SHARIAT-MADARI AND THE QOM AYATOLLAHS ARE VIRTUAL PRISONERS OF RADICAL MULLAHS IN QOM WHO SURROUND THEIR HOUSES AND SCREEN VISITORS.

6. SHAHGOLI SAID HE KNEW VIDA HAJIBI, A WELL KNOWN COMMUNIST WHO STUDIED IN FRANCE, LIVED 20 YEARS OUT OF THE COUNTRY, CAME BACK FOR 5 YEARS, AND SPENT THE LAST 6 YEARS IN JAIL. SHE WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL ABOUT THREE MONTHS AGO AND EVERY DAY SINCE SHE HAS RECEIVED "200 OR 300" PEOPLE CALLING AT HER HOME. AS OF THE LAST 3 OR 4 WEEKS SHE DISAPPEARS FROM HER HOME FROM DAWN TO LATE AT NIGHT. SHE IS HUMBLE, PLEASANT, HIGH INTELLIGENT AND OBVIOUSLY WORKING VERY HARD IN THE COMMUNIST CAUSE. HER COMMUNIST HUSBAND, FROM WHOM SHE HAS RECENTLY BEEN DIVORCED, HAS RETURNED FROM VENEZUELA TO PARIS AND IS THINKING OF COMING BACK TO IRAN. PEOPLE WHO ARE SO DEDICATED AND WORK SO HARD PROBABLY DESERVE TO WIN, SHAHGOLI REMARKED BITTERLY.

7. HE AND THE INTERMEDIARY CITED OTHER EXAMPLES OF HOW THE COUNTRY IS TURNING TO THE LEFT. A PERSON HAD BANGED ON SHAHGOLI'S CAR AS HE WAS COMING TO THE MEETING IN THE STREETS OF TEHRAN AND REMARKED "NEXT MONTH I WILL BE DRIVING THIS CAR." THERE ARE REPORTS OF SQUATTERS MOVING IN ON FOREST LANDS IN THE CASPIAN, CUTTING DOWN AND SELLING TREES IN THE PROCESS. THE SPIRIT IS ABROAD THEY ARE IN THE MIDST OF A REVOLUTION WHICH WILL MAKE THE POOR RICH. ANOTHER EXAMPLE WERE SOME 200 ARMED AFGHANS WHO WERE ARRESTED BY THE GOVT THE OTHER DAY. (COMMENT: WE HAVE A GOOD REPORT FROM AN AFGHAN SOURCE THAT THE "ARMED AFGHANS" WERE REALLY A VARIETY OF AFGHANS WORKING THE COUNTRY WITHOUT PERMITS WHO WERE ROUNDED UP BY THE POLICE.)

8. THERE ARE THREE THOUSAND PEOPLE ON A LIST TO BE QUESTIONED BY THE GOVT, SHAHGOLI SAID. YOU STAND CONDEMNED BT
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. ST BY BEING ON THAT LIST. THESE ARE THE TOP UNDER-SECRETARIES AND BUSINESS MANAGERS IN THE COUNTRY. WHO WILL RUN THE COUNTRY WITHOUT THEM? SHAHGOLI'S THESIS WAS THAT THE GOVT ABDICATED AUTHORITY OVER THE PAST YEAR. SAVAK, POLICE AND ARMY WERE GETTING NO INSTRUCTIONS AND DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO. KHOMEINI SAW THIS AND SIMPLY STEPPED INTO THE VACUUM. SHARIF-EMAMI CAME IN AND DISTRIBUTED CONCESSIONS LIKE CANDY. HE GAVE MORE THAN PEOPLE WERE ASKING FOR AND DID NOT NEGOTIATE WITH THE OPPOSITION. HE THREW OUT SOME MINISTERS, THE WRONG ONES IN SHAHGOLI'S ESTIMATION. HOVEYDA HIMSELF HAS BEEN THROWN TO THE WOLVES. GEN. AZHARI BEHAVED THE WAY HE DID BECAUSE HE WAS SCARED OF BEING UNPOPULAR AND BEING THROWN TO THE WOLVES ALSO. HOVEYDA KNEW HOW TO HANDLE THE RELIGIOUS PEOPLE. HE KNEW THE WAY IN WHICH MONEY HAS TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO BE ACCEPTABLE. AMOUZEGAR, WHOM THE SOURCE HAS KNOWN ALL HIS LIFE (AMOUZEGAR AND SOURCE'S BROTHER WERE IN SCHOOL TOGETHER), WAS THE WRONG MAN FOR PRIME MINISTER. HE HAS A PHOTOGRAPHIC MEMORY AND WAS ALWAYS A TOP STUDENT BECAUSE HE STUDIED SO HARD, BUT HE LACKS IDEAS.

[illegible]. SHAHGOLI'S SUCCESSOR AS MINISTER, SHEIKHOLAMZADEH IS A RELATIVELY POOR MAN, YET HE IS A GOOD DOCTOR, AND SHOULD HAVE MADE MONEY, BUT AS MINISTER HE HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED OVER THE LAST 5 YEARS TO EARN MONEY FROM OTHER SOURCES. THIS WAS THE REASON SHAHGOLI HIMSELF QUIT IN 1973 WHEN THE RULE WAS FIRST APPLIED, SINCE HE COULD NOT LIVE ON A GOVT SALARY. HE KNOWS SHEIKHOLAMZADEH'S FAMILY IN THE U.S. ARE LIVING UNDER VERY STRICT CIRCUMSTANCES, "IN ONE ROOM." THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE IF HE WAS GUILTY OF THE WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION HE IS BEING ACCUSED OF. THE SAME IS TRUE WITH HIS DEPUTY ARAM, WHOSE WIFE IS AN AMERICAN. HE TOO HAS NO MEANS DESPITE THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST HIM. IN FACT, SHAHGOLI SAID, MINISTERS LIVE IN GLASS HOUSES AND CANNOT AFFORD TO TAKE BRIBES. THE STORY THAT THEY TAKE BRIBES ARISES FROM THE BEHAVIOR OF MIDDLEMEN WHO INTRODUCE POTENTIAL CLIENTS TO MINISTERS AND THEN TAKE BRIBES SAYING THESE ARE FOR THE MINISTER, BUT ARE REALLY FOR THEMSELVES.

12. AS THINGS ARE GOING, TROUBLE AND BLOODSHED ARE INEVITABLE, SHAHGOLI SAID. SHOULD MAJLES RESIGN IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW BAKHTIAR CAN GOVERN. ANY ELECTIONS THAT MIGHT BE HELD IN THE ABSENCE OF TRUE LAW AND ORDER ARE BOUND TO SEE MANY LIVES LOST. EVEN UNDER BETTER CIRCUMSTANCES THE ELECTION PROCESS IN IRAN DEPENDS ON A COMBINATION OF FORCE AND MONEY. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE WILL BE SOMETHING CLOSE TO CHAOS.

13. THE SILENT MAJORITY STILL WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE SHAH BACK. SHAHGOLI CONTINUED. THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE WHO DON'T

LIKE THE SHAH BUT NEVERTHELESS CONSIDERED HIM THEIR LEADER. IN TALKING WITH OTHERS, ONE OFTEN GETS THE QUESTION: "HAS THE SHAH APPROVED THIS?" PEOPLE STILL LOOK TO HIM FOR GUIDANCE. SHAHGOLI THOUGHT THERE ARE STILL MANY WHO WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM RETURN IN A DETERMINED WAY, AS HE DID IN 1953. (COMMENT: HE WAS NOT HIMSELF VOLUNTEERING TO LEAD THE TROOPS IN THIS EXPEDITION, BUT SOUNDED AS IF HE WOULD CONSIDER ANY PROPOSITIONS.)

12. COMMENT: SHAHGOLI REPRESENTS A TYPE WE SEE MORE AND MORE OF: A MAN WHO FELL FROM GRACE POLITICALLY IN THE LAST YEARS OF THE SHAH BUT STILL RETAINS LOYALTY TO THE MONARCHICAL SYSTEM AND IS AFRAID OF THE ALTERNATIVES. LIKE MANY OF THESE PEOPLE, HE SUBSCRIBES TO THE THEORY THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS MUCH STRONGER THAN IT APPEARS AND IS IN EFFECT TAKING OVER KHOMEINI'S RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE PRODUCED FOR THIS THEORY. INDEED, ALL INDICATIONS TO DATE ARE THAT THE STRONGEST FORCE IN THE COUNTRY BY FAR IS A MILITANT ISLAM DEDICATED TO JUSTICE AND EGALITARIANISM, WHICH WOULD RESIST COMMUNISTS AND LEFTISTS WITH VIGOR. SULLIVAN
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O 251201Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3453
INFO
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01375

CHRGE: STATE 1/28/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MIN ECON-2 PM OR CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/28/99 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PIRS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: (C) IRANIAN MFA OFFICIALS ASK THAT USG SUPPORT KHOMEINI

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: SPEAKING PRIVATELY, TWO MFA OFFICIALS SUPPORT KHOMEINI AND DOWNGRADE BAKHTIAR. THEY REPRESENT A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF MFA OFFICIALS WHO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT. THEIR BASIC MESSAGE IS THAT KHOMEINI'S "ISLAMIC REPUBLIC" WOULD BE BEST BUFFER AGAINST COMMUNISM AND NOT ESSENTIALLY UNFRIENDLY TO THE U.S. END SUMMARY

3. JUST BEFORE WEEKEND TWO HIGH OFFICIALS OF MFA SEPARATELY TOLD POL COUNSELOR THAT THEY EARNESTLY HOPE USG WILL SUPPORT KHOMEINI EVEN THOUGH THEY THEMSELVES ARE NEITHER ISLAMIC PARTISANS NOR SUPPORT AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC AS SUCH. ONE WAS MANUCHEHR DAVOUDI (PROTECT), FORMER HEAD OF FIRST POLITICAL DEPARTMENT (ARAB STATES) AND PRESENT CONSUL GENERAL IN HONG KONG, WHO WAS HERE FOR A BRIEF VISIT AND ASKED TO SEE POL COUNSELOR URGENTLY. OVER LONG LUNCH, HE PUSHED IDEA THAT "ALTERNATIVE TO KHOMEINISM IS COMMUNISM." HIS THESIS WAS THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS THE ONLY ORGANIZED GROUP APART FROM COMMUNISTS AND IS DEDICATED TO KEEPING COMMUNISTS FROM POWER. IN THE LONG RUN, IT IS THE SAFEST ALTERNATIVE FOR U.S. AND WESTERN WORLD. ARMY IS VERY SLIM REED ON WHICH TO LEAN, AS ARE OTHERS SUCH AS BAKHTIAR, WHO DOES NOT COMMAND ANY REAL POWER. IF USG COULD FACILITATE TAKEOVER BY KHOMEINI FORCES, IT WOULD INGRATIATE ITSELF WITH THEM AND IMPROVE RELATIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

4. DAVOUDI REMINDED POL COUNSELOR THAT HE IS BASICALLY AN ANTI-COMMUNIST AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN VIEWED WELL IN MFA. HE REQUESTS THAT ABOVE MESSAGE BE PROTECTED ENTIRELY, BUT REMINDED POL COUNSELOR HE HAD EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN ABOUT SHAH'S ABILITY TO HOLD ON MANY MONTHS AGO. HE REPEATED THAT, AS FAR AS ISLAMIC REPUBLIS IS CONCERNED, KHOMEINI PEOPLE ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE AS RADICAL AS PORTRAYED, AND THEY WILL REACH COMPROMISES WITH REALITY IN THE COURSE. (NOTE: HE WAS ALSO ONE OF A GROUP OF OPPOSITIONISTS WITH WHOM EMBOFFS MET NEXT DAY, SEE SEPTEL.)

5. A VARIANT ON THIS THEME WAS GIVEN US NEXT EVENING BY AZIZOLLAH KAZEMI, LONGTIME HEAD OF THE LEGAL AND TREATIES DEPARTMENT OF MFA, WHO CONFIREMD HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY BAKHTIAR TO SERVE AS FOREIGN MINISTER (AND WE BELIEVE BY SADIGH BEFORE THAT). A LONGTIME ADHERENT AND SYMPATH-

IZER OF THE NATIONAL FRONT, KAZEMI (WHO WENT TO PRISON ONCE IN 1961 FOR PARTICIPATING IN A DEMONSTRATION) TOLD US HE WAS AGAINST BAKHTIAR'S ACTION WHICH WOULD SPLIT THE NATIONAL FRONT FROM THE MAIN LINE OF THE KHOMEINI REVOLUTION. THERE WILL BE TIME FOR VARIOUS GROUPS TO WORKOUT THEIR DIFFERENCES LATER, ONCE THE REVOLUTION IS WON. AS LONG AS THE SHAH HAS NOT ABDICATED, HE CAN ALWAYS RETURN, ON THE BAYONETS OF THE ARMY. THE MOVEMENT MUST THEREFORE RETAIN ITS SINGLE VOICE, KHOMEINI'S, UNTIL INSTALLED IN POWER. THE NATIONAL FRONT WOULD HAVE NO CHANCE OF BUILDING POPULAR APPEAL IF IT BROKE WITH KHOMEINI. BY THE SAME TOKEN, BAKHTIAR'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO PROVE HE HAS SOME SORT OF PUBLIC FOLLOWING IN COMPETITION WITH KHOMEINI'S IS A LOSING PROPOSITION, AND ONE WHICH WILL SIMPLY EMBITTER THE ATMOSPHERE. MOST OF BAKHTIAR'S PRESENT PARTISANS ARE RELATED TO THE ARMY, SAVAK, OR OTHER DIED-IN-THE-WOOL SHAH SUPPORTERS. THIS REPRESENTS A BETRAYAL OF WHAT THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT STAND FOR. BAKHTIAR SHOULD SIMPLY TURN OVER THE GOVERNMENT TO KHOMEINI AND FACILITATE THINGS SO AS TO AVOID BLOODSHED.

6. KAZEMI WAS ONLY PARTLY IMPRESSED BY POL COUNSELOR'S REJOINER THAT THE ARMY MIGHT MOVE IF KHOMEINI FORCED THE PACE TOO MUCH. HE EXPRESSED THE OPINION PREVALENT AMONG MANY OPPOSITIONISTS THAT THE ARMY IS DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT SUCCEED. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, DISMISS THE ARGUMENT THAT A GREAT DEAL OF BLOODSHED WOULD RESULT FROM THE EFFORT ITSELF, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME. HE RELUCTANTLY CAME AROUND TO THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MOVE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL STAGES TO ANY REVOLUTINARY CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT -- THOUGH HE MADE THE POINT SEVERAL TIMES THAT KHOMEINI IS NOT A MAN TO BARGAIN.

7. KAZEMI IS A PARTISAN OF THE SIMPLE LIFE. AS HE PUT IT, THE U.S. SHOULD LEAVE IRAN TO ITS OWN DEVICES AND ITS OWN "BACKWARDNESS." ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL LIFE WOULD BE WORKED OUT TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE PEOPLE
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#1375

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1701Z JAN 79
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3451

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01375

LIMDIS

IN THE COUNTRY WITHOUT THE FURIOUS EFFORTS AT DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION WHICH THE SHAH BROUGHT, WITH U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT. IRAN HAS NOTHING AGAINST THE U.S., AND ADMIRES MANY THINGS IN THE WEST, BUT IT MUST FIND ITS OWN PACE OF DEVELOPMENT WITHOUT U.S. URGING. HE RIDICULED ANY IDEA THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE STRONG IN IRAN, OR THE SOVIETS VERY ACTIVE, BUT BOTH COULD BECOME SO IN THE LONGER RUN IF THE PRESENT UNREST WAS NOT RESOLVED SOON. THE USG SHOULD DO WHAT IT CAN TO AVOID BEING AN OBSTACLE IN KHOMEINI'S PATH. IT HAS CONTROL OVER THE ARMY SUFFICIENT TO DO THIS.

4. AS TO THE NATURE OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, KAZEMI SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC. THE TERM "REPUBLIC" HAS FOR MANY YEARS MEANT TO IRANIANS A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER. THIS IS KHOMEINI VERY WISELY ADDED THE WORLD "ISLAMIC" TO DIFFERENTIATE HIS POSITION FROM THE COMMUNISTS. KAZEMI HIMSELF IS RECOMMENDING THAT AN ADDITIONAL QUALIFIER "DEMOCRATIC" BE ADDED SO THAT THE END RESULT BE DESCRIBED AS A "DEMOCRATIC ISLAMIC REPUBLIC." HE BELIEVED THIS IS REALLY WHAT KHOMEINI HAD IN MIND, NOT A CLERICAL DICTATORSHIP (COMMENT: THIS IS A MINORITY VIEWPOINT.) HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE ACTIVITY OF ISLAMIC MOBS IN THE STREETS DURING THIS REVOLUTIONARY STAGE TRULY REPRESENTED THE FUTURE OF WHAT WOULD COME LATER. BEYOND THAT, KHOMEINI IS WISE TO BE RETURNING NOW SO THAT THE REVOLUTION WOULD CONTINUE TO ITS LOGICAL CONCLUSION. IT WAS UP TO BAKHTIAR TO MEET KHOMEINI'S DEMANDS. KHOMEINI CARRIES LEGITIMACY JUST AS MUCH AS ANY NEW GOVT THAT COMES OUT OF A REVOLUTION OR A COUP D'ETAT. LEGALLY, IT HAS ITS OWN LEGITIMACY TO SUPPLANT THE EXISTING GOVT AND CONSTITUTION. HE COMPARED KHOMEINI'S CHARACTER TO THAT OF DE GAULLE (WHICH IS NOT THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE HEARD THIS COMPARISON).

5. LMI'S ENTEZAM BELIEVES BAKHTIAR SHOULD WORK OUT FULL POLITICAL DEAL IN PARIS BECAUSE UNLESS HE DOES SO, HE WILL BE HOSTAGE TO ARMY WHEN IT COMES TIME TO IMPLEMENT ANY AGREEMENT IN TEHRAN. ONE SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR MAKING SOME SORT OF OBEISANCE TO KHOMEINI, GETTING THE AYATOLLAH'S NOD TO BE PRIME MINISTER UNTIL ELECTIONS ARE HELD (THREE-

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 137

[redacted] IS PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN AN INFORMAL COMMITTEE THAT HAS SPRUNG UP WITHIN THE MFA TO SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION. HE MARCHED WITH THE PRO-KHOMEINI DEMONSTRATORS. UNDERSECY ZELLI (NO. 2 IN MFA) MARCHED FOR BAKHTIAR AND THE CONSTITUTION. BOTH KAZEMI AND DAVOUDI HAD GOOD WORDS FOR MINISTER MIR-FENDERESKI, WHO IS VIEWED AS AN ABLE, EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONAL WITH ACCEPTABLY LIBERAL OUTLOOK.

10. COMMENT: BOTH SOURCES ARE VERY MUCH ESTABLISHMENT TYPES, AND NEITHER IS AN EXTREMIST OR COMMUNIST ORIENTED. THEY REPRESENT SIZEABLE NUMBERS OF MFA OFFICIALS WHO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT, BUT HAVE BEEN KEEPING QUIET ALL THESE YEARS. THEY ARE URGING ON U.S. RECOGNITION OF A REALITY IN THE OVERWHELMING POWER OF THE

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS TEHRAN 137

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ISLAMIC MOVEMENT LED BY KHOMEINI. WHILE THEY MAY BE DRAWING TOO ROSY A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION WHICH WOULD EMERGE FROM A KHOMEINI TAKEOVER, THEY BELIEVE THEY ARE BEING REALISTIC IN RECOGNIZING ITS INEVITABILITY AND, FROM THEIR SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT BACKGROUNDS, BOTH BELIEVE THE RESULT WOULD BE REASONABLY SATISFACTORY FROM THE U.S. AND WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. SULLIVAN
BT
#1379

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CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS 137

1[illegible] JAN 79
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3454
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01379

CHRGD: STATE 1-28-79
APPRV: DCM:CHAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL
CLEAR: POL:SBLAMBRAKI
DISTR: POL [illegible] AMB DCM ECON-2 PM OR CHRON/10

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1-28-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PORS, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL POT BOILING VIGOROUSLY, THREAT OF VIOLENCE GROWS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BAKHTIAR'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WILL GO TO PARIS HAS TRIGGERED FRANTIC MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS IN TEHRAN AND BETWEEN TEHRAN AND PARIS. MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS REPORTEDLY WANT HIM TO NEGOTIATE KHOMEINI RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE FOR FEAR OF VIOLENCE, WHILE LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) APPEARS TO BE MORE CONCERNED FOR A COMPLETE POLITICAL DEAL. CROWDS WHICH HAVE GATHERED (SOME FROM PROVINCES) TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI ARE RESTIVE. TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE CALLED FOR CALM FOR 48 MORE HOURS, BUT POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE IS SUBSTANTIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH MODERATE POLITICAL BROKER MINATCHI AND LMI'S ENTEZAM OVER PAST 24 HOURS, IT APPEARS THAT BAKHTIAR'S DECISION TO GO TO PARIS WAS WORKED OUT WITH CHIEF KHOMEINI LIEUTENANT IN TEHRAN BEHESHTI AND NUMBER OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS. IT ALSO INVOLVED CONSIDERABLE TELEPHONE WORK WITH PARIS. APPARENTLY DEAL AGREED TO LATE EVENING JAN 27 JUST INCLUDED BAKHTIAR-KHOMEINI MEETING; LEADERS ARE MEETING VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUSLY THROUGH DAY OF JAN 28 TO WORK OUT ADDITIONAL DETAILS, AND UNCERTAINTY LEVEL IS HIGH ALL AROUND.

4. MINATCHI BELIEVES CRITICAL POINT IS TO GET BAKHTIAR AND KHOMEINI TOGETHER TO SET TIME FOR KHOMEINI'S RETURN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. CROWDS WHICH HAVE ASSEMBLED IN TEHRAN OVER PAST FEW DAYS TO WELCOME AYATOLLAH ARE BECOMING RESTIVE. SPEAKERS AT MOURNING RALLY JAN 27 EXPLICITLY STATED THAT IF KHOMEINI DID NOT RETURN JAN 28, ARMED STRUGGLE SHOULD BEGIN JAN 30. BOTH MODERATE TYPES AND LMI ARE VERY MUCH CONCERNED THAT UNDUE DELAY IN PROGRESS TOWARD POLITICAL DEAL THAT WILL BRING KHOMEINI BACK WILL MEAN VIOLENCE WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. POTENTIAL FOR UNCONTROLLED REACTIONS BY GANGS OF PROVINCIAL VISITORS IS GROWING. THERE HAVE BEEN SCATTERED REPORTS OF SOME LOOTING IN SOUTH TEHRAN AND OTHER INCIDENTS ELSEWHERE. SEVERAL OF OUR UNIVERSITY SOURCES SAY RADICAL FACTIONS TO LEFT OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT ARE CALLING FOR "MORE ACTIVE" STRUGGLE. HOWEVER, SITUATION REMAINS UNDER CONTROL FOR NOW.

FOUR MONTHS), AND RETURNING ON SAME PLANE WITH AYATOLLAH. ANOTHER SCENARIO HAS BAKHTIAR WORKING OUT AGREEMENT, RETURNING TO PACIFY ARMY AND THEN WELCOMING KHOMEINI.

6. IN EFFORT TO GIVE POLITICAL PROCESS TIME TO WORK, TEHRAN CLERGY HAVE ISSUED ANNOUNCEMENT MORNING JAN 28 UNDER SIGNATURE OF AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI CALLING FOR 48 MORE HOURS CALM WHILE PRIME MINISTER "ARRANGES RETURN" OF KHOMEINI. BOTH ENTEZAM, AND MINATCHI THINK SOLUTION AT LEAST TO ARRIVAL PROBLEM MUST BE SET BY THAT TIME, OR LMI AND OTHERS WILL HAVE TROUBLE CONTROLLING CROWD REACTION.

7. COMMENT: MINATCHI IS NOT USUALLY GIVEN TO CONCERN OVER VIOLENCE, AND HE IS CLEARLY WORRIED. NUMBER OF U.S. JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE BEEN ABOUT IN CITY OVER PAST THREE DAYS REPORT MOOD BOTH OF CROWDS AND OF ARMY IS GENERALLY TOUGHER. BUT QUESTION AT THIS POINT IS WHETHER POLITICAL PROCESS CAN CREAK THROUGH TO ENOUGH OF A SOLUTION TO HEAD OFF A CRUNCH BEFORE HOT HEADS TAKE MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. SULLIVAN
BT
#1379

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 137

P 291303Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3457
INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4266
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1422
RUENPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3697
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01382

CHRGE: STATE 1/29/79
APPRV: MIN:CMAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MTN
ECON-2 PM JR
CHRON/1

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/18/99 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: AN ELDERLY SHAH LOYALIST CONGRATULATES USG ON ITS POLICY -- AND PRESSES FOR SHAH'S ABDICATION

1. (U-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ELDERLY PRO-SHAH LOYALIST BELIEVES KHOMEINI IS UNSTOPPABLE AND PRESSES FOR SHAH'S EARLY ABDICATION TO KEEP SITUATION FROM DETERIORATING FURTHER, TO FAVOR THE COMMUNISTS. HE THINKS USG HAS PLAYED ITS CARDS JUST RIGHT IN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SHAH, WHICH HAS LULLED THE SOVIETS AND PAVED THE WAY FOR PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO KHOMEINI-INSPIRED GOVT. HE BELIEVES CROWN PRINCE COULD EVENTUALLY RETURN. MEANWHILE, QUIET, NOT PUBLIC, SUPPORT FOR BAKHTIAR IS INDICATED. END SUMMARY

3. ELDER STATESMAN EX-SENATOR EBRAHIM KHAJENURI ASKED THROUGH AN INTERMEDIARY TO MEET POL COUNSELOR AND PASSED ON HIS VIEWS TO HIM JAN 25. KHAJENURI, AT PRESENT RETIRED BUT ACTIVE, HAS A LONG POLITICAL HISTORY, THE HIGH POINT OF WHICH WAS HIS ROLE IN INTRODUCING GENERAL ZAHEDI TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AT A KEY MOMENT IN 1953. SPEAKING FROM THIS LOYALIST BACKGROUND, KHAJENURI'S MESSAGE NEVERTHELESS WAS THAT THE SHAH'S DAY HAS PASSED, DUE IN LARGE MEASURE TO HIS OWN EFFORTS AND INABILITY TO KEEP UP WITH THE CHANGING TIMES. ONLY HIS SPEEDY ABDICATION COULD SAVE THE MONARCHY AND KEEP THE SITUATION FROM DETERIORATING FURTHER, TO FAVOR THE COMMUNISTS.

4. LIKE MOST OTHER THINKING IRANIANS, KHAJENURI HAS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT KHOMEINI IS UNSTOPPABLE. THE SOONER ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION IS MADE WITH WHAT KHOMEINI REPRESENTS, THE SOONER WILL IRAN MOVE TO A NEW NORMALITY, AND PREVENT A FURTHER SLIDE INTO CHAOS FROM WHICH ONLY THE COMMUNISTS CAN PROFIT. THE USG SHOULD DO WHAT IT CAN TO ENCOURAGE THE SHAH TOWARD ABDICATION. HE REALIZES A DIRECT APPROACH IS PROBABLY NOT THE BEST, BUT THERE ARE PEOPLE TO WHOSE COUNSEL THE SHAH WILL LISTEN (HEADS OF OTHER STATES, BOTH EUROPEAN AND ARAB), AND THEY SHOULD BE ENERGIZED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THE CROWN PRINCE WOULD PROBABLY BE ACCEPTABLE AFTER PASSIONS OF THE MOMENT HAVE SUBSIDED. AND THOSE PASSIONS CAN ONLY SUBSIDE ONCE THE SHAH HAS DEFINITELY REMOVED HIMSELF FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY RETURN, THUS ALLOWING OPPOSITION FACTIONS TO EXPRESS THEIR OWN VIEWS ABOUT THE FUTURE, WHICH OFTEN DIFFER FROM KHOMEINI'S.

5. THE SENATOR THOUGHT HE READ RECENT USG POLICY IN TERMS OF ITS REALITY, NOT ITS SURFACE APPEARANCES. HE CONGRATULATED USG ON APPEARING TO SUPPORT THE SHAH -- A PUBLIC SUPPORT WHICH KHAJENURI THOUGHT ACTUALLY HELPED TO SINK HIM. BY APPEARING TO BE LOSING IRAN USG HAS EFFECTIVELY LULLED THE RUSSIANS, WHO MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE INTERVENED. IT WAS ONLY UNFORTUNATE THAT THE USG HAD PUBLICLY ALSO SUPPORTED BAKHTIAR, THUS PLANTING A KISS OF DEATH ON HIM TOO. BAKHTIAR, WHOM KHAJENURI DOES NOT KNOW PERSONALLY, IMPRESSES AS COURAGEOUS AND A USEFUL TRANSITION FIGURE. HE COULD HELP SMOOTH THE WAY FOR THE KHOMEINI TAKEOVER AND IS THEREFORE WORTH SUPPORTING QUIETLY. SINCE THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION FROM MEDDLING, U.S. POLICY SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK INDIRECTLY AND AS EFFECTIVELY AS IT HAS. KHAJENURI WAS NOT TO BE DIVERTED BY POL COUNSELOR'S ASSERTIONS THAT WE DO NOT INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS, AND THAT AMERICAN POLICY WAS WHAT IT APPEARED TO BE. HE SMILED WISELY AND SAID ALL NATIONS IN TODAY'S WORLD INTERVENE IN SOME INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS.

6. KHAJENURI, WHO DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS A SOCIOLOGIST THE HAS WRITTEN SEVERAL BOOKS) AND "LAY PSYCHOLOGIST," NOTED THAT THE SHAH IS A "NARCISSUS INDIVIDUAL." SUCH PEOPLE OFTEN ACCOMPLISH GREATER THINGS THAN REALISTIC MINDS, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PRONE TO MORE WISHFUL THINKING. HE IS SURE THAT THE SHAH STILL THINKS OF RETURNING TO HIS THRONE, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT TAKE THE CRUCIAL STEP OF ABDICATING WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE PUSHING FROM ADVISORS WHOSE COUNCIL HE TRUSTS.

7. COMMENT: THE IMPORTANT FACT TO BE DRAWN FROM THIS MEETING IS THAT AN OLD WAR HORSE WHO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE SHAH'S RETURN IN 1953 HAS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SHAH HAS TO GO AND AN ACCOMMODATION MUST BE MADE WITH KHOMEINI TO PREVENT COMMUNISTS FROM CAPITALIZING ON CONTINUING UNREST. SULLIVAN

PT
#1382

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CHRGE: STATE 1/30/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: POL-5 AMB MIN
ECON-2 PM ICA
OR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/15

P 290338Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3513

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01478

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/30/99 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: MODERATES CONTINUE TO ORGANIZE, BUT FEAR COMMUNISTS AND KHOMEINI

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MODERATE OPPOSITIONISTS HELD FIRST LARGE ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING RECENTLY AND STOOD OFF COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO DISRUPT IT. THEY FEAR COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF DICTATORSHIP TO BE SET UP BY KHOMEINI BUT SEE LITTLE ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATING WITH KHOMEINI FOR THE MOMENT. THEY DO NOT THINK BAKHTIAR HAS ANY CHANCE AS LONG AS HE HAS NOT DENOUNCED THE SHAH. END SUMMARY

3. OPPOSITIONIST HEAD OF IRAN'S TEACHERS UNION MOHAMMAD DERAKHSHESH TOLD POL COUNSELOR JAN 28 THAT HIS POLITICAL GROUP HAD ORGANIZED A MEETING OF 4 OR 5 THOUSAND PEOPLE FIVE DAYS BEFORE (JAN 23) TO DISCUSS COMMON INTERESTS IN POLITICAL SITUATION. THEY HAD ADVERTISED IN THREE NEWSPAPERS AND USED TEACHERS' CLUB WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. THIS HAD BEEN OPEN TO THEM EVEN THOUGH THEY NEVER REQUESTED PERMISSION FROM MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES.

4. PROMINENT OPPOSITIONISTS SPOKE, APART FROM A SPEAKER REPRESENTING TEACHERS UNION. THESE INCLUDED LAWYER MATINDAFTARI ON BEHALF OF BAR ASSOCIATION, LAWYER LAHIJI ON BEHALF OF LAWYERS GROUP, RAHIM SAFFARI OF BANI-AHMAD'S "UNITY FOR LIBERTY" PARTY (SEE TEHRAN 451), DR. (FNU) FARAGHI OF A DOCTORS ORGANIZATION AND A MR. (FNU) MOAMENI OF WRITERS ORGANIZATION. MEETING AGREED ON COOPERATING TO RENT PREMISES FOR A CLUB, AND THEY ARE NOW LOOKING. THEY ARE ALSO SEEKING PERMISSION TO CONTINUE PUBLICATION OF DERAKHSHESH'S WEEKLY (OF WHICH A FEW COPIES HAVE APPEARED FROM TIME TO TIME OVER PAST FEW MONTHS).

5. TOWARD THE END OF THE MEETING SOME COMMUNISTS CAME IN AND TRIED TO BREAK IT UP BY SHOUTING. ABOUT 100 STEWARDS WITH BADGES PREVENTED THEM FROM COMING UP TO THE SPEAKERS PLATFORM, AND SINCE THE MEETING WAS NEARLY OVER, THEY DID NOT DISRUPT IT. THIS BROUGHT DERAKHSHESH TO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE GETTING STRONGER. THE CITY IS FULL OF THEIR BOOKS, WHICH ARE PLENTIFUL AND CHEAP. MRS. DERAKHSHESH SAID THEY WERE ALL OVER THE PLACE IN "VALIAD" (CROWN PRINCE) SQUARE AND SHE HAD BOUGHT THREE HERSELF. COMMUNISTS ARE GETTING READY TO TAKE OVER ONCE THE MULLAHS FAIL.

6. AS HE HAS DONE ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS DERAKHSHESH AGAIN EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO REPLACEMENT OF SHAH'S DICTATORSHIP BY A DICTATORSHIP OF THE MOSLEM CLERGY. IN

HIS BOOKS KHOMEINI CLAIMS TO BE REPRESENTATIVE OF GOD AND HOW CAN ANYONE ARGUE WITH THE WORD OF GOD? GOVT BASED ON THE KORAN IS BOUND TO BE BACKWARD AND NOT AT ALL HELPFUL IN BRINGING TRUE EDUCATION TO THE PEOPLE OF IRAN.

7. DERAKHSHESH BLAMED THE SHAH FOR SUPPORTING A VERY LIMITED TYPE OF EDUCATION FOR HIS PEOPLE, WHICH NARROWED THEIR HORIZONS INSTEAD OF BROADENING THEM AS GOOD EDUCATION SHOULD. HE SAID BAKHTIAR PROBABLY COULD HOLD HIS OWN IF HE TOOK A POSITION AGAINST THE SHAH. AS IT IS, PEOPLE THINK HE WANTS THE SHAH TO RETURN. MOREOVER, BAKHTIAR AS PRIME MINISTER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT CONTROL THE ARMY, THE SHAH DOES. BAKHTIAR WAS WELL RECEIVED AT FIRST, FOR HE DID SOME OF THE THINGS HE SAID HE WOULD. HE FREED POLITICAL PRISONERS, ALLOWED RELATIVELY FREE PRESS, ALLOWED FREE DEMONSTRATIONS, BUT IN LAST FEW DAYS ARMY HAS BEEN SHOOTING AT THE PEOPLE EVEN THOUGH BAKHTIAR SAID HE WOULD NOT SHOOT AT THEM. THIS SUGGESTS BAKHTIAR DOES NOT REALLY CONTROL THE ARMY AS HE SAYS HE DOES.

8. DESPITE ALL OF THE ABOVE, DERAKHSHESH RECOGNIZED HIS OPTIONS ARE LIMITED. HE HOPED FOR THE BEST IN THE CONTINUING CONFRONTATION BETWEEN KHOMEINI AND THE ARMY, WITH BAKHTIAR AS BUFFER. HE SAID HE WAS MOST CONCERNED WITH COMMUNIST THREAT, AS IT WAS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS FOR A TEACHERS ORGANIZATION SINCE THAT IS ONE OF THE FIRST PLACES THE COMMUNISTS TRY TO RECRUIT. DERAKHSHESH HIMSELF HAS BEEN UNDER COMMUNIST FIRE IN THE PAST AND HAS RETURNED THE FIRE. HE SEEMED PERSUADED THAT, WHILE HIS ULTIMATE AIM IS A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY FREE OF RELIGIOUS-CLERICAL PREJUDICES, TACTICALLY HE PROBABLY HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO ALLY HIMSELF WITH THE KHOMEINI FORCES. HE COULD THUS HOPE TO HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON THE NATURE OF ANY RELIGIOUS GOVT WHICH FOLLOWS AND NOT LEAVE THE RELIGIOUS PEOPLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. POL COUNSELOR SUGGESTED DERAKHSHESH AND OTHER MODERATES WOULD BE WELL ADVISED TO CONSULT MORE CLOSELY WITH FELLOW MODERATES SUCH AS
BT
#1478

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R 300838Z JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3514
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01478

BAZARGAN, WHO AFTER ALL MAINTAINS THE BEST CONTACTS WITH MAINSTREAM OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT.

9. COMMENT: DERAKHSHESH CLEARLY DISTRUSTS STAYING POWER OF KHOMEINI'S MOVEMENT AND IS AFRAID IT WILL IMPOSE A DICTATORSHIP WHICH COMMUNITS WILL IN TIME SEIZE CONTROL OF. SULLIVAN-
BT
#1478

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1524

R 3015102 JAN 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3544
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01524

CHRGE: STATE 1-30-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT:LAB
CLEAR: POL:GBLANEBRAKIS
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECON-2 CR USICA
PM SHIP IABR
ISF CHRON/14

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/28-89 (PERETT, W.G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: (C) OPPOSITION VIEWS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBOFFS PERETT AND PATTERSON MET JAN 25 WITH GROUP OF OPPOSITIONISTS IN HOME OF DR. KHAJAVI. PRIMARY PURPOSE WAS TO GET BAZAARI VIEWS OF POLITICAL SITUATION AND FIVE BAZAARIS WERE PRESENT--MESSRS. ALIBABAI, ALINASSABI, ALAGHE-DIN, NAJIBABAI AND ESFAHBODI. SEVERAL OF DR. KHAJAVI'S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE FRIENDS ALSO ATTENDED, AS DID MANOUCHEHR DAVOUDI, A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, WHO IS CONSUL GENERAL IN HONG KONG. (DAVOUDI APPEARED DISTINCTLY UNCOMFORTABLE AT ATTENDING WHAT WAS SO PLAINLY AN OPPOSITION GATHERING--SEE TEHRAN 1375.)

3. EMBOFFS' EFFORTS TO DRAW OUT OPPOSITIONISTS REGARDING THE POLITICAL SCENE GENERALLY PRODUCED A CHORUS OF SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI AND INVECTIVE AGAINST THE REGIME. WE SUSPECT THE SIZE OF THE GROUP WORKED AGAINST CANDOR (WE HAD REQUESTED A MUCH SMALLER GATHERING). THESE MEN ECHOED OTHER OPPOSITION CONTACTS IN DECLARING THAT BAKHTIAR IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE HE WAS APPOINTED BY THE SHAH AND CONFIRMED BY AN ILLEGAL PARLIAMENT. FROM THAT FACT ALONE HE CANNOT BE TRUSTED: HE MAY BE PART OF A PLOT TO BUY TIME IN WHICH TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE SHAH TO RETURN. USG SHARED IN MUCH OF THE CRITICISM DIRECTED AT THE SHAH. ONE BAZAARI (WHOSE ELOQUENCE WAS MUCH ADMIRED BY OTHERS) SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE WOULD GIVE US ONE MORE CHANCE; THE BRITISH, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE WOULD NEVER FORGIVE. ("I WILL GO ON SACRIFICING MY WEALTH UNTIL WE HAVE WON. MY SPIRIT HAS BEEN TRAMPLED IN THE DUST.") BAD FEELING TOWARD THE U.S. WAS MITIGATED BY THE VIEW THAT AMERICAN ERRORS RESULTED FROM BLUNDERS, WHILE THE BRITISH AND SOVIET MACHINATIONS WERE OUTRIGHT SCHEMES TO RULE THE COUNTRY.

4. OLDEST AND APPARENTLY MOST RESPECTED BAZAARI, ALINASSABI, GAVE A SHORT SPEECH, A MIXTURE OF SOPHISTICATION AND NAIVETE, IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED HOW FOLLOWING HUGE INCREASE IN OIL REVENUES IMPORTS CLIMBED SWIFTLY TO AROUND $15 BILLION, WITH MUCH OF THIS BEING WASTEFUL EXPENDITURE ON LUXURY GOODS AND INAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY. HE ARGUED THAT GIVEN IRAN'S POOR LAND, DRY CLIMATE AND AND HIGH COST OF IRRIGATION, THE COUNTRY SHOULD INVEST ENOUGH IN AGRICULTURE "TO FEED ITSELF" BUT NO MORE AND PUT REST OF EARNINGS INTO "APPROPRIATE" INDUSTRY, WHICH COULD EXPORT AND EVENTUALLY REPLACE OIL REVENUES. HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR INDUSTRY IN RURAL AREAS TO END "HIDDEN UNEMPLOYMENT." TO EMBOFF'S QUESTION ON HOW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (WHICH ALL BAZAARIS PRESSED USG TO SUPPORT) WOULD

BE ORGANIZED, ALINASSABI REPLIED THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF POLITICS BUT WOULD OFFER ECONOMIC ADVICE TO KHOMEINI: "I WOULD SUGGEST TO HIM, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE TIE OIL EXPORTS TO DEVELOPMENT OF OTHER EXPORTS, THAT WE SAY TO OTHER COUNTRIES THAT FOR EACH 10,000 BARRELS OF OIL WE SELL THEM, THEY MUST ALSO BUY SO MANY CARPETS." EMBOFFS EXPRESSED POLITE SKEPTICISM AS TO FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A SCHEME. SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS MADE THE POINT THAT THEY WANTED IRAN-US TRADE TO CONTINUE; THEY EVEN EXPECTED IT WOULD INCREASE UNDER THE NEW REGIME.

5. COMMENT: AGAIN THIS GROUP SHOWS ITS CONFUSION. THEY MAINTAIN, AT LEAST IN FRONT OF ONE ANOTHER, THAT THEY ARE ALL FOR KHOMEINI, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO EXTRACT A REASON WHY. THEY SIMPLY EXPECT THE FUTURE TO BE BRIGHTER UNDER THE AYATOLLAH, AND IF IT IS NOT, THEIR ANTI-REGIME ANGER WILL HAVE TO FIND A NEW FOCAL POINT. SULLIVAN
BT
#1524

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1524

[illegible] JAN 79
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUFHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3579
RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3711
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01576

ORIGIN: S/S-I 1/31/
APPRV: MIN:G[illegible]
DRFTD: POL:JDSTS PEL
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMPRA
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MI
ECON-2 PM OR
CHRON/10

LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 1/31/99 (STEMPEL, JOHN D.) OR-P
TAGS: PORS, PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: KHOMEINI ARRIVAL: MILITARY TALKS GOING WELL, FINAL ARRANGEMENTS SOLIDIFYING

REF: (A) TEHRAN 1514, (B) TEHRAN 1547,

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DR. MINATCHI TOLD POLOFF AT NOON JAN 31 THAT TALKS BETWEEN GEN GHARABAGHI AND ENG. MEHDI BAZARGAN EVENING JAN 30 HAD BEEN VERY PRODUCTIVE. SOME SECURITY DETAILS FOR KHOMEINI PRESENCE IN TEHRAN FOR NEXT FEW DAYS REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT, BUT THESE ARE CONSIDERED MINOR. MAJOR POINT WAS SPECIFIC GHARABAGHI ASSURANCE TO BAZARGAN THAT MILITARY WOULD NOT RPT NOT OPPOSE CHANGE, "EVEN CHANGES IN CABINET" AS LONG AS THEY WERE CARRIED OUT UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ACCORDING TO MINATCHI, WHO HAD LONG SESSION WITH BAZARGAN MORNING JAN 31, GHARABAGHI TOLD BAZARGAN THAT EVEN CHANGES IN CONSTITUTION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE IF DONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ARMY WAS SWORN TO KEEP COUNTRY'S INDEPENDENCE AND RESPECT CONSTITUTION AND WANTS TO KEEP OUT OF POLITICS. GHARABAGHI REPORTEDLY SAID FORMER PRIME MINISTER SHARIF-EMAMI'S BIGGEST MISTAKE WAS TRYING TO INTERPOSE ARMY INTO POLITICS. (COMMENT: GRANTED OUR SOURCE HAS HIS OWN AXE TO GRIND AND MAY HAVE PUT BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT ON GHARABAGHI COMMENTS, IT SOUNDS LIKE MILITARY HAVE COME AROUND TO ACCEPTING KHOMEINI ARRIVAL AND ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT AS LONG AS CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS BE RESPECTED. WE'RE NOT SURE IF GHARABAGHI'S APPARENT PASSING OVER OF ARMY'S OATH TO SHAH WAS MERELY EDITING BY OUR SOURCE OR SIMPLY NEW EMPHASIS SENIOR MILITARY ARE PUTTING ON ARMY'S MISSION. NET EFFECT ON POLITICAL SITUATION, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO BE POSITIVE.)

3. KHOMEINI ARRIVAL IS SET PER REFTELS. BOTH MINATCHI AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT SOURCE CONFIRMED PLANS ARE SET. MINATCHI SAID MILITARY WILL MAINTAIN AIRPORT SECURITY AND DELIVER KHOMEINI MOTORCADE TO SHAHYAD SQUARE, WHERE LIBERATION MOVEMENT SECURITY MARSHALLS WILL TAKEOVER. ARMY WILL APPARENTLY BE STANDING BY ROUTE ON MARCH TO BEHESHT-E-ZARAH CEMETARY, BUT NOT VERY VISIBLY. MINOR HITCH HAS DEVELOPED WITH RESPECT TO THOSE WHO ARE TO GREET THE AYATOLLAH. APPARENTLY 1200 CARDS HAD BEEN ISSUED TO ALLOW ENTRANCE TO AIRPORT. MILITARY BALKED AT [redacted] AND SAID GREETING HALL COULD HOLD AT MOST 50. CARDS WILL BE CANCELLED, AND MASTER LIST DRAWN UP. MINATCHI SAID VARIOUS OPPOSITIONISTS PARTICIPATED IN

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[redacted] OF LIST OF HUNDRED-PLUS NAMES FROM WHICH PRIME MINISTER WILL SELECT 50 TO GREET AYATOLLAH. WHEN QUESTIONED WHY BAKHTIAR WAS GIVEN SELECTION TASK, MINATCHI INTIMATED THAT KHOMEINI FOLLOWERS HAD HAD DIFFICULTY BOILING LIST DOWN. THIS WAY, BAKHTIAR TAKES ONUS OF EXCLUDING SOME PEOPLE. (COMMENT: A BEAUTIFUL PERSIAN SOLUTION TO PROBLEM. THERE COULD, HOWEVER, BE SOME DIFFICULTY FROM THOSE EXCLUDED WHO DO NOT GET WORD. MINATCHI FELT THIS WOULD BE MANAGEABLE BY COMBINED OPPOSITIONIST-MILITARY COMMITTEE AT AIRPORT ENTRANCE.)

4. MINATCHI SAID KHOMEINI'S FAMILY WILL COME IN ON SAME PLANE AS AYATOLLAH AND LIVE IN HOUSE ON DOWLAT, AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. SULLIVAN

#1576

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O 011752Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO BUREC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7687
INFO BUOMBAY/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1989
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4214
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1788
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY BONN 1961
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY DACCA 5502
BUDAPEST/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0284
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY DOHA 4207
BUDAPEST/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 4288
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 5183
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0187
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 1
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY LONDON
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY MANAMA
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 14
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY SANAA
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 5436
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7721
BUDAPEST/USIS BERLIN
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY BONN
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2169
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1289
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY TOKYO
BUDAPEST/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
BUDAPEST/AMEMBASSY
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 1

E.O. 12065: GDS 2/12/85 (PASTERNAK, DAVID P.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: POLITICAL SECURITY REPORT, FEBRUARY 6, 1979

1. (U - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: CONFUSION REIGNS SUNDAY AS KEY IS EXPECTED TO RETURN. KHOMEINI-BAKHTIAR NEGOTIATIONS TO BEGIN. NEGOTIATIONS CALL DEMONSTRATION AT ISRAELI EMBASSY. ANTI-SOVIET EMOTIONS RAISE "EXECUTED" IN TEHRAN BY GUERRILLA GROUP. "DEATH TO SOVIETS" WAS PROMINENT SLOGAN IN TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN NORTH TEHRAN TODAY. TEHRAN GENERALLY QUIET. END SUMMARY

3. (C) KHOMEINI SOURCE SAYS KHOMEINI VERY TIRED TODAY, WILL GO TO REST. HE WILL BEGIN INTENSIVE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS TOMORROW. IN KHOMEINI VIEW PM BAKHTIAR STILL BEING OBSTINATE. KHOMEINI-BAKHTIAR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN TONIGHT. KHOMEINI EXPECTS THESE TALKS TO CENTER ON THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC COUNCIL AND BAKHTIAR'S ROLE IN THE TRANSITION GOVT. A KEY ISSUE IS THAT OF WHO WILL CONTROL UPCOMING ELECTIONS.

4. (C) MINATCHI TOLD POLOFF STEMPEL THAT SATURDAY DEMONSTRATION GENERALLY WORKED VERY WELL, THOUGH AT A FEW POINTS CROWDS PRESSED SO HARD ON KHOMEINI THAT IT WAS FELT HE MIGHT BE INJURED. KHOMEINI ANTICIPATES A-7

DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WILL BE NEEDED TO FIND SOLUTION.

5. TEHRAN GENERALLY APPEARS QUIET, WITH LIGHT TRAFFIC AND NO UNTOWARD NOISE.

6. WE ARE STILL TRYING TO GET CLEAR READING OF WHAT KHOMEINI SAID IN SPEECH AT BEHESHT-I-ZAHRA YESTERDAY. REPORTS CONFLICT, BUT SOME SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN STRONGLY ANTI-FOREIGN, ANTI-AMERICAN. TWO IRANIAN SOURCES [illegible] CONFIRM.

7. AMERICAN PRESS SOURCE TELLS US KHOMEINI DIDNOT GIVE CONCILIA[illegible] SPEECH TODAY TO PROUP OF MEN ASSEMBLED AT A SOUTH TEHRAN SCHOOL NEAR HIS HEADQUARTERS. THOUSANDS WERE PRESENT, SOURCE SAID, AND PROMINENT AMONG SLOGANS WAS "DEATH TO CARTER." SOURCE COMMENTED THAT MUCH HOSTILITY BEING FOCUSSED ON GEN. HUYSER WHO IS BEING PAINTED AS AN "ASSISTANT AMBASSADOR" OPERATING OUT OF AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN'S OFFICE. SOURCE NOTED MEDIA SOVIET RADIO ATTACKS ON HUYSER. KHOMEINI IS SCHEDULED TO ADDRESS GROUP OF [illegible] LATER THIS AFTERNOON.

8. ISFAHAN REPORTS MAJOR DEMONSTRATION TODAY, WITH THOUSANDS OF MARCHERS CONVERGING ON CEMETERY. NUMEROUS LARGE TRUCKLOADS OF MARCHERS HAVE PASSED CONSULATE SHOUTING ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-BAKHTIAR SLOGANS. MEMBERS GENERALLY SHOUTING PRO-KHOMEINI SLOGANS, DISORDER, AND SWITCHING TO "DEATH TO FOREIGNERS" WHEN THEY SPOT FOREIGN ONLOOKERS. BELL EMPLOYEE WHO SPOT TAXI DRIVER CONTINUES UNDER PROTECTION OF ISFAHAN AYATOLLAH QUDDUSI.

9. AP REPORTS ASSASSINATION OF ONE FERREIDUN ZAND, 28-YEAR OLD EX-AIRFORCE. ZAND REPORTEDLY TAKEN FROM HIS HOME AND EXECUTED BY FIVE ARMED MEN LAST NIGHT. AP SAID GROUP CALLED "PEOPLES WARRIOR MOWHID (MONOTHEIST) GUERRILLAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCUSED ZAND OF COMMUNIST AND SAVAK CONNECTIONS. SULLIVAN

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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3702
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 TEHRAN 01748

CHRGE: STATE 2/4/79
APPRV: MIN:CWHAAS
DRFTD: POL:GBLAMBRA
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: ~~POL 5~~ AMB MI
ECON-2 PM IC
PR ADM SY DA
AFOSI CHRON/

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2/4/89 (LAMBRAKIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LEADER SANJABI COMMENTS ON CURRENT SITUATION

1. (C ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: IN CAGEY CONVERSATION SANJABI EXPRESSED OPINION THAT KHOMEINI HAS GIVE UP IDEA OF AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL OR OF LARGE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. HE SEEMS TO BE BACK ON THE INSIDE TRACK WITH KHOMEINI, THOUGH NOT REVEALING THIS TO US. HE OPINED NEW REPUBLIC WOULD HAVE STRONG PRESIDENT AND CONVENTIONAL PARLIAMENT (NOT SPECIAL ISLAMIC COUNCIL). END SUMMARY

3. AT MEETING REQUESTED BY SANJABI FEB 3 HE COMMENTED IN GUARDED FASHION TO POL COUNSELOR ON CURRENT SITUATION. HE SAID HE THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD WANTED SANJABI ON HIS ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. SANJABI HAD NEVER CATEGORICALLY TURNED DOWN THIS INVITATION, BUT THOUGHT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR A COUNCIL. APPARENTLY KHOMEINI HAS HEEDED THIS ADVISE AND WILL NOT ANNOUNCE ANY ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL. SANJABI CLAIMED NOT TO KNOW WHO MIGHT BE ON THE ISLAMIC GOVT TO BE ANNOUNCED BY KHOMEINI.

4. FOROUHAR HAD HAD QUITE A FEW MEETINGS WITH KHOMEINI IN PARIS INCLUDING SOME ALONE WITHOUT ADVISORS. KHOMEINI HAD SPOKEN OF A DESIRE TO CALL A SORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FROM REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL PARTS OF THE COUNTRY AND ALL WALKS OF LIFE, BUT FOROUHAR HAD DESCRIBED THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND HE THOUGHT KHOMEINI HAD GIVEN UP THAT IDEA.

5. COMMENTING ON THE CONSTITUTION, SANJABI SAID HE THOUGHT LAWYER NAZIEH IS WRITING IT IN PARIS. HE WAS NOT PUT OFF BY A SUGGESTION FROM POL COUNSELOR THAT A FRIEND OF NAZIEH'S HAD OPINED NAZIEH'S ROLE IS PERIPHERAL NOT CENTRAL (MATIN-DAFTARI, SEE TEHRAN 1698). WHEN ASKED WHETHER KHOMEINI ENVISAGES PRESIDENTIAL TYPE OF REPUBLIC OR ONE IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER HOLDS THE POWER, SANJABI SAID HE HAD THE FEELING IT WAS THE PRESIDENTIAL TYPE. AS AN EXAMPLE HE MENTIONED THE U.S. SYSTEM ALTHOUGH POL COUNSELOR HAD ACTUALLY BEEN THINKING OF THE FRENCH FIFTH REPUBLIC SYSTEM.

6. SANJABI TALKED OF A FUTURE PARLIAMENT AS QUITE SIMILAR TO PAST ONES. IN FACT, HE OPINED THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT IS NOT SO DIFFERENT FROM MANY WHICH HAVE TAKEN OFFICE SINCE MOSSADEQ'S DAY. THE FIRST PARLIAMENT AFTER THE CREATION OF A REPUBLIC IS LIKELY TO HAVE A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF MULLAHS ELECTED BUT OTHERWISE HE THOUGHT THE ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE SO DIFFERENT FROM THE PAST. SANJABI SAID

THAT IN HIS MEETING A FEW MONTHS AGO IN PARIS HE HAD REMINDED KHOMEINI THAT AS RECENTLY AS 1963 KHOMEINI HAD NOT BEEN CALLING FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH BUT SIMPLY ASKING THE SHAH TO ACT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCH. THIS WAS WHAT MOSSADEQ TOO WANTED. HE HAD ALSO REMINDED KHOMEINI THAT RELIGIOUS PEOPLE WERE VERY PROMINENT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1906-07 CONSTITUTION. THIS BUSINESS ABOUT CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION AND TERMING ALL THE REST ILLEGAL WAS FAIRLY NEW WITH KHOMEINI. (COMMENT: SANJABI WAS SILENT ON KHOMEINI'S REACTION.)

7. SANJABI REITERATED WHAT HE HAD TOLD US BEFORE THAT AS FAR AS THE NATIONAL FRONT AND HE HIMSELF ARE CONCERNED HE HAD ALWAYS FAVORED MOSSADEQ'S IDEA THAT A MONARCHY IS MORE SUITABLE FOR IRAN IN ITS GEOGRAPHIC AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT THAN A REPUBLIC. WHEN ASKED, HE SAID HE HAD NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO TALK WITH THE AYATOLLAH. (COMMENT: SEE BELOW.) IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION HE SAID THE AYATOLLAH SEEMED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, WELL PRESERVED FOR A MAN OF 78 YEARS OR SO. HE LAUGHED AT POL COUNSELOR'S COMMENT THAT HE TOO IS WELL PRESERVED AT 74.

8. SANJABI DWELT ON THE POPULARITY OF THE NATIONAL FRONT IDEA AMONG INTELLECTUALS, TEACHERS, ETC. WHO ARE NOT VERY TAKEN WITH THE IDEA OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN CARRIED ON THE SHOULDERS OF SOME DEMONSTRATORS ON THE DAY KHOMEINI ARRIVED. HE WAS VAGUE ABOUT CONTACTS WITH BAZARGAN AND THE LMI GROUP, BUT SAID THESE WERE CONTINUING.

9. COMMENT:· WE HAVE PRETTY GOOD INFORMATION FROM ANOTHER SOURCE THAT SANJABI HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN SECRET, VERY CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH KHOMEINI ALONG WITH BAZARGAN AND A FEW OTHER TOP KHOMEINI LEADERS. HE WAS NOT WILLING TO REVEAL THIS TO US. PERHAPS HE IS STILL FEELING HIS WAY CAUTIOUSLY NOW THAT HE APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTED ALBEIT AS A NEW MEMBER, IN KHOMEINI'S INNER GROUP. IF INDEED THIS IS THE REASON FOR HIS PLAYING IT SO CAGEY WITH US, IT BT
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FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3703
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01748

WOULD SUGGEST HIS OPINIONS ON THE SHAPE OF INSTITUTIONS UNDER THE NEW ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ARE REASONABLY AUTHORITATIVE. AT THE SAME TIME HE CLEARLY WANTS TO PLAY A SEPARATE GAME WITH THE EMBASSY, AS WITNESS HIS ASSERTING A PREFERENCE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY RATHER THAN A REPUBLIC.
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TEHRAN 1866/1

Ø61404Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3789
INFO

CHRGE: STATE 2-6-79
APPRV: DCM:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:JDSTEMPEL:LAN
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: [redacted] AMB DCM
ECON-2 PM USICA
OR SHIR TABR
ISF CHRON/14

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION Ø1 TEHRAN Ø1866

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2-6-99 (STEMPEL, J.D.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PORS, PGOV, IR, PINT
SUBJECT: WHERE ARE WE NOW? WHERE ARE WE GOING?

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: ESTABLISHMENT OF SO-CALLED "TEMPORARY" ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI EVENING FEB 5 IS LIKELY TO USHER IN PERIOD OF MORE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN RELIGIONISTS AND PRIME MINISTER. NEITHER GOI NOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SEEMS DISPOSED TO PUSH CONFRONTATION HASTILY. AS ACTIONS PROJECTED, NEXT MINI-CONFRONTATION COULD COME WHEN BAZARGAN NAMES MINISTERS, IF THEY TRY TO EXERCISE AUTHORITY. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HOPES IT CAN MOVE KHOMEINI TO QOM ONCE FULL CABINET IS SELECTED. CONTROL OF PROJECTED REFERENDUM IS CRITICAL POLITICAL ISSUE. EVENTS MAY BE COMPLICATED IF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TRIES TO GET PARLIAMENTARY VOTE OF NO-CONFIDENCE IN BAKHTIAR. MILITARY WILL PROBABLY GO ALONG AS LONG AS CONSTITUTIONAL LEGALITIES ARE FOLLOWED, UNLESS OVERT CONFRONTATION OCCURS, OR IS FORCED, BY NON-ISLAMIC RADICALS. END SUMMARY.

3. FOLLOWING ARE SOME OBSERVATIONS ON EVENTS OF PAST TWELVE HOURS IN TERMS OF WHERE THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO LEAD. ANALYSIS OFFERED--WHICH CANNOT BE DEFINITIVE--TAKES INTO ACCOUNT INTENTIONS OF KEY PLAYERS AS FAR AS WE KNOW THEM TODAY, AS WELL AS SOME PROJECTED EVENTS.

4. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF "TEMPORARY" ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IS BEING BILLED AS A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT AND GOI. SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING CONTEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT, SUGGEST THAT THIS IS MERELY NEXT STEP IN CAUTIOUS APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY LIBERATION MOVEMENT (LMI) CONTINGENT AND RELIGIOUS MODERATES. KHOMEINI DID NOT REPEAT NOT NAME FULL CABINET, OR ANY OTHER MINISTERS EXCEPT BAZARGAN AS PRIME MINISTER. SOURCES WITHIN MOVEMENT TELL US BAZARGAN WILL GO FAIRLY SLOWLY IN NAMING HIS OTHER MINISTERS PRECISELY TO AVOID CONFRONTATION WITH MILITARY WHO, WHILE THEY HAVE AGREED TO FOLLOW BAKHTIAR LEAD AND IGNORE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SHADOW CABINET, ARE PREPARED TO DEFEND KEY INSTALLATIONS IF BAZARGAN'S MINISTERS TRY TO ASSERT AUTHORITY. TIME FRAME FOR BAZARGAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF AT LEAST SOME MINISTERS IS NOW CONSIDERED TO BE ANYWHERE FROM TWO DAYS TO A WEEK, WITH MORE SLIPPAGE POSSIBLE.

5. SEVERAL SOURCES WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SUGGEST THAT ALL, INCLUDING KHOMEINI, MIGHT BE CONTENT TO WAIT FOR EVENTS TO ERODE PRIME MINISTER'S SUPPORT. IF THIS IS TRUE, NEXT MINI-CONFRONTATION WOULD COME WHEN NEW "MINISTERS" ATTEMPTED TO RUN THEIR MINISTRIES. BAKHTIAR INDICATES HE WOULD ORDER ARMY TO ARREST MOST OF THEM IF THEY TRIED TO

ENTER THEIR MINISTRIES. ONE LMI SOURCE HAS INDICATED THAT NEW MINISTERS ARE PREPARED TO "RUN THEIR MINISTRIES FROM A TELEPHONE BOOTH" IF NEED BE AND LET MASSIVE SUPPORT FOR KHOMEINI MOVEMENT WITHIN MOST MINISTRIES PERFORM ACTUAL TAKEOVER FROM THE INSIDE. IF MILITARY ARRESTS PUTATIVE MINISTERS, KHOMEINI IS PREPARED TO APPOINT MORE, UNTIL WEIGHT OF BAKHTIAR "ILLEGITIMACY" BRINGS DOWN PRESENT GOVERNMENT.

6. ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IS NOT COUNTING SOLELY ON THAT, HOWEVER. WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS THAT LMI SUPPORTERS IN PARLIAMENT MAY ATTEMPT TO CALL FOR A NON-CONFIDENCE DEBATE AND VOTE, PERHAPS BEGINNING WITH SESSION TODAY, FEB 6, AFTER SAVAK DISSOLUTION BILL AND CORRUPTION COURTS ACT HAVE BEEN PASSED. SUCH DEBATE AND VOTE WOULD TAKE AT LEAST A WEEK BY BEST ESTIMATES. LMI FEELS IT HAS INDICATIONS (FROM MAJLIS SPEAKER) THAT BAKHTIAR WOULD LOSE VOTE. (COMMENT: WE ARE NOT SO SURE, BUT THIS STEP, IF TAKEN, PRESSURES BAKHTAIR AT A VERY VULNERABLE POINT: IF MAJLIS DID VOTE HIM OUT, AS AN AVOWED CONSTITUTIONALIST, HE WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN.) WITH BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT CUT OF THE WAY, PATH WOULD BE CLEAR FOR ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO MAKE A DEAL WITH REGENCY COUNCIL TO NAME BAZARGAN PRIME MINISTER AND FULFILL CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS BY HAVING MAJLIS APPROVE GOVERNMENT, BRINGING ISLAMIC MOVEMENT TO POWER BY CONSTITUTIONAL MEANS. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, MEAN DROPPING (OR AT LEAST SHELVING) OPPOSITION'S CHARGE THAT CURRENT PARLIAMENT AND REGENCY COUNCIL ARE "ILLEGAL."

7. ABOVE IS LMI PROJECTION FOR DEALING WITH BAKHTIAR REFUSAL TO COMPROMISE. SEVERAL RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT SOURCES BELIEVE COMPROMISE WILL BE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE OF CONCLUSION OF ABOVE SCENARIO, OR INSTEAD OF IT. KEY FACTOR ACCORDING TO DR. MINATCHI (PROTECT) OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, IS TO GET FULL CABINET NAMED SO THAT AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI CAN "RETURN TO QOM AND LEAVE POLITICAL MATTERS IN ENG BAZARGAN'S HANDS." IT IS CLEAR FROM DISCUSSIONS THAT LOCAL LMI MEN AND OTHERS ARE TIRED OF RECALCITRANT KHOMEINI
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 TEHRAN 01866

ATTITUDE AND HOPE TO PUT HIM TO ONE SIDE. THEY WILL PROBABLY NOT SUCCEED FULLY, BUT THERE ARE PRESSURES AROUND KHOMEINI FROM RELIGIOUS MODERATES WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY LEAD HIM TO RETURN TO QOM AS PART OF OVERALL DEAL.

8. LMI SOURCES SEEM TO FEEL THE MILITARY WILL GO ALONG WITH SCENARIO THAT BRINGS MOVEMENT TO POWER CONSTITUTIONALLY, AND THEY ARE PROBABLY RIGHT, IF CONFRONTATION CAN BE AVOIDED ENROUTE. ONE BIG DANGER AT THE MOMENT (RECOGNIZED AS SUCH BY GOI AND ISLAMIC MOVEMENT) IS THAT RADICAL LEFTISTS OR HOODLUMS WILL TOUCH OFF VIOLENCE WHICH WILL DRAW IN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT. MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN COMPROMISE IS QUESTION OF WHO ANNOUNCES AND CONTROLS ELECTIONS. IF KHOMEINI CAMP (ESPECIALLY THE AYATOLLAH HIMSELF) CAN BE SATISFIED THAT ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WILL HAVE MAJOR SHARE IN CONTROL OF REFERENDUM ON MONARCHY VS ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, THEN THEY MAY BE MORE READY TO COMPROMISE THAN THEY NOW SEEM. BAKHTIAR HAS ALREADY INDICATED TO THEM PRIVATELY THAT THEY WILL HAVE A PREDOMINANT ROLE IN REFERENDUM AND ANY SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS. KHOMEINI CAMP REMAINS SUSPICIOUS OF BAKHTIAR, ARMY AND OTHER PRO-SHAH FORCES SUCH AS GENDARMERIE, HOWEVER, AND EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH THIS, AS WELL AS REMAINING SUSPICIONS OF U.S. ROLE WITH THE MILITARY. SULLIVAN
BT
#1866

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 1928

Q 071439Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3843
bT
S E C R E T TEHRAN 01928

CHRGE: STATE 2/7/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:DRPATTERSON
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRAKIS
DISTR: ~~POL~~ 3 AMB MIN
ECON-2 PM ICA
CR ADM SY DAO
AFOSI CHRON/15

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 2/7/99 (PATTERSON, D.R.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, IR
SUBJECT: ALI-ASGHAR HAJ-SEYYED-JAVADI SOUGHT FOR ARREST

1. (S) WE HAVE REPORTED IN SITREP ALLEGED ARREST OF HAJ-SEYYED-JAVADI (HSJ). CONTACT OF POLOFF STEMPEL INDICATED THAT HSJ APPARENTLY NOT ARRESTED BUT IN HIDING. ENG. SALEH BANAFTI TOLD POL OFF PATTERSON THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO HSJ NIGHT AFTER SUPPOSED ARREST AND KNOWS THAT HE IS IN HIDING. HSJ IS PROMINENT WRITER, MUCH ADMIRED IN OPPOSITION CIRCLES. WE HAVE REPORTED LAST YEAR ON CONTACT WITH HIM IN CDHRF MEETING AND SEND PACKAGE OF HIS WRITINGS TO DEPT WITH RECOMMENDATION THAT THEY BE TRANSLATED. HSJ HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH UNION OF NATIONAL FRONT FORCES (SEE TEHRAN A-19 OF FEB 1, 1978 RPT 1978) AND WRITER'S MOVEMENT, IN ADDITION TO CDHRF. HE IS AN EXTREMELY SKILLED POLITICAL PAMPHLETEER. HE IS DEFINITELY LEFTIST, ANTI-ZIONIST, AND APPARENTLY ANTI-AMERICAN; HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD ISLAM APPEARS TO BE ONE OF POLITICAL ACCEPTANCE RATHER THANOF RELIGIOUS ZEAL. THE ARTICLE FOR WHICH HE WAS "ARRESTED" DOES NOT ONCE USE THE WORD ISLAM IN ANY OF ITS FORMS, BUT REFERS ALWAYS TO THE "MOVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF IRAN" AND THE "GREAT NATIONAL REVOLUTION."

2. (C) THE ARTICLE IN QUESTION WAS PUBLISHED IN ETTELA'AT ON SUNDAY, FEB 4, AND IS TITLED "ANSWER TO MACHINEGUNS!" IT BEARS A SUPRA-HEAD "JUST WHAT IS THE ARMY DEPENDING?" AND A SUB-HEAD "THEY HAVE SENT ME A MESSAGE THAT THEY WILL MACHINEGUN ME FULL OF HOLES, THIS IS MY ANSWER TO THEIR MACHINEGUNS." TONE OF THE ARTICLE IN PERSIAN CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS VIRULENT. ITS CLEAR PURPOSE IS TO DIVIDE "THE GENERALS" FROM THE REST OF THE ARMED FORCES. THEME IS THAT GENERALS HAVE BEEN BLINDLY LOYAL SERVANTS OF THE SHAH AND AS SUCH HAVE MURDERED THE PEOPLE OF IRAN TO TRY TO STOP THE GREAT NATIONAL REVOLUTION. THEY HAVE DONE ALL THIS TO PRESERVE THE PRIVILEGES OF THE DICTATORIAL REGIME AND TO PROTECT THE THE INTERESTS OF INTERNATIONAL ZIONISM, AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS SO THAT THEY, SHAH AND THEIR FRIENDS CAN CONTINUE USING IRAN AND STEALING ITS WEALTH. THOSE CRIMINAL GENERALS ARE DOING ALL THEY CAN TO KEEP THE "HONORED AND PATRIOTIC" OFFICERS, NONCOMS AND MEN OF IRAN FROM REALIZING THAT THEY ARE BEING USED TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGES OF CRIMINALS AND THE INTERESTS OF FOREIGNERS RATHER THAN TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF IRAN AND ITS PEOPLE. THE LANGUAGE OF THE ORIGINAL IS EVEN HARSHER THAT THE ABOVE SUMMARY SUGGESTS. IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT "THE GENERALS" WERE ANGERED.

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3. (C) SOME REPORTS HAVE IT THAT JAVADI MIGHT BE

NAMED AS MEMBER OF BAZARGAN'S "PROVISIONAL GOVT," PERHAPS MINISTER OF INFORMATION. FACT HE IS BEING SOUGHT FOR ARREST ON BASIS OF THIS ARTICLE DOES NOT BODE WELL FOR ARMY - BAZARGAN RELATIONS IF HE IS NAMED MINISTER.
SULLIVAN
BT
#1928

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S E C R E T TEHRAN 1928

P 071346Z FEB 79
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3841
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 01922

CHRGE: STATE 2/7/79
APPRV: MIN:CWNAAS
DRFTD: POL:WGPERETT
CLEAR: POL:GBLAMBRA
DISTR: POL 3 AMB MI
ECON-2 PM IC
OR ADM SY DA
AFOSI CHRON/

File Pol 12
Rush, for Cy

E.O. 12065: GDS 2/7/85 (PERETT, WILLIAM G.) OR-P
TAGS: PINS, PINT, IR
SUBJECT: FARDUST REPORTEDLY SWIMMING WITH THE TIDE

REF: TEHRAN 397

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. GEORGE NATHANSON, AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN AND SELF-STYLED INTERNATIONAL INTRIGUER, CAME WITH FRANK BURROUGHS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF IRAN-AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TO SEE EMBOFF PERETT FEB 5. EMBASSY HAS FOR SOME TIME PARRIED NATHANSON'S ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH "ACTION PROGRAMS" WITH SOME USG INVOLVEMENT (REFTEL). EMBOFF HAD TO EXPLAIN AGAIN THAT USG WILL NOT INTERVENE TO SAVE THE REGIME, BUT THIS TIME NATHANSON SAID HE HAD A MESSAGE FROM GENERAL HOSSEIN FARDUST. THE TWO HAD MET THE PREVIOUS EVENING.

3. ACCORDING TO NATHANSON, FARDUST SEEKS AN ACCOMMODATION AMONG KHOMEINI, USG, AND PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS SUCH AS HIMSELF. BAKHTIAR HAS LITTLE FOLLOWING OUTSIDE THE ARMY, AND IT IS TIME TO CONCENTRATE UPON MODERATING KHOMEINI. IT IS IN FACT ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT KHOMEINI'S NEW GOVT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE IF HE FAILS, THE COMMUNISTS ARE SURE TO SEIZE POWER. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, USG APPROACHESTHE KHOMEINI FORCES AND DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF A PRO-WESTERN STANCE, THE ISLAMIC PARTY WILL WITHER AWAY. IF WE ESTABLISH CLOSE TIES WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE NEW GOVT, AND KHOMEINI ACCEPTS THE CONSTITUTION, PERHAPS ONE DAY THE SHAH WILL EVEN BE ABLE TO RETURN, PROVIDED HE AGREES TO REIGN, NOT RULE. FARDUST BELIEVES BRITISH AND RUSSIANS ARE COOPERATING IN FOMENTING THIS CRISIS (COMMENT: WE OFTEN HEAR THIS FANTASTIC CHARGE), AND USG MUST TAKE ACTION TO SAVE THE SITUATION. IN PARTICULAR, WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE ARMY STAYS OUT OF THE POLITICAL ARENA. ARMY SHOULD SUPPORT NEITHER BAKHTIAR NOR KHOMEINI. FARDUST EXPECTS EMBASSY REPLY REGARDING USG POSITION.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH NATHANSON IS NOT A WHOLLY RELIABLE CONTACT, WE HAVE NO REASON TO DOUBT THE MEETING WITH FARDUST OR THE THRUST OF FARDUST'S MESSAGE. THIS APPEARS TO BE A STRIKING DEMARCHE FROM ONE OF SHAH'S CLOSEST COLLEAGUES (WITH WHOM THE EMBASSY HAS HAD PRACTICALLY NO CONTACT IN RECENT YEARS) -- FLATLY OPPOSING A COUP, AND PLACING HIS HOPES FOR PRO-WESTERN GOVT AND EVEN FOR THE SHAH'S RETURN UPON KHOMEINI'S SUCCESS. WE CANNOT OVERLOOK THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THIS IS A PROVOCATION.
SULLIVAN
BT
1922

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شود. در حقیقت مطمئن شدن از اینکه دولت جدید خمینی موفق میشود اهمیت دارد، چرا که اگر او شکست بخورد قدرت مطمئنا" بدست کمونیستها می‌افتد. از طرفی اگر دولت ایالات متحده به نیروهای خمینی نزدیک شود و ارزش و اهمیت یک وضعیت طرفدار غرب را نشان دهد، حزب اسلامی پژمرده خواهد شد. اگر ما روابط نزدیک با اعضای دولت جدید برقرارکنیم و خمینی هم قانون اساسی را قبول کند، شاید روزی حتی شاه هم قادر باشد برگردد، مشروط بر اینکه سلطنت کند نه حکومت. فردوست اعتقاد دارد که انگلیس و روسیه در تحریک کردن این بحران باهم همکاری میکنند (نظریه: ما اغلب این اتهام خیالی و خارق‌العاده را میشنویم.)، و دولت ایالات متحده باید برای نجات اوضاع اقدامی نماید. مخصوصا" مابایستی مطمئن شویم که ارتش خارج از صحنهٔ سیاسی خواهد ماند. ارتش میبایست نه بختیار را حمایت کند نه خمینی را. فردوست از سفارت انتظار پاسخ در رابطه با موضع ایالات متحده را دارد.

۴ ــ نظریه: اگر چه ناتانسون یک رابط کاملا" قابل اعتماد نیست، ما هیچ دلیلی نداریم که در ملاقاتش با فردوست و یا درستی پیغامش شک روا داریم. بنظر میرسد که این یک مانور زننده از جانب یکی از نزدیکترین دوستان شاه باشد (فردی که سفارت با وی در سالهای اخیر عملا" هیچگونه تماسی نداشته است)ــــ صریحا" با کودتا مخالفت کردن و امیدواریش در مورد سرکار آمدن دولتی طرفدار غرب و یا حتی بازگشت شاه پس از پیروزی خمینی. ما نمیتوانیم از این امکان قوی چشم‌پوشی کنیم، این یک تحریک است.

سولیوان